ATTACHMENT

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60CV-14-1722
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, ARKANSAS
TWELFTH DIVISION

NEW CINGULAR WIRELESS PCS LLC AND AT&T MOBILITY WIRELESS OPERATIONS HOLDINGS INC. SUCCESSOR TO PINE BLUFF CELLULAR, INC. **PLAINTIFFS**

V. **CASE NO. 60CV-14-1722**

RICHARD A. WEISS, in his Official Capacity as DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION **DEFENDANT**

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT TO RECOVER OVERPAYMENT OF ARKANSAS GROSS RECEIPTS TAXES

Come now New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC and AT&T Wireless Operations Holdings, Inc. successor to Pine Bluff Cellular, LLC (collectively, "Plaintiffs") and for their First Amended Complaint to Recover Overpayment of Arkansas Gross Receipts Taxes erroneously paid to the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (the "Department"), respectfully state:

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1. This action is for judicial relief pursuant to Arkansas Code §26-18-507(e)(3) and §26-18-406 of the Arkansas Tax Procedure Act from the failure of Richard A. Weiss, Director ("Director") of the Department, to issue written decisions on the Plaintiffs' claims for refund of state and local gross receipts taxes ("sales taxes"), after the claims for refund have been filed for more than six (6) months, and for recovery of the taxes erroneously paid, with interest as otherwise provided by law.

PARTIES

2. Plaintiff New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, ("New Cingular") is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware. New Cingular was admitted to do business in Arkansas on October 26, 1999 and is registered and in good standing with the Secretary of State of Arkansas.

3. Plaintiff AT&T Mobility Wireless Operations Holdings, Inc. ("AT&T Mobility Wireless") is a business corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware. AT&T Mobility Wireless is successor by merger of Pine Bluff Cellular, Inc. ("Pine Bluff Cellular"), was admitted to do business in Arkansas on July 20, 2010 and is registered and in good standing with the Secretary of State of Arkansas.

4. Plaintiffs are subsidiaries of AT&T Mobility LLC ("AT&T Mobility"). Plaintiffs' principal place of business is 1025 Lenox Park Blvd NE, Atlanta, GA 30319.

5. Defendant Richard A. Weiss is the Director of the Department and is named as Defendant in his representative capacity in accordance with his general plenary authority as executive head of the Department under Arkansas Code §25-8-101, his specific duties with respect to suits and other proceedings that concern taxes administered by the Department under Arkansas Code §26-17-304, and his specific responsibilities for refunding overpayments of taxes set out in Arkansas Code §26-18-507.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. This Circuit Court's subject matter jurisdiction over this action is founded upon Ark. Code §26-18-507(e) and § 26-18-406(c). Ark. Code §26-18-507(e) provides in part as follows:

> (a)(1) Any taxpayer who has paid any state tax to the State of Arkansas in excess of the state taxes lawfully due, subject to the requirements of this chapter, shall be refunded the overpayment of the state tax determined by the director to be erroneously paid upon the filing of an amended return or a verified claim for refund, subject to subsection (e) of this section.
> ...
>
> (e)(1)(A) The director shall make a written determination and give notice to the taxpayer concerning whether or not a refund is due.
> ...
> (3) The taxpayer may seek judicial relief under the provisions of § 26-18-406 from:
> (A) A notice of a denial of a claim for refund issued by the director; or
> (B) The director's failure to issue a written decision after the claim for refund has been filed for six (6) months.

Ark. Code § 26-18-406 further provides in part as follows:

> (c)(1) Jurisdiction for a suit to contest a determination of the director under this section shall be in Pulaski County Circuit Court or the circuit court of the county in which the taxpayer resides or has his or her principal place of business, where the matter shall be tried de novo.

Accordingly, the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas is a proper venue for this action.

7. This Complaint is timely filed in accordance with Ark. Code § 26-18-507(e)(3)(B).

SUMMARY OF THE CASE

8. Between November 1, 2005 and September 31, 2010 (the "Period at Issue") the Plaintiffs mistakenly collected Arkansas state and local sales taxes from customers on internet access charges included on their customers' statements, and remitted these taxes to the Department. Following class action litigation and a settlement requiring Plaintiffs to file refund claims nationwide to recover the taxes paid on their customers' behalf, Plaintiffs

subsequently filed claims for refund of the taxes with the Department on or about November 9, 2010. The Department has not acted on the claims for refund in the three plus years since the claims were filed. This action seeks judicial relief including a judgment for the amount of the refund claims and interest, in accordance with statutory remedies in the Arkansas Tax Procedure Act.

9. Arkansas law as in effect during the Period at Issue, did not impose sales tax on Internet access charges.

10. Additionally, even if Arkansas law were construed to impose sales tax on Internet access charges during the Period at Issue, such tax would be barred by the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act ("ITFA"). The ITFA, enacted by Congress in October 1998 and extended multiple times thereafter, imposes a presumptive moratorium on any state or local government's taxation of Internet access charges.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

Background Facts.

11. During the Period at Issue in the Plaintiffs' claims for refund, Plaintiffs sold wireless data services providing Internet access to customers, which services enable customers using various wireless devices (including "smart phones" such as an iPhone or Blackberry, laptops, and other devices capable of housing a SIM card (subscriber identity module, or smart card)) to access to the Internet using the device (the "Internet Access Services").

12. Specifically, the Internet Access Services enabled a customer to access a particular access point name ("APN") on the Internet and to identify and connect to a

wireless application protocol ("WAP") server. From that point, Plaintiffs' customer could browse the Internet or access the appropriate server to enable the customer, among many other things, to send or receive electronic mail.

13. Plaintiffs' Internet Access Services are separate and distinct from the wireless voice telecommunications services that they sell. Many of Plaintiffs' customers purchase both voice services and Internet Access Services for use on the same mobile device, with separately stated charges for each service.

New Cingular Refund Claim.

14. New Cingular billed and remitted $18,215,729.01 in state and local sales tax to the Department on charges for Internet Access Services on invoices issued for the Period at Issue to customers who had reported a location in Arkansas as the place of primary use for the device in question.

15. On or about November 9, 2010, New Cingular filed a claim for refund for the $18,215,729.01 in sales tax paid on charges for Internet Access Services during the Period at Issue (the "New Cingular Refund Claim"). The New Cingular Refund Claim included a cover letter, a duly executed refund claim form identifying the amount claimed, tax period and tax type, a detailed statement in support of the claim and a DVD containing: (i) a listing of the customers to whom the sales tax sought in the New Cingular Refund Claim had been billed (with the total sales tax for each customer), and (ii) a listing of the total monthly amounts of sales tax billed on Internet Access Services for each month during the Refund Period, which amounts had been remitted to the State. A copy of the New Cingular Refund Claim omitting the DVD and contents is attached as Exhibit A.

16. The Department acknowledged receipt of the New Cingular Refund Claim by letter to New Cingular dated November 19, 2010, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B. The Director's representatives subsequently assured New Cingular by email dated November 9, 2012 that "on the initial receipt of those requests, the Department [d]id formally acknowledge them and locked the periods in place so that additional time in processing this complex issue has not resulted in any of those time periods phasing out due to statute of limitations under Arkansas law."

17. On or about March 28, 2011, New Cingular filed a supplement to the New Cingular Refund Claim to remove certain customers opting out of the class action settlement, reducing the amount of the refund claim by $148.96. A copy of New Cingular's March 28, 2011 supplemental filing is attached as Exhibit C. On or about June 15, 2012, New Cingular filed an additional supplement to the New Cingular Refund Claim, reducing the amount of the refund claim by an additional $1,704,344.65 and proposed a further reduction of 1.5% to offset credits for bad debt amounts included in the claim. A copy of New Cingular's June 15, 2012 supplemental filing is attached as Exhibit D.

Pine Bluff Cellular Refund Claim.

18. Pine Bluff Cellular billed and remitted $539,983.33 in state and local sales tax to the Department on charges for Internet Access Services on invoices issued for the Period at Issue to customers who had reported a location in Arkansas as the place of primary use for the device in question.

19. On or about November 9, 2010, Pine Bluff Cellular filed a claim for refund for the $539,983.33 in sales tax paid on charges for Internet Access Services during the Period

at Issue (the "Pine Bluff Cellular Refund Claim"). The Pine Bluff Cellular Refund Claim included a cover letter, a duly executed refund claim form identifying the amount claimed, tax period and tax type, a detailed statement in support of the claim and a DVD containing: (i) a listing of the customers to whom the sales tax sought in the Pine Bluff Cellular Refund Claim had been billed (with the total sales tax for each customer), and (ii) a listing of the total monthly amounts of sales tax billed on Internet Access Services for each month during the Refund Period, which amounts had been remitted to the State. A copy of the Pine Bluff Cellular Refund Claim omitting the DVD and contents is attached as Exhibit E.

20. The Department acknowledged receipt of the Pine Bluff Cellular Refund Claim by letter to Pine Bluff Cellular dated November 19, 2010, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit F. The Director's representatives subsequently assured Pine Bluff Cellular by email dated November 9, 2012 that "on the initial receipt of those requests [for refund], the Department [d]id formally acknowledge them and locked the periods in place so that additional time in processing this complex issue has not resulted in any of those time periods phasing out due to statute of limitations under Arkansas law." The New Cingular Refund Claim and Pine Bluff Cellular Refund Claim are collectively referred to in this Complaint as the "Refund Claims."

21. On or about June 15, 2012, Pine Bluff Cellular filed a supplement to the Pine Bluff Cellular Refund Claim, reducing the amount of the refund claim by $98,304.85 and proposed a further reduction of 1.5% to offset credits for bad debt amounts included in the claim. A copy of Pine Bluff Cellular's June 15, 2012 supplemental filing is attached as Exhibit G.

Scope of Refund Claims.

22. The sales taxes sought to be recovered in the Refund Claims relate solely to charges for Internet Access Services, and do not include sales taxes collected and remitted with respect to charges for voice, text messaging or other services or equipment sold by Plaintiffs.

23. The sales taxes sought in the Refund Claims do not include sales tax collected and remitted on any charges for Internet Access Services that were bundled with charges for other services or equipment that are otherwise sold separately by Plaintiffs.

24. The sales taxes sought in the Refund Claims do not relate to telecommunications services sold to an Internet service provider in order to facilitate the provision of Internet access services to its customers. Instead, the Refund Claims relate solely to the Internet Access Services sold by Plaintiffs directly to residential or business consumers.

The Global Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs and Their Customers.

25. Plaintiffs and several other subsidiaries and affiliates of AT&T Mobility were sued by customers who had purchased Internet Access Services in various jurisdictions across the country, including Arkansas, asserting that Plaintiffs had erroneously collected taxes on Internet Access Services. Those actions were transferred for Multidistrict Litigation treatment to the Northern District of Illinois. *In re: AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Services Tax Litigation*, MDL No. 2147 (N.D. Ill) (the "MDL").

26. The cases in the MDL were settled as part of a Global Class Action Settlement Agreement ("Settlement Agreement"), to which the Plaintiffs are parties. A copy of the

Settlement Agreement, with class representative signature pages and exhibits omitted, is attached as Exhibit H. A complete copy of the Settlement Agreement can be downloaded at www.attmsettlement.com. The Order granting final approval of the Settlement Agreement is found at *In re AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Services Sales Tax Litigation*, 789 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. Ill. 2011) and is attached as Exhibit I.

27. The Settlement Agreement provides that Plaintiffs' customers included in the settlement class consented to Plaintiffs' filing of the Refund Claims and payment of the refunds to the Plaintiffs, as follows:

> The Settlement Class hereby consents to: AT&T Mobility's [defined to include Plaintiffs] filing of the claims for refund of Internet Taxes contemplated by this Settlement Agreement; (b) the payment of refunds or issuance of tax credits to [Plaintiffs] in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement; and (c) the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund in accordance with paragraph 8.19. ... To the extent required by the law of any state or local jurisdiction at issue, the Settlement Class assigns [Plaintiffs] all rights of the Settlement Class members to file the refund claims for Internet Taxes contemplated by this Settlement Agreement.
>
> Settlement Agreement ¶8.8.

28. Under the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs assigned all their rights, title and interest in all amounts refunded or credited in response to the Refund Claims to Plaintiffs' customers that are members of the settlement class. Settlement Agreement ¶ 8.10.

29. The Settlement Agreement establishes an escrow account to which any refunded sales tax and interest must be paid, for the benefit of the Arkansas customers who paid the tax (the "Escrow Account"). *Id.* The Settlement Agreement provides that refunds (or credits) of tax issued to Plaintiffs shall either be paid directly to the Escrow Account by

the taxing authority or, if issued to Plaintiffs, shall be paid by Plaintiffs to the Escrow Account. *Id.*

30. The "Plan of Distribution", which is Exhibit O to the Settlement Agreement, provides for the distribution of refunded amounts to the customers in the settlement class.

31. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, settlement class members were given notice of the settlement and advised that they could opt out of the settlement by sending written notice to the prescribed class administrator on or before February 2, 2011. Five Arkansas customers opted out of the Settlement. All of those customers were customers of Plaintiff New Cingular and were excluded from the claim by virtue of Exhibit C, referenced in paragraph 17, above.

PRINCIPAL LEGAL PROVISIONS

State Taxation of Telecommunications and Related Services.

32. From January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2007, the sales tax on telecommunications services was codified in Ark. Code as Ark. Code §26-52-301(3)(A). Under this section, sales tax applied to: "Service by telephone, telecommunications and telegraph companies to subscribers or users, including transmission of messages or images, whether local or long distance." Ark. Code § 26-52-301(3)(A)(i) (2005). The section specified that tax would apply: "to all customer access line charges billed to an Arkansas telephone number." Ark Code § 26-52-301(3)(A)(v)(*a*) (2005). However, "access line charges" subject to tax were defined narrowly as: "those charges associated with or for access to a long distance network." *Id.* Internet access is not access to a long distance network.

The same Code section went on to provide that charges for non-taxable services that were aggregated with other charges in billings would remain non-taxable: "if the seller can reasonably identify the nontaxable charges on the seller's books and records kept in the regular course of business." Ark. Code § 26-52-301((3)(A)(vi)(*a*) (2005). The Plaintiffs' recordkeeping for the Internet Access Services at issue fully complies with this requirement.

33. Prior to the start of the Period at Issue in 2005, Arkansas had already adopted an alternative Code section for taxation of telecommunications services as part of its obligations under the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement ("SSUTA"), adopted November 12, 2002. The alternative Code section was adopted in 2003 and was to go into effect when certain contingencies were met. The contingencies were met in 2007 and the alternative section finally went into effect January 1, 2008. *See*, 2003 Ark. Acts 1273, Ark. Code § 26-52-315. Ark. Code § 26-52-315 continues to impose Arkansas gross receipts tax (sales tax) on telecommunications and related services, as follows:

> (a) The gross receipts or gross proceeds derived from the sale of the following are subject to the gross receipts tax levied by this chapter:
> (1) Any intrastate, interstate, and international telecommunications service that is sourced to this state in accordance with subsection (d) of this section;
> (2) Any ancillary service; and
> (3) Any installation, maintenance, or repair service of telecommunications equipment.

The term "telecommunications service" is defined in this section, but the definition specifically provides: "'Telecommunications service' does not include: ... (vi) Internet access service; ..." Ark. Code §26-51-315(e)(19)(C)(vi). Accordingly, Internet access service

continued to be excluded from the scope of sales taxes on telecommunications and related services throughout the Period at Issue.

Department Authority to Administer Local Sales Tax.

34. County and municipal sales taxes apply to the same items and services as state sales taxes, and are collected and administered by the Director at the same time and in the same manner as state sales taxes. *See, e.g.,* Ark. Code §26-74-312(a) that provides the following concerning county sales taxes for capital improvements:

> (b) In addition to the state gross receipts tax, the director shall collect an additional tax under the authority of this subchapter on the gross receipts from the sale of all items and services that are subject to the Arkansas Gross Receipts Act of 1941, §26-52-101 et seq., and the Arkansas Compensating Tax Act of 1949, § 26-53-101 et seq.
>
> (c)(1) The tax imposed under this subchapter and the tax imposed under the Arkansas Gross Receipts Act of 1941, § 26-52-101 et. seq. shall be collected together and reported upon such forms and under such administrative rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the director not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter. ...

Similarly, the refund procedures prescribed for state sales taxes in the Arkansas Tax Procedure Act apply to county and municipal sales taxes as well:

> 26-18-104. Definitions.
> As used in this chapter:
> ...
> (13) "State tax" means any tax, or any fee for a license, permit or registration which is payable to, collected by, or administered by the Revenue Division of the Department of Finance and Administration, State of Arkansas.

The Internet Tax Freedom Act.

35. As access to the Internet began to grow dramatically in the mid- to late 1990s, members of the public and the Internet industry expressed concern that state and

local governments might impose new tax burdens that could inhibit the industry's future growth.

36. Congress responded in October 1998 by enacting Public Law 105-277, commonly known as the "Internet Tax Freedom Act" or "ITFA." The ITFA and its subsequent amendments and extensions may now be found as a note to 47 U.S.C. § 151.

37. The centerpiece of the ITFA is a moratorium on taxes on Internet access charges. Section 1101(a) of the original ITFA states, in most relevant part:

> (a) MORATORIUM. No State or political subdivision thereof shall impose any of the following taxes during the period beginning on October 1, 1998, and ending 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act –
> (1) taxes on Internet access, unless such tax was generally imposed and actually enforced prior to October 1, 1998...

38. The original ITFA's moratorium on taxes on Internet access charges has been extended multiple times, by Public Law 107-75 in 2001 (extending the moratorium until November 1, 2003), by Public Law 108-435 in 2004 (extending the moratorium until November 1, 2007), and by Public Law 110-108 in 2007 (extending the moratorium until November 1, 2014). The ITFA also defined the term "Internet access service." Section 1101(e)(3)(D) of the original ITFA states:

> INTERNET ACCESS SERVICE. The term "Internet access service" means a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered over the Internet and may also include access to proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package of services offered to consumers. Such term does not include telecommunications services.

47 U.S.C. § 151, note (§ 1101(e)(3)(D)) (1998) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the ITFA specifically prohibits Arkansas from imposing sales tax on the Plaintiffs' Internet Access Services provided to their customers during the Period at Issue.

Refund Claims Under Arkansas Tax Procedure Act.

39. Arkansas law grants taxpayers the right to claim and receive refunds in accordance with Ark. Code § 26-18-507, which provides as follows:

> § 26-18-507. Claims for refunds of overpayments
>
> (a)(1) Any taxpayer who has paid any state tax to the State of Arkansas in excess of the state taxes lawfully due, subject to the requirements of this chapter, shall be refunded the overpayment of the state tax determined by the director to be erroneously paid upon the filing of an amended return or a verified claim for refund, subject to subsection (e) of this section.
> ...
>
> (b) The claim shall specify:
> (1) The name of the taxpayer;
> (2) The time when and the period for which the state tax was paid;
> (3) The nature and kind of state tax paid;
> (4) The amount of the state tax that the taxpayer claimed was erroneously paid;
> (5) The grounds upon which a refund is claimed; and
> (6) Any other information relative to the payment as may be prescribed by the director.
>
> (c) The director shall determine what amount of refund, if any, is due as soon as practicable after a claim has been filed, but in no event shall the taxpayer be entitled to file a suit for refund under § 26-18-406 until at least six (6) months have elapsed from the date of the filing of the claim for refund or the director has issued a notice of denial of a claim for refund.
>
> (d) Notwithstanding any provisions of the law to the contrary, a taxpayer who acts only as an agent of the state in the collection of any state tax shall be entitled to claim a credit or refund of the state tax only if the taxpayer establishes that he or she has:
> (1) Borne the state tax in question;
> (2) Repaid the amount of the state tax to the person from whom he or she collected it; or

(3) Obtained the consent of the person to the allowance of the credit or refund.

(e)(1)(A) The director shall make a written determination and give notice to the taxpayer concerning whether or not a refund is due.

40. Department Rule GR-81.1 generally repeats the statutory requirements for filing claims for refund. A copy of Rule GR-81.1 is attached as Exhibit J. In particular, Rule 81.1 contains the following provisions concerning the Plaintiffs' rights to file the Refund Claims with their customers' consent:

C. CLAIMS FOR REFUND.
1.Who May File a Claim for Refund?
a. Sales or Use Tax.
(1) The taxpayer (vendor) who collected and remitted the tax may file a refund claim, if the vendor satisfies one of the following conditions:
(a) The vendor has borne the tax in question (i.e., the vendor did not collect the tax from the customer);
(b) The vendor repaid the tax to the customer from whom the vendor collected the tax; or
(c) The customer consents to refunding the tax to the vendor.

Rule GR-81.1.C.1.a.(1).

Because the Plaintiffs' customers have consented to the Plaintiffs filing the Refund Claims, and refund of tax to the Plaintiffs as set forth in paragraphs 27-31 above, Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action and recover the sales taxes erroneously collected and paid.

The Refund Claims.

41. On or about November 9, 2010 Plaintiffs filed the Refund Claims with the State. The Claims contained all the required information and detail to be valid under Ark. Code § 26-18-507.

42. To date, the State has failed to act to either grant or deny the claims. In accordance with Ark. Code §§ 26-18-507(e)(3)(B) and 28-18-406, Plaintiffs are entitled to bring this action to seek this Court's judgment granting the Refund Claims because more than six months have passed since the filing of the claims.

43. During the Period at Issue, no Arkansas statute authorized the imposition of tax on the charges for Internet Access Services billed to Plaintiffs' customers. Therefore, the amounts sought in the Refund Claim are due and owing.

44. The State's application of its sales tax to Plaintiffs' charges for Internet Access Services is further barred by the ITFA.

45. Therefore, the Plaintiffs are entitled to the refunds claimed.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court hold that the failure to grant the Refund Claims violates Arkansas and federal law, and issue judgment on behalf of Plaintiffs as follows:

1. For Plaintiff New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC, in the amount of $16,511,235.40 (or the amount proved at trial), together with statutory interest allowed;

2. For Plaintiff AT&T Mobility Wireless Operations Holdings, Inc., in the amount of $441,678.48 (or the amount proved at trial) together with statutory interest allowed; and,

3. For Plaintiffs' costs of suit and all other relief to which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted:

NEW CINGULAR WIRELESS PCS LLC, AND AT&T MOBILITY WIRELESS OPERATIONS HOLDINGS, INC.

Plaintiffs

By Their Attorneys

/s/ Michael G. Smith

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Michael G. Smith, hereby certify that on this 27th day of June, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, a true copy of which has been sent via regular mail and email to the following:

Joel DiPippa, Attorney Specialist
Revenue Legal Counsel
P. O. Box 1272, Room 2380
Little Rock, AR 72203
joel.dipipa@dfa.arkansas.gov

/s/ Michael G. Smith

McDermott
Will & Emery

Boston Brussels Chicago Düsseldorf Houston London Los Angeles Miami Milan
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November 3, 2010

To: REFUND CLAIM PROCESSING UNIT

Re: AT&T Mobility Claim for Refund of Tax Attributable to Internet Access Services

To Whom It May Concern:

The documentation included in this mailing constitutes a refund claim seeking a refund of tax that was previously remitted with respect to charges for various wireless services providing Internet access ("Data Services") to customers in your jurisdiction. The Data Services are described in detail in the enclosed statement in support of the refund claim.

This refund claim is filed by or on behalf of the specific AT&T Mobility affiliate that remitted the tax, as identified on the enclosed refund claim form, and is joined in by the customers from whom tax amounts were collected, to the extent and as explained in the enclosed statement in support.

Specifically, this refund claim package includes:

(1) A refund claim form identifying the particular AT&T Mobility affiliate that is filing the claim and the total amount of tax on Data Services for which a refund is being claimed (that amount includes only taxes on relevant Data Services; previously remitted taxes related to charges for other goods or services are not included in the refund claim amount);

(2) A statement in support of the refund claim, which provides background regarding both the Data Services and the basis for claiming a refund of previously remitted taxes on Data Services;

(3) If applicable, a copy of a waiver agreement executed by the relevant AT&T Mobility affiliate at the request of your jurisdiction;

(4) A DVD containing encrypted data in support of the refund claim for your jurisdiction, including:

a. A listing of the customers from whom AT&T collected tax on Data Services on bills issued from November 1, 2005 through September 7, 2010, which tax amounts are included in the refund claim amount. This schedule provides the total amount of tax on Data Services charged to each customer (net of adjustments), with customers identified at the billing account number level.

b. A listing of the total monthly amounts of tax billed on Data Services (net of adjustments) for your jurisdiction from November 1, 2005 through September 7, 2010, which amounts were remitted by AT&T in accordance with your jurisdiction's periodic remittance requirements and which in total equal the aggregate by-customer listing of tax billed on Data Services.

(5) A power of attorney form appointing specified attorneys at McDermott Will & Emery LLP as the representatives of AT&T Mobility and its affiliates for purposes of this refund claim (PLEASE NOTE: THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IS NOT INTENDED TO REPLACE OR SUPERCEDE OTHER POWERS OF ATTORNEY THAT MAY BE ON FILE WITH YOUR JURISDICTION FOR THE APPLICABLE COMPANY).

You will receive a separate mailing enclosing a decryption code and instructions for accessing the data files contained on the enclosed DVD. Questions related to the DVD and the data contained therein may be directed to Linda Fisher, AT&T, lf2212@att.com, (561) 775-4319.

Other questions related to the refund claim may be directed to Margaret Wilson, McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, mwilson@mwe.com, (212) 547-5743.

Sincerely,

Margaret C. Wilson

EXHIBIT
A

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CLAIM FOR REFUND OF TAX ATTRIBUTABLE TO AMOUNTS PAID FOR INTERNET ACCESS

This refund claim is being filed by or on behalf of AT&T Mobility or one of the affiliates of AT&T Mobility that provides various wireless services to customers in your jurisdiction, including but not limited to "Data Services" (described in detail below) (hereinafter, the "Refund Claim").

A list of all AT&T Mobility affiliates that have sold Data Services is attached as Exhibit A. Tax was remitted to your jurisdiction by the specific AT&T Mobility affiliate that had a contractual relationship with customers in your jurisdiction, and that same AT&T Mobility affiliate is hereby seeking a refund of tax previously remitted with respect to amounts the affiliate charged those customers for Data Services. AT&T Mobility and the various AT&T Mobility affiliates each sold the same types of Data Services, and so the affiliated companies will be referred to collectively in this statement as "AT&T Mobility."

As discussed in detail below, this Refund Claim is made pursuant to a "Settlement Agreement" and to the extent permitted under the laws of your jurisdiction the "Settlement Class" (customers of AT&T Mobility) joins in the making of this Refund Claim, as contemplated under the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement obligates AT&T Mobility to transfer all refunded monies related to tax on Data Services, including any refund granted in response to this Refund Claim, to certain Escrow Accounts that are for the sole benefit of the Settlement Class – and not for the benefit of AT&T Mobility. One hundred percent (100%) of the amount refunded will be for the benefit of customers of AT&T Mobility who remitted the tax payments to AT&T Mobility.

I. Overview

This Refund Claim relates solely to receipts from Data Services sold to customers who used various types of wireless devices. Data Services are distinct from and sold separately from the various types of voice telecommunications services that are also sold by AT&T Mobility to customers for use with such wireless devices. In contrast to typical voice services, Data Services permit the customer to transmit electronic data across the Internet – thus enabling the customer to "surf" the Internet, send electronic mail, and make numerous other uses of the Internet. These Data Services are described more fully below.

Several months ago, various plaintiffs filed lawsuits against AT&T Mobility in numerous jurisdictions claiming that the AT&T Mobility Data Services the plaintiffs had purchased were the sale of "Internet access" as it is defined under the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act ("ITFA"), and thus could not be subjected to state or local taxation. The lawsuits were filed as putative class actions and alleged that AT&T Mobility had improperly collected tax on Data Services from the plaintiffs in violation of the ITFA.

As described below in "II – The Internet Tax Freedom Act," the ITFA is a federal law that prohibits the imposition of state and local taxes on Internet access. As described below in "III – AT&T Mobility Data Services," the Data Services sold by AT&T Mobility fall within the definition of protected "Internet access" under the ITFA. Finally, in "IV – The National Class Action Settlement," we describe the process by which all amounts refunded or credited pursuant to this Refund Claim will be submitted to a specially administered escrow fund for the benefit of (and to be distributed to) the class action plaintiffs.

This Refund Claim reflects tax remitted to your jurisdiction in connection with separately stated charges for Data Services because even to the extent, if any, that the laws of your jurisdiction sought to impose tax on charges for Internet access, the imposition of that tax was barred by the ITFA.

II. The Internet Tax Freedom Act

The ITFA provides that no state or political subdivision of a state may impose a tax on Internet access during the period beginning November 1, 2003, and ending November 1, 2014. The current language in the ITFA is the product of several different Congressional Acts, as follows:

P.L. 105–277: effective Oct. 21, 1998 (the Internet Tax Freedom Act)
P.L. 107-75: effective Nov. 28, 2001 (extended the ITFA to Nov. 1, 2003)
P.L. 108-435: effective Nov. 1, 2003 (Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, amending ITFA)
P.L. 110-108: effective Nov. 1, 2007 (further amendments to ITFA)

The language from the ITFA that is relevant to this Refund Claim is set forth below.

1. Definition of the "Internet"

The definition of "Internet" reads:

> INTERNET.—The term ''Internet'' means collectively the myriad of computer and telecommunications facilities, including equipment and operating software, which comprise the interconnected world-wide network of networks that employ the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, or any predecessor or successor protocols to such protocol, to communicate information of all kinds by wire or radio.[1]

Thus, to fall within this definition, the computer or telecommunications facilities at issue must be: (1) part of the "world-wide network of networks," (2) must be an "interconnected" part of that network, and (3) must employ the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol or a predecessor or successor protocol.

[1] ITFA Section 1105(4).

2. Definition of "Internet access"

The ITFA defines "Internet access" as follows:

> (A) means a service that enables users to connect to the Internet to access content, information, or other services offered over the Internet;
>
> (B) includes the purchase, use or sale of telecommunications by a provider of a service described in subparagraph (A) to the extent such telecommunications are purchased, used or sold—
> (i) to provide such service; or
> (ii) to otherwise enable users to access content, information or other services offered over the Internet;
>
> (C) includes services that are incidental to the provision of the service described in subparagraph (A) when furnished to users as part of such service, such as a home page, electronic mail and instant messaging (including voice- and video-capable electronic mail and instant messaging), video clips, and personal electronic storage capacity;
>
> (D) does not include voice, audio or video programming, or other products and services (except services described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E)) that utilize Internet protocol or any successor protocol and for which there is a charge, regardless of whether such charge is separately stated or aggregated with the charge for services described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E); and
>
> (E) includes a homepage, electronic mail and instant messaging (including voice- and video-capable electronic mail and instant messaging), video clips, and personal electronic storage capacity, that are provided independently or not packaged with Internet access.[2]

Subpart "A" of the definition of "Internet access" emphasizes that a qualifying service will "enable" "users" to connect to the Internet, for various purposes. The term "enable," which is not defined in ITFA, is commonly defined as providing someone with "means or opportunity."[3] As discussed below, the AT&T Mobility Data Services enable customers to connect to the Internet and, as such, are Internet access subject to the ITFA tax moratorium.

While subpart "B" provides that certain telecommunications are included within the scope of protected Internet access, those types of sales are not at issue and are not included in this Refund Claim. For example, the Refund Claim does not include sales of telecommunications to Internet service providers used to transport data being sent or received by the Internet service provider's customer.

---

[2] ITFA Section 1105(5).
[3] Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary.

Subpart "C" states that the provision of any services that are incidental to enabling an Internet connection will also be considered to be within the scope of protected "Internet access." This provision gives a list of examples of such permissible incidental services. The types of incidental services expressly listed are a home page, electronic mail, instant messaging, video clips and personal electronic storage capacity. Permissible electronic mail and instant messaging includes forms of those services that are voice-capable and video-capable. The provision of such incidental services as part of an Internet access service does not cause sales of Internet access service to fall outside the ITFA moratorium on state and local taxes. In fact, subpart "E" of the definition of Internet access explicitly provides that these products and services qualify as protected Internet access even when those services are "provided independently or not packaged with Internet access."

Subpart "D" of this definition expressly excludes voice, audio programming, video programming, and any "other products and services" not described in the other parts of the Internet access definition. Taxes related to charges for such services are not included in this Refund Claim.

III. AT&T Mobility Data Services

This Refund Claim seeks the refund or credit of taxes remitted by AT&T Mobility with regard to charges it made for Data Services because those Data Services constitute protected Internet access under the ITFA.

1. The Nature of AT&T Mobility Data Services

AT&T Mobility's Data Services are separate and distinct from the voice calling services that AT&T Mobility sells. Many AT&T Mobility customers purchase both voice calling services and Data Services for use on the same mobile device.

Each of the Data Services sold by AT&T Mobility provides access to the public Internet from various types of devices, including smart-phones, laptops, and other devices capable of housing a SIM card (subscriber identity module, or smart card) to enable the user to utilize his or her mobile network subscription. These Data Services enable a customer to connect to and browse the public Internet. Specifically, the AT&T Mobility Data Services are used to access a particular access point name ("APN") on the Internet and to identify and connect to a wireless application protocol ("WAP") server. From that point, the AT&T Mobility customer can browse the public Internet or access the appropriate server that will enable the customer, among many other things, to send or receive electronic mail.

For the purposes of accessing the Public Internet, the Data Service is essentially the same for each particular device (whether a smart-phone, air-card for a laptop, etc.). In each case, the Data Service provided by AT&T Mobility enables the customer to access the public Internet.

The Data Services are sold under numerous different names and in numerous different formats that vary depending on the type of use the customer desires and the type of device(s) that the

customer will be using. The pricing varies as well, with the customer either paying a flat monthly charge or a varying charge based on actual usage (e.g., a pay-per-use basis). These are pricing distinctions that do not reflect distinctions in the nature of the Data Service being sold – just the quantity.

2. AT&T Mobility Data Services Are Internet Access Under the ITFA

All of the AT&T Mobility Data Services give customers the ability to browse anywhere on the public Internet. As such, the Data Services are a "service that enables users to connect to the Internet to access content, information, or other services offered over the Internet" for purposes of the ITFA.[4] Thus, except for jurisdictions specifically grandfathered under the ITFA to charge tax on Internet access, no state or local taxes may be imposed on charges for AT&T Mobility's Data Services.

3. Taxes Not Included in this Refund Claim

The taxes sought in this Refund Claim relate solely to charges for Data Services, and do **not** include taxes collected and remitted with respect to charges for voice, text messaging (neither SMS (short message services) nor MMS (multimedia message services)) or other services or equipment sold by AT&T Mobility. This Refund Claim does **not** seek the refund of taxes collected on any charges for Data Services that were bundled with charges for other services that are otherwise sold separately by AT&T Mobility.

This Refund Claim also does **not** relate to telecommunications services sold to an Internet service provider in order to facilitate the provision of Internet access services to its customers. Instead, this Refund Claim relates solely to the Data Services sold by AT&T Mobility directly to residential or business consumers.

IV. The National Class Action Settlement

As mentioned above, AT&T Mobility has been the subject of numerous lawsuits over the past several months claiming that state and/or local taxes were incorrectly imposed on charges to customers for Data Services because those taxes are barred by the ITFA. Those cases were consolidated and transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to transfer orders from the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

After reviewing both the precise terms of the ITFA and the nature of the Data Services, AT&T Mobility has agreed that the taxes relating to charges for Data Services that were previously collected and remitted to your jurisdiction were taxes on Internet access and are thus barred by the ITFA. As such, AT&T Mobility:

---

[4] ITFA §1105(5)(A) (definition of Internet access, as in effect since November 1, 2007). This definition replaced an earlier ITFA definition of Internet access that had been effective November 1, 2003, which provided that "'Internet access' means a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered over the Internet, and may also include access to proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package of services offered to users. The term 'Internet access' does not include telecommunications services, except to the extent such services are purchased, used, or sold by a provider of Internet access to provide Internet access."

- has ceased collecting and remitting the taxes that are the subject of this Refund Claim on any charges for Data Services, and

- now seeks the recovery of previously remitted taxes attributable to Data Services, as set forth in this Refund Claim.

These matters are addressed in the Settlement Agreement entered into among AT&T Mobility and the class of all its past and present Data Services customers who do not choose to opt out of the settlement (the "Settlement Class"). What follows are the pertinent terms of that Settlement Agreement and notice of other matters relevant to this Refund Claim.

1. The Settlement Class Consents to and Joins in this Refund Claim

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the Settlement Class has consented to, and has assigned to AT&T Mobility its rights related to, this Refund Claim, as follows:

> The Settlement Class hereby consents to AT&T Mobility's filing of the claims for refund of Internet Taxes contemplated by this Settlement Agreement and to the payment of refunds or issuance of tax credits to AT&T Mobility in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. ... To the extent required by the law of any state or local jurisdiction at issue, the Settlement Class assigns AT&T Mobility all rights of the Settlement Class members to file the refund claims for Internet Taxes contemplated by this Settlement Agreement.

The Settlement Class has thus expressly joined in the making of this Refund Claim, as contemplated under the Settlement Agreement.

2. All Funds to be Paid to Escrow for Benefit of the Settlement Class

The Settlement Agreement obligates AT&T Mobility to transfer all refunded monies related to tax on Data Services, including any refund granted in response to this Refund Claim, to certain Escrow Accounts that are for the sole benefit of the Settlement Class – and not for the benefit of AT&T Mobility. To that end, AT&T Mobility is required to assign to the Settlement Class all of its rights, title and interest in all amounts obtained through Refund Claims.

> With respect to those refund claims filed in the name of AT&T Mobility, to the extent that the Taxing Jurisdiction grants AT&T Mobility a refund, AT&T Mobility shall assign all of its rights, title and interest in such refund to the Settlement Class, subject to any claims or conditions that may be imposed on such refund by the Taxing Jurisdiction. In accordance with this assignment, AT&T Mobility shall seek to have the refunded monies paid directly to the Escrow Accounts by the Taxing Jurisdictions. All monies that are nonetheless received by AT&T Mobility relating to the refund claims filed with the Taxing Jurisdictions shall be transferred by AT&T Mobility to the Escrow Accounts

established at the Depository Bank within seven (7) business days of receipt. The monies transferred by AT&T Mobility to the Escrow Accounts for refunds from a Taxing Jurisdiction shall be segregated by the Escrow Agent pursuant to the Escrow Agreement into separate accounts, each designated as originating from the specific jurisdiction for which the monies in question were received and each for the benefit of those Settlement Class Members who remitted Internet Taxes to AT&T Mobility for payment to such Taxing Jurisdiction making the refund.

All sums deposited in the Escrow Accounts will be assigned to and solely for the benefit of the Settlement Class in accordance with the distribution procedures under the Settlement Agreement.

3. Request that Cash Refunds Be Paid Directly to Settlement Class Escrow Accounts

Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, and in accordance with AT&T Mobility's assignment of its refund rights to the Settlement Class, AT&T Mobility requests that any payment of a cash refund in response to this Refund Claim be made directly to the Escrow Accounts established by the Settlement Agreement. Instructions for such direct payment will be provided upon request.

4. Settlement Class Acknowledges AT&T Mobility Satisfies Any Pre-Payment Requirement

The Settlement Class has acknowledged that its members have already received effective payment of the refund amounts sought in this Refund Claim by virtue of AT&T Mobility's assignment of refund rights to the Settlement Class and its obligation to transfer all refunds received to the Settlement Class, under the terms of the Settlement Agreement and under the supervision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

In light of AT&T Mobility's obligation to pay the refunded or credited Internet Taxes received by AT&T Mobility to the Escrow Accounts, the Settling Parties agree that AT&T Mobility has assigned and refunded to the Settlement Class all Internet Tax refunds to be sought pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.

The Settlement Class thus waives any requirement that AT&T Mobility pay cash refunds to the Settlement Class prior to obtaining a refund or credit from this taxing jurisdiction.

5. Interest

In addition to taxes AT&T Mobility also seeks the payment (or credit) of interest with respect to all amounts sought in the Refund Claim.

6. Credit, Instead of Cash, Refund

In lieu of a cash payment to satisfy this Refund Claim, AT&T Mobility is willing to accept an effective refund of all tax, interest, and any other amounts sought in this Refund Claim through the issuance of credits to be applied to satisfy future tax liabilities of AT&T Mobility ("Credits").

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, upon the receipt from or acknowledgement of such Credits from this taxing jurisdiction AT&T Mobility will make a payment of cash representing the agreed upon value of those Credits to the Escrow Accounts for the benefit of the Settlement Class Members.

* * *

AT&T Mobility and the Settlement Class have consented to the filing of this Refund Claim and to all requests made herein, join in the filing of this Refund Claim to the extent that is permitted, assign to the other party any of its rights necessary to the filing and perfection of this Refund Claim, to the extent possible have waived any requirement that AT&T Mobility pay refunds to the Settlement Class prior to obtaining a refund or credit from this Taxing Jurisdiction, and have waived any other rights that might be inconsistent with the refund claim or the manner in which it has been filed.

EXHIBIT A

Acadiana Cellular GP
AT&T Mobility II LLC
AT&T Mobility of Galveston LLC
AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico Inc
ATC Custom Services, Inc.
Bellingham Cellular Partnership
Bloomington Cellular Telephone Company
Bradenton Cellular Partnership
Bremerton Cellular Telephone Company
Cagal Cellular Communications Corporation
Cagal Cellular Communications Corporation
Cellular Retail LLC
Champaign CellTelCo
Chattanooga MSA LP
Cincinnati SMSA LP
Cingular Wireless Of Texas RSA #11 LP
Cingular Wireless Of Texas RSA #16 LP
Citrus Cellular Limited Partnership
Decatur RSA LP
Florida RSA No 2B
Georgia RSA #3 LP
Hood River Cellular Telephone Company Inc
Houma - Thibodaux Cellular Partnership
Lafayette MSA LP
Louisiana RSA No 7 Cellular GP
Louisiana RSA No 8 LP
Lubbock SMSA LP
Madison SMSA LP
McAllen-Edinburg Mission SMSA LP
Medford Cellular Telephone Company Inc
Melbourne Cellular Telephone Company
Milwaukee SMSA LP
Missouri RSA 11/12 LP
Missouri RSA 8 LP
Missouri RSA 9B1 LP
NE Georgia Limited Partnership
New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC
Ocala Cellular Telephone Company Inc
Oklahoma City SMSA LP
Oklahoma Independent RSA 7 Partnership
Oklahoma RSA 3 LP
Oklahoma RSA 9 LP
Olympia Cellular Telephone Company Inc
Orlando SMSA LP
Pine Bluff Cellular Inc

Provo Cellular Telephone Company
Reno Cellular Telephone Company
Salem Cellular Telephone Company
Santa Barbara Cellular Systems Ltd
Sarasota Cellular Telephone Company
St Cloud Cellular Telephone Company Inc
Telecorp Communications LLC
Texas RSA 18 LP
Texas RSA 19 LP
Texas RSA 2 Limited Partnership
Texas RSA 20B1 LP
Texas RSA 6 LP
Texas RSA 7B1 LP
Texas RSA 9B1 LP
Topeka SMSA LP
Visalia Cellular Telephone Company
Wireless Maritime Services LLC

SECTION 1 – CLAIM INFORMATION (To Be Used by all Claimants)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

Claimant's Name			Federal I.D. Number (FEIN)
New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC			22-3330080
Address			Social Security Number
11760 U.S. Highway 1, West Tower, Suite 600			
City	State	Zip	Claimant's Sales/Use Tax Permit
North Palm Beach	FL	33408	
Telephone Number Area Code (561) 775 - 4319	Best time to Call (Weekday, Daytime Hours)		

This refund is for Sales/Use tax paid during the period

11-01-05 to 9-30-10

INDICATE THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF REFUND YOU ARE REQUESTING

$ $18,215,729.01

Under penalties of law, I declare that the amount of sales or use tax for which I am submitting this claim for refund has NOT been refunded or credited to me by the Department or the seller to whom the tax was previously paid. I will immediately send payment for any such duplicate refund to the Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration; PO Box 1272, Little Rock, AR 72203-1272.

Print Your Name	Title
Linda A. Fisher	Assistant Secretary and Director of Tax
Signature of Claimant or Authorized Representative Linda A. Fisher	Date 11-1-10

- If your claim results from a vendor assignment and includes a refund of sales/use tax paid to more than one vendor, you must attach a separate Section 2 and a separate Section 3 for each vendor and summarize your total refund claim in Section 1. Each Separate vendor must complete Column 12 of Section 2 and Section 3.

Please Mail your Request for Refund to:
Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration
Sales Tax Refund Request
P.O. Box 8054 Room 1340
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203-8054

Questions:
Telephone: 501-682-7130
Fax: 501-682-7667
Website: www.state.ar.us/salestax
Form 2004-6 2/07

Section 2 (To be filled out by Purchaser and/or Vendor)

Claimant's Name:

SCHEDULE OF PURCHASES

Col 1	Col 2	Col 3	Col 4	Col 5	Col 6	Col 7	Col 8	Col 9	Col 10	Col 11	Col 12
Invoice Date	Vendor Name	Invoice Number	Description	How used/exemption claimed (Note: A reference to a statute/rule will not suffice)	Price Before Tax	Ark State Tax	County Tax	City Tax	County Name	City Name	Date Tax Remitted to State (MM/YY)
	See enclosed data files										
				Totals							
				Total Tax Refund Requested (Col 7 + Col 8 + Col 9)							

Form 2004-6 2/07

State of Arkansas
Department of Finance and Administration
Power of Attorney

Date of Revocation

1 Taxpayer Information

Taxpayer name(s) and address (Please type or print)	Social Security Number(s)	Employer Identification Number
AT&T Mobility LLC . and each Affiliate listed on Exhibit A 11760 US Highway 1, West Tower, Suite 600 North Palm Beach FL 33408	Primary Spouse	74-2955068
	Sales tax permit number	Daytime Telephone Number (561) 775-4319

hereby appoint(s) the following representative(s) as attorney(s)-in-fact:

2 Representative(s)

Name and address (Please type or print)	Telephone Number Fax Number
Each Representative listed on Exhibit B	
Name and address	Telephone Number Fax Number

to represent the taxpayer(s) before the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration for the following tax matters:

3 Tax Matters

Type of Tax (Sales, Use, Income, etc.)	Year(s) or Period(s)
Sales	1-01-2005 – 9-30-2010

4 Acts Authorized

The representatives are authorized, subject to revocation by the taxpayer, to receive and inspect confidential tax information and to perform any and all acts that I (we) can perform with respect to the tax matters described in line 3, including the authority to sign any agreements, consents, waivers or other documents.

The authority does not include the power to receive refund checks, the power to substitute another representative, the power to sign returns, or the power to execute a request for disclosure of tax returns or return information to a third party.

List any specific additions or deletions to the acts otherwise authorized in this power of attorney:

5 Computer generated notices will continue to be sent to taxpayer as required by law (see instructions).

6 Signature of Taxpayer(s)

If signed by a corporate officer, partner, guardian, executor, receiver, administrator, or trustee on behalf of the taxpayer, I certify that I have the authority to execute this form on behalf of the taxpayer. If a tax matter concerns a joint return, both husband and wife must sign if joint representation is requested.
If not signed and dated, this power of attorney will be returned.

Signature	Date	Title
Linda Fisher	9-22-10	Asst. Sec. & Director of Tax
Signature	Date	Title

(Revised 08/05)

Power of Attorney
Taxpayer Information

Taxpayer's FEIN: 74-2955068

EXHIBIT A

INCLUDED AFFILIATES OF AT&T MOBILITY LLC

Name of Affiliate:	FEIN:
Acadiana Cellular GP	58-1887375
AT&T Mobility II LLC	84-1659970
AT&T Mobility of Galveston LLC	75-3244338
AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico Inc	13-3120943
ATC Custom Services, Inc.	26-0497223
Bellingham Cellular Partnership	91-1410480
Bloomington Cellular Telephone Company	91-1433690
Bradenton Cellular Partnership	91-1414365
Bremerton Cellular Telephone Company	91-1430625
Cagal Cellular Communications Corporation	59-2794544
Cagal Cellular Communications Corporation	59-2794544
Cellular Retail LLC	25-1689318
Champaign CellTelCo	36-3665161
Chattanooga MSA LP	58-1616444
Cincinnati SMSA LP	36-3298472
Cingular Wireless Of Texas RSA #11 LP	22-3104693
Cingular Wireless Of Texas RSA #16 LP	22-3104704
Citrus Cellular Limited Partnership	93-1116059
Decatur RSA LP	58-1948295
Florida RSA No 2B	58-1901899
Georgia RSA #3 LP	58-1921807
Hood River Cellular Telephone Company Inc	91-1451869
Houma - Thibodaux Cellular Partnership	72-1326054
Lafayette MSA LP	74-2508690
Louisiana RSA No 7 Cellular GP	58-1887376
Louisiana RSA No 8 LP	58-1887374
Lubbock SMSA LP	75-2176282
Madison SMSA LP	36-3479364
McAllen-Edinburg Mission SMSA LP	75-2694914
Medford Cellular Telephone Company Inc	91-1429384
Melbourne Cellular Telephone Company	91-1430745
Milwaukee SMSA LP	36-3298475
Missouri RSA 11/12 LP	75-2694918
Missouri RSA 8 LP	75-2694916
Missouri RSA 9B1 LP	75-2694917
NE Georgia Limited Partnership	58-1918882
New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC	22-3330080
Ocala Cellular Telephone Company Inc	91-1429238
Oklahoma City SMSA LP	75-2694919
Oklahoma Independent RSA 7 Partnership	73-1398216
Oklahoma RSA 3 LP	75-2694920

Power of Attorney
Taxpayer Information

Taxpayer's FEIN: 74-2955068

EXHIBIT A (continued)

INCLUDED AFFILIATES OF AT&T MOBILITY LLC

Name of Affiliate:	FEIN:
Oklahoma RSA 9 LP	75-2694922
Olympia Cellular Telephone Company Inc	91-1429232
Orlando SMSA LP	58-1596096
Pine Bluff Cellular Inc	71-0685006
Provo Cellular Telephone Company	91-1430747
Reno Cellular Telephone Company	86-0585485
Salem Cellular Telephone Company	91-1430749
Santa Barbara Cellular Systems Ltd	77-0166031
Sarasota Cellular Telephone Company	91-1430748
St Cloud Cellular Telephone Company Inc	91-1496911
Telecorp Communications LLC	52-2105807
Texas RSA 18 LP	75-2298601
Texas RSA 19 LP	75-2298602
Texas RSA 2 Limited Partnership	73-1398219
Texas RSA 20B1 LP	75-2338365
Texas RSA 6 LP	75-2298616
Texas RSA 7B1 LP	75-2298613
Texas RSA 9B1 LP	75-2298610
Topeka SMSA LP	75-2688729
Visalia Cellular Telephone Company	91-1430750
Wireless Maritime Services LLC	20-0781427

Power of Attorney
Representative Information

Taxpayer's FEIN: 74-2955068

EXHIBIT B

Representative's Name			Phone Number
Margaret C. Wilson			(212) 547-5743
Mailing Address			Fax Number
McDermott Will & Emery			(212) 547-5444
Mailing Address			
340 Madison Avenue			
City	State	ZIP Code	Email Address
New York	NY	10173-1922	mwilson@mwe.com
Representative's Name			Phone Number
Arthur R. Rosen			(212) 547-5596
Mailing Address			Fax Number
McDermott Will & Emery			(212) 547-5444
Mailing Address			
340 Madison Avenue			
City	State	ZIP Code	Email Address
New York	NY	10173-1922	arosen@mwe.com
Representative's Name			Phone Number
Lindsay M. LaCava			(212) 547-5344
Mailing Address			Fax Number
McDermott Will & Emery			(212) 547-5444
Mailing Address			
340 Madison Avenue			
City	State	ZIP Code	Email Address
New York	NY	10173-1922	llacava@mwe.com
Representative's Name			Phone Number
Matthew C. Boch			(312) 547-5399
Mailing Address			Fax Number
McDermott Will & Emery			(212) 547-5444
Mailing Address			
3227 West Monroe Street, Suite 4400			
City	State	ZIP Code	Email Address
Chicago	IL	60606-5096	mboch@mwe.com

Recd 11/22

STATE OF ARKANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
REFUNDS UNIT
P.O. BOX 1272, LITTLE ROCK, AR 72203-1272

November 19, 2010

AT&T MOBILITY
ATTN: MARY WATSON
11760 US HIGHWAY 1 STE 600
N PALM BEACH FL 33408-3029

Letter ID: L1387772416
Account ID: 00282285-SLS
Audit ID: A1893949440
Audit From: November 1, 2005
Audit To: September 30, 2010

RE: Refund Claim Request

DEAR TAXPAYER:

The REFUNDS UNIT received your refund request for the above tax period(s).

Your request has been referred to the Audit Section for further review. Once verification has been completed by the Audit Section, we will notify you.

Refund Request in the amount of $18,215,729.01 covering November 2005-September 2010 Tax Periods.

If you have questions, please contact a customer service representative at (501) 682-7104 or fax to (501) 682-7904. Provide your Account ID and Letter ID shown above when you call or write about this letter.

Sincerely,

Brian Fry
Fiscal Support Analyst

CC: McDermott Will & Emery LLP
ATTN: Margaret C. Wilson
340 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10173-1922

EXHIBIT
B

STATE OF ARKANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
P.O. BOX 1272
LITTLE ROCK • 72203

02-004

McDermott Will & Emery LLP
ATTN: Margaret C. Wilson
340 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10173-1922

McDermott
Will & Emery

Boston Brussels Chicago Düsseldorf Houston London Los Angeles Miami Milan
Munich New York Orange County Rome San Diego Silicon Valley Washington, D.C.
Strategic alliance with MWE China Law Offices (Shanghai)

Margaret C. Wilson
Attorney at Law
mwilson@mwe.com
+1 212 547 5743

March 28, 2011

Re: SUPPLEMENT to Previously Filed AT&T Mobility Claim for Refund of Tax Attributable to Internet Access Services

TAX REFUND CLAIM PROCESSING UNIT
Arkansas Dept of Finance and Administration
Sales Tax Refund Request
P.O. Box 8054
Room 1340
Little Rock, AR 72203-8054

To Whom It May Concern:

The supplemental refund claim documentation included in this mailing is a supplement to the refund claim previously submitted to your jurisdiction on or about November 3, 2010.

Supplemental Refund Claim - Taxes for "Opt-Out" Customers

The enclosed supplemental refund claim form reflects a REDUCTION in tax (in the amount identified below) attributable to the tax amounts that were collected from customers who "opted-out" of the Settlement Class pursuant to the Settlement Agreement (each as defined and described in the previously submitted statement in support of this refund claim). The deadline for customers to opt out has now passed. As discussed below, a DVD reflecting the identity of and tax attributable to each of those customers is enclosed.

In summary, your jurisdiction's revised total tax refund claim amount is $18,215,580.05, and this amount was derived as follows:

	$18,215,729.01	Original tax refund claim amount (November 3, 2010)
+	($148.96)	Reduction for tax for opt-out customers
	$18,215,580.05	**Total shown on supplemental refund claim**

EXHIBIT C

Specifically, this package includes:

1. A copy of the November 3, 2010 cover letter under which the refund claim was submitted;

2. A supplemental refund claim form identifying the particular AT&T Mobility affiliate that filed the claim and the revised total amount of tax on Data Services for which a refund is claimed; and

3. A DVD containing encrypted data related to those customers who have elected to opt-out of the Settlement Class, including:
   a. A listing of the customers who have elected to opt-out of the Settlement Class and the total amount of tax on Data Services charged to each of the opt-out customers, with customers identified at the billing account number level.
   b. A listing of the total monthly amounts charged to the opt-out customers on Data Services, which amounts were remitted in accordance with your jurisdiction's periodic remittance requirements, and which in total equal the aggregate by customer listing.

The same password that was previously provided for the DVD submitted on or about November 3, 2010 will also enable you to access the relevant data on the DVD(s) enclosed herewith. If you require an additional copy of your password, please email Richard Lucas at mrlucas@mwe.com.

Questions related to the DVD and the data contained therein may be directed to Linda Fisher, AT&T, lf2212@att.com, (561) 775-4319.

Other questions related to the refund claim may be directed to Margaret Wilson, McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, mwilson@mwe.com, (212) 547-5743.

Sincerely,

Margaret C. Wilson /MRL

Margaret C. Wilson

Enclosures

McDermott
Will & Emery

Boston Brussels Chicago Düsseldorf Houston London Los Angeles Miami Milan
Munich New York Orange County Rome San Diego Silicon Valley Washington, D.C.
Strategic alliance with MWE China Law Offices (Shanghai)

Margaret C. Wilson
Attorney at Law
mwilson@mwe.com
+1 212 547 5743

November 3, 2010

COPY

To: REFUND CLAIM PROCESSING UNIT

Re: AT&T Mobility Claim for Refund of Tax Attributable to Internet Access Services

To Whom It May Concern:

The documentation included in this mailing constitutes a refund claim seeking a refund of tax that was previously remitted with respect to charges for various wireless services providing Internet access ("Data Services") to customers in your jurisdiction. The Data Services are described in detail in the enclosed statement in support of the refund claim.

This refund claim is filed by or on behalf of the specific AT&T Mobility affiliate that remitted the tax, as identified on the enclosed refund claim form, and is joined in by the customers from whom tax amounts were collected, to the extent and as explained in the enclosed statement in support.

Specifically, this refund claim package includes:

(1) A refund claim form identifying the particular AT&T Mobility affiliate that is filing the claim and the total amount of tax on Data Services for which a refund is being claimed (that amount includes only taxes on relevant Data Services; previously remitted taxes related to charges for other goods or services are not included in the refund claim amount);

(2) A statement in support of the refund claim, which provides background regarding both the Data Services and the basis for claiming a refund of previously remitted taxes on Data Services;

(3) If applicable, a copy of a waiver agreement executed by the relevant AT&T Mobility affiliate at the request of your jurisdiction;

(4) A DVD containing encrypted data in support of the refund claim for your jurisdiction, including:

a. A listing of the customers from whom AT&T collected tax on Data Services on bills issued from November 1, 2005 through September 7, 2010, which tax amounts are included in the refund claim amount. This schedule provides the total amount of tax on Data Services charged to each customer (net of adjustments), with customers identified at the billing account number level.

b. A listing of the total monthly amounts of tax billed on Data Services (net of adjustments) for your jurisdiction from November 1, 2005 through September 7, 2010, which amounts were remitted by AT&T in accordance with your jurisdiction's periodic remittance requirements and which in total equal the aggregate by-customer listing of tax billed on Data Services.

(5) A power of attorney form appointing specified attorneys at McDermott Will & Emery LLP as the representatives of AT&T Mobility and its affiliates for purposes of this refund claim (PLEASE NOTE: THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IS NOT INTENDED TO REPLACE OR SUPERCEDE OTHER POWERS OF ATTORNEY THAT MAY BE ON FILE WITH YOUR JURISDICTION FOR THE APPLICABLE COMPANY).

You will receive a separate mailing enclosing a decryption code and instructions for accessing the data files contained on the enclosed DVD. Questions related to the DVD and the data contained therein may be directed to Linda Fisher, AT&T, lf2212@att.com, (561) 775-4319.

Other questions related to the refund claim may be directed to Margaret Wilson, McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, mwilson@mwe.com, (212) 547-5743.

Sincerely,

Margaret C. Wilson

SUPPLEMENT TO PREVIOUSLY FILED REFUND CLAIM

SECTION 1 – CLAIM INFORMATION (To Be Used by all Claimants)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

Claimant's Name			Federal I.D. Number (FEIN)
New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC			22-3330080
Address			Social Security Number
11760 U.S. Highway 1, West Tower, Suite 600			
City	State	Zip	Claimant's Sales/Use Tax Permit
North Palm Beach	FL	33408	
Telephone Number Area Code (561) 775 - 4319	Best time to Call (Weekday, Daytime Hours)		

This refund is for Sales/Use tax paid during the period

11-01-05 to 9-30-10

INDICATE THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF REFUND YOU ARE REQUESTING

$ $18,215,580.05

Under penalties of law, I declare that the amount of sales or use tax for which I am submitting this claim for refund has NOT been refunded or credited to me by the Department or the seller to whom the tax was previously paid. I will immediately send payment for any such duplicate refund to the Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration; PO Box 1272, Little Rock, AR 72203-1272.

Print Your Name	Title
Linda A. Fisher	Assistant Secretary and Director of Tax
Signature of Claimant or Authorized Representative Linda Fisher	Date 3-21-11

- If your claim results from a vendor assignment and includes a refund of sales/use tax paid to more than one vendor, you must attach a separate Section 2 and a separate Section 3 for each vendor and summarize your total refund claim in Section 1. Each Separate vendor must complete Column 12 of Section 2 and Section 3.

Please Mail your Request for Refund to:
Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration
Sales Tax Refund Request
P.O. Box 8054 Room 1340
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203-8054

Questions:
Telephone: 501-682-7130
Fax: 501-682-7667
Website: www.state.ar.us/salestax

Form 2004-6 2/07

2148

AT&T Mobility
11760 U.S. Highway 1, West Tower
Suite 600
North Palm Beach, FL 33408

June 15, 2012

Arkansas Dept of Finance and Administration
Sales Tax Refund Request
P.O. Box 8054
Room 1340
Little Rock, AR 72203-8054

ATTN: TAX REFUND CLAIM PROCESSING UNIT

Re: SUPPLEMENT to AT&T Mobility Claim for Refund of Tax on Internet Access Charges (Filed on or about November 9, 2010)
Refund Claim filed by: New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC (FEIN: 22-3330080, Registration ID: 00282285-SLS)

This letter supplements the refund claim previously submitted to your jurisdiction by AT&T Mobility affiliate New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC ("AT&T Mobility") seeking a refund of tax attributable to various wireless services providing internet access, reflected on customer bills as a separately stated charge ("Data Services") for the period November 1, 2005 through September 30, 2010 (the "Refund Claim"). The Refund Claim was filed on or about November 9, 2010.

The Refund Claim that you received identified the amount of tax on Data Services for which a refund is sought, and the Refund Claim package included a DVD with two listings of supporting data breaking out the total tax amount being sought as: (1) a listing of the customers from whom AT&T Mobility collected tax on Data Services on bills issued during the Refund Claim period, and (2) a listing of the total monthly amounts of tax billed on Data Services for the Refund Claim period.

The process of identifying the specific Data Services that provided Internet access for which an unbundled charge was shown on AT&T Mobility customer bills was thorough and careful; however, in the months since that process was undertaken, the company has identified certain tax amounts that should not be included in the amount sought in the Refund Claim. AT&T Mobility has sought to make the Refund Claim verification process as transparent as possible for the taxing jurisdictions involved and, continuing with that forthright approach, AT&T Mobility now brings to your attention the following issues potentially resulting in a reduction of the tax amount being sought in the Refund claim filed with your jurisdiction.

1. Removal of Tax Associated with Certain Charges. AT&T Mobility advises that the total tax amount sought in the Refund Claim for the period November 1, 2005 through September 30, 2010 should be **reduced** by the amount $1,704,344.65 to reflect the following two issues.

    a. Certain charges for voice services sold on a pay-per-use basis to customers with a monthly data plan that constitutes a Data Service were inadvertently captured in the course of culling the AT&T Mobility computerized billing

EXHIBIT
O

records to generate the tax information used to prepare the Refund Claims. The related Data Service monthly plan charges were separately stated on customer bills and the tax associated with those charges was properly included in the Refund Claims. The tax associated with voice pay-per-use charges, also shown as separate line items on customer bills, should be removed from the amount sought in the Refund Claim (the "Voice Service Tax"). To the extent there was an amount of Voice Service Tax inadvertently included in the amount sought in the Refund Claim filed with your jurisdiction, that amount has been identified for the period November 2005 through September 2010 and is reflected in the amount listed above as a specific **reduction** in the total refund of tax being sought. For further details, please contact either the AT&T Mobility representative with whom you are working to verify the Refund Claim or Scott Adams (sa245q@att.com).

b. The AT&T Mobility companies have, historically, used thousands of different combinations of billing codes to identify the various services, including Data Services, sold to customers (with varying pricing and terms). The process of determining which of those billing codes constituted Data Services was exhaustive and thorough. However, in the time since that process was conducted, certain billing codes that were included in generating the tax amounts for the Refund Claims have been identified as not constituting Data Service (the "Excluded Codes"). To the extent there was an amount of tax attributable to Excluded Codes that was inadvertently included in the amount sought in the Refund Claim filed with your jurisdiction, that amount has been identified for the period November 2005 through September 2010 and is reflected in the amount listed above as a specific **reduction** in the total refund of tax being sought. For further details, please contact either the AT&T Mobility representative with whom you are working to verify the Refund Claim or Scott Adams (sa245q@att.com).

2. Adjustments for Bad Debt Credits. The Refund Claims were generated from actual AT&T Mobility billing system data, culled from billions of records maintained on nationwide platforms. Any billing adjustments related to Data Services that had been reflected on current bills were captured and reflected in the amounts sought in the Refund Claims. However, because credits for outstanding customer balances that are written off as "bad debt" are taken in periods subsequent to the billing period for which the tax was remitted, the culling process through which the Refund Claim data was generated did not capture credits taken against tax remittances for bad debts. The AT&T Mobility billing records systems do not tie bad debt amounts back to specific customer charges; as such, it is not possible to trace bad debt credits back to individual Data Service charges that were included in the Refund Claim. The AT&T Mobility companies do maintain records reflecting the percentage of charges written off as bad debt for each jurisdiction in each month. AT&T Mobility submits that a 1.5% Reduction (based on AT&T Mobility's national average bad debt credit percentage for 2009-2010) is an appropriate reduction in the amount of tax that should have been paid or credited by your jurisdiction.

The AT&T Mobility representative with whom you worked on the Refund Claim can make such information available to you for review and discuss with you any proposed resolution.

Please direct any questions you may have regarding the above to the AT&T Mobility representative with whom you are working to verify Refund Claim or to Scott Adams (sa245q@att.com).

Sincerely,



Linda A. Fisher
Assistant Secretary and
Director of Tax

McDermott
Will&Emery

Boston Brussels Chicago Düsseldorf Houston London Los Angeles Miami Milan
Munich New York Orange County Rome San Diego Silicon Valley Washington, D.C.
Strategic alliance with MWE China Law Offices (Shanghai)

Margaret C. Wilson
Attorney at Law
mwilson@mwe.com
+1 212 547 5743

November 3, 2010

To: REFUND CLAIM PROCESSING UNIT

Re: AT&T Mobility Claim for Refund of Tax Attributable to Internet Access Services

To Whom It May Concern:

The documentation included in this mailing constitutes a refund claim seeking a refund of tax that was previously remitted with respect to charges for various wireless services providing Internet access ("Data Services") to customers in your jurisdiction. The Data Services are described in detail in the enclosed statement in support of the refund claim.

This refund claim is filed by or on behalf of the specific AT&T Mobility affiliate that remitted the tax, as identified on the enclosed refund claim form, and is joined in by the customers from whom tax amounts were collected, to the extent and as explained in the enclosed statement in support.

Specifically, this refund claim package includes:

(1) A refund claim form identifying the particular AT&T Mobility affiliate that is filing the claim and the total amount of tax on Data Services for which a refund is being claimed (that amount includes only taxes on relevant Data Services; previously remitted taxes related to charges for other goods or services are **not** included in the refund claim amount);

(2) A statement in support of the refund claim, which provides background regarding both the Data Services and the basis for claiming a refund of previously remitted taxes on Data Services;

(3) If applicable, a copy of a waiver agreement executed by the relevant AT&T Mobility affiliate at the request of your jurisdiction;

(4) A DVD containing encrypted data in support of the refund claim for your jurisdiction, including:

a. A listing of the customers from whom AT&T collected tax on Data Services on bills issued from November 1, 2005 through September 7, 2010, which tax amounts are included in the refund claim amount. This schedule provides the total amount of tax on Data Services charged to each customer (net of adjustments), with customers identified at the billing account number level.

b. A listing of the total monthly amounts of tax billed on Data Services (net of adjustments) for your jurisdiction from November 1, 2005 through September 7, 2010, which amounts were remitted by AT&T in accordance with your jurisdiction's periodic remittance requirements and which in total equal the aggregate by-customer listing of tax billed on Data Services.

(5) A power of attorney form appointing specified attorneys at McDermott Will & Emery LLP as the representatives of AT&T Mobility and its affiliates for purposes of this refund claim (PLEASE NOTE: THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IS NOT INTENDED TO REPLACE OR SUPERCEDE OTHER POWERS OF ATTORNEY THAT MAY BE ON FILE WITH YOUR JURISDICTION FOR THE APPLICABLE COMPANY).

You will receive a separate mailing enclosing a decryption code and instructions for accessing the data files contained on the enclosed DVD. Questions related to the DVD and the data contained therein may be directed to Linda Fisher, AT&T, lf2212@att.com, (561) 775-4319.

Other questions related to the refund claim may be directed to Margaret Wilson, McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, mwilson@mwe.com, (212) 547-5743.

Sincerely,

Margaret C. Wilson

EXHIBIT
E

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CLAIM FOR REFUND OF TAX ATTRIBUTABLE TO AMOUNTS PAID FOR INTERNET ACCESS

This refund claim is being filed by or on behalf of AT&T Mobility or one of the affiliates of AT&T Mobility that provides various wireless services to customers in your jurisdiction, including but not limited to "Data Services" (described in detail below) (hereinafter, the "Refund Claim").

A list of all AT&T Mobility affiliates that have sold Data Services is attached as Exhibit A. Tax was remitted to your jurisdiction by the specific AT&T Mobility affiliate that had a contractual relationship with customers in your jurisdiction, and that same AT&T Mobility affiliate is hereby seeking a refund of tax previously remitted with respect to amounts the affiliate charged those customers for Data Services. AT&T Mobility and the various AT&T Mobility affiliates each sold the same types of Data Services, and so the affiliated companies will be referred to collectively in this statement as "AT&T Mobility."

As discussed in detail below, this Refund Claim is made pursuant to a "Settlement Agreement" and to the extent permitted under the laws of your jurisdiction the "Settlement Class" (customers of AT&T Mobility) joins in the making of this Refund Claim, as contemplated under the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement obligates AT&T Mobility to transfer all refunded monies related to tax on Data Services, including any refund granted in response to this Refund Claim, to certain Escrow Accounts that are for the sole benefit of the Settlement Class – and not for the benefit of AT&T Mobility. One hundred percent (100%) of the amount refunded will be for the benefit of customers of AT&T Mobility who remitted the tax payments to AT&T Mobility.

I. Overview

This Refund Claim relates solely to receipts from Data Services sold to customers who used various types of wireless devices. Data Services are distinct from and sold separately from the various types of voice telecommunications services that are also sold by AT&T Mobility to customers for use with such wireless devices. In contrast to typical voice services, Data Services permit the customer to transmit electronic data across the Internet – thus enabling the customer to "surf" the Internet, send electronic mail, and make numerous other uses of the Internet. These Data Services are described more fully below.

Several months ago, various plaintiffs filed lawsuits against AT&T Mobility in numerous jurisdictions claiming that the AT&T Mobility Data Services the plaintiffs had purchased were the sale of "Internet access" as it is defined under the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act ("ITFA"), and thus could not be subjected to state or local taxation. The lawsuits were filed as putative class actions and alleged that AT&T Mobility had improperly collected tax on Data Services from the plaintiffs in violation of the ITFA.

As described below in "II – The Internet Tax Freedom Act," the ITFA is a federal law that prohibits the imposition of state and local taxes on Internet access. As described below in "III – AT&T Mobility Data Services," the Data Services sold by AT&T Mobility fall within the definition of protected "Internet access" under the ITFA. Finally, in "IV – The National Class Action Settlement," we describe the process by which all amounts refunded or credited pursuant to this Refund Claim will be submitted to a specially administered escrow fund for the benefit of (and to be distributed to) the class action plaintiffs.

This Refund Claim reflects tax remitted to your jurisdiction in connection with separately stated charges for Data Services because even to the extent, if any, that the laws of your jurisdiction sought to impose tax on charges for Internet access, the imposition of that tax was barred by the ITFA.

II. The Internet Tax Freedom Act

The ITFA provides that no state or political subdivision of a state may impose a tax on Internet access during the period beginning November 1, 2003, and ending November 1, 2014. The current language in the ITFA is the product of several different Congressional Acts, as follows:

P.L. 105–277: effective Oct. 21, 1998 (the Internet Tax Freedom Act)
P.L. 107-75: effective Nov. 28, 2001 (extended the ITFA to Nov. 1, 2003)
P.L. 108-435: effective Nov. 1, 2003 (Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, amending ITFA)
P.L. 110-108: effective Nov. 1, 2007 (further amendments to ITFA)

The language from the ITFA that is relevant to this Refund Claim is set forth below.

1. Definition of the "Internet"

The definition of "Internet" reads:

> INTERNET.—The term "Internet" means collectively the myriad of computer and telecommunications facilities, including equipment and operating software, which comprise the interconnected world-wide network of networks that employ the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, or any predecessor or successor protocols to such protocol, to communicate information of all kinds by wire or radio.[1]

Thus, to fall within this definition, the computer or telecommunications facilities at issue must be: (1) part of the "world-wide network of networks," (2) must be an "interconnected" part of that network, and (3) must employ the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol or a predecessor or successor protocol.

[1] ITFA Section 1105(4).

2. Definition of "Internet access"

The ITFA defines "Internet access" as follows:

> (A) means a service that enables users to connect to the Internet to access content, information, or other services offered over the Internet;
>
> (B) includes the purchase, use or sale of telecommunications by a provider of a service described in subparagraph (A) to the extent such telecommunications are purchased, used or sold—
> (i) to provide such service; or
> (ii) to otherwise enable users to access content, information or other services offered over the Internet;
>
> (C) includes services that are incidental to the provision of the service described in subparagraph (A) when furnished to users as part of such service, such as a home page, electronic mail and instant messaging (including voice- and video-capable electronic mail and instant messaging), video clips, and personal electronic storage capacity;
>
> (D) does not include voice, audio or video programming, or other products and services (except services described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E)) that utilize Internet protocol or any successor protocol and for which there is a charge, regardless of whether such charge is separately stated or aggregated with the charge for services described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E); and
>
> (E) includes a homepage, electronic mail and instant messaging (including voice- and video-capable electronic mail and instant messaging), video clips, and personal electronic storage capacity, that are provided independently or not packaged with Internet access.[2]

Subpart "A" of the definition of "Internet access" emphasizes that a qualifying service will "enable" "users" to connect to the Internet, for various purposes. The term "enable," which is not defined in ITFA, is commonly defined as providing someone with "means or opportunity."[3] As discussed below, the AT&T Mobility Data Services enable customers to connect to the Internet and, as such, are Internet access subject to the ITFA tax moratorium.

While subpart "B" provides that certain telecommunications are included within the scope of protected Internet access, those types of sales are not at issue and are not included in this Refund Claim. For example, the Refund Claim does not include sales of telecommunications to Internet service providers used to transport data being sent or received by the Internet service provider's customer.

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[2] ITFA Section 1105(5).
[3] Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary.

Subpart "C" states that the provision of any services that are incidental to enabling an Internet connection will also be considered to be within the scope of protected "Internet access." This provision gives a list of examples of such permissible incidental services. The types of incidental services expressly listed are a home page, electronic mail, instant messaging, video clips and personal electronic storage capacity. Permissible electronic mail and instant messaging includes forms of those services that are voice-capable and video-capable. The provision of such incidental services as part of an Internet access service does not cause sales of Internet access service to fall outside the ITFA moratorium on state and local taxes. In fact, subpart "E" of the definition of Internet access explicitly provides that these products and services qualify as protected Internet access even when those services are "provided independently or not packaged with Internet access."

Subpart "D" of this definition expressly excludes voice, audio programming, video programming, and any "other products and services" not described in the other parts of the Internet access definition. Taxes related to charges for such services are not included in this Refund Claim.

III. AT&T Mobility Data Services

This Refund Claim seeks the refund or credit of taxes remitted by AT&T Mobility with regard to charges it made for Data Services because those Data Services constitute protected Internet access under the ITFA.

1. The Nature of AT&T Mobility Data Services

AT&T Mobility's Data Services are separate and distinct from the voice calling services that AT&T Mobility sells. Many AT&T Mobility customers purchase both voice calling services and Data Services for use on the same mobile device.

Each of the Data Services sold by AT&T Mobility provides access to the public Internet from various types of devices, including smart-phones, laptops, and other devices capable of housing a SIM card (subscriber identity module, or smart card) to enable the user to utilize his or her mobile network subscription. These Data Services enable a customer to connect to and browse the public Internet. Specifically, the AT&T Mobility Data Services are used to access a particular access point name ("APN") on the Internet and to identify and connect to a wireless application protocol ("WAP") server. From that point, the AT&T Mobility customer can browse the public Internet or access the appropriate server that will enable the customer, among many other things, to send or receive electronic mail.

For the purposes of accessing the Public Internet, the Data Service is essentially the same for each particular device (whether a smart-phone, air-card for a laptop, etc.). In each case, the Data Service provided by AT&T Mobility enables the customer to access the public Internet.

The Data Services are sold under numerous different names and in numerous different formats that vary depending on the type of use the customer desires and the type of device(s) that the

customer will be using. The pricing varies as well, with the customer either paying a flat monthly charge or a varying charge based on actual usage (e.g., a pay-per-use basis). These are pricing distinctions that do not reflect distinctions in the nature of the Data Service being sold – just the quantity.

2. AT&T Mobility Data Services Are Internet Access Under the ITFA

All of the AT&T Mobility Data Services give customers the ability to browse anywhere on the public Internet. As such, the Data Services are a "service that enables users to connect to the Internet to access content, information, or other services offered over the Internet" for purposes of the ITFA.[4] Thus, except for jurisdictions specifically grandfathered under the ITFA to charge tax on Internet access, no state or local taxes may be imposed on charges for AT&T Mobility's Data Services.

3. Taxes Not Included in this Refund Claim

The taxes sought in this Refund Claim relate solely to charges for Data Services, and do **not** include taxes collected and remitted with respect to charges for voice, text messaging (neither SMS (short message services) nor MMS (multimedia message services)) or other services or equipment sold by AT&T Mobility. This Refund Claim does **not** seek the refund of taxes collected on any charges for Data Services that were bundled with charges for other services that are otherwise sold separately by AT&T Mobility.

This Refund Claim also does **not** relate to telecommunications services sold to an Internet service provider in order to facilitate the provision of Internet access services to its customers. Instead, this Refund Claim relates solely to the Data Services sold by AT&T Mobility directly to residential or business consumers.

IV. The National Class Action Settlement

As mentioned above, AT&T Mobility has been the subject of numerous lawsuits over the past several months claiming that state and/or local taxes were incorrectly imposed on charges to customers for Data Services because those taxes are barred by the ITFA. Those cases were consolidated and transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to transfer orders from the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

After reviewing both the precise terms of the ITFA and the nature of the Data Services, AT&T Mobility has agreed that the taxes relating to charges for Data Services that were previously collected and remitted to your jurisdiction were taxes on Internet access and are thus barred by the ITFA. As such, AT&T Mobility:

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[4] ITFA §1105(5)(A) (definition of Internet access, as in effect since November 1, 2007). This definition replaced an earlier ITFA definition of Internet access that had been effective November 1, 2003, which provided that "'Internet access' means a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered over the Internet, and may also include access to proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package of services offered to users. The term 'Internet access' does not include telecommunications services, except to the extent such services are purchased, used, or sold by a provider of Internet access to provide Internet access."

- has ceased collecting and remitting the taxes that are the subject of this Refund Claim on any charges for Data Services, and

- now seeks the recovery of previously remitted taxes attributable to Data Services, as set forth in this Refund Claim.

These matters are addressed in the Settlement Agreement entered into among AT&T Mobility and the class of all its past and present Data Services customers who do not choose to opt out of the settlement (the "Settlement Class"). What follows are the pertinent terms of that Settlement Agreement and notice of other matters relevant to this Refund Claim.

1. The Settlement Class Consents to and Joins in this Refund Claim

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the Settlement Class has consented to, and has assigned to AT&T Mobility its rights related to, this Refund Claim, as follows:

> The Settlement Class hereby consents to AT&T Mobility's filing of the claims for refund of Internet Taxes contemplated by this Settlement Agreement and to the payment of refunds or issuance of tax credits to AT&T Mobility in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. ... To the extent required by the law of any state or local jurisdiction at issue, the Settlement Class assigns AT&T Mobility all rights of the Settlement Class members to file the refund claims for Internet Taxes contemplated by this Settlement Agreement.

The Settlement Class has thus expressly joined in the making of this Refund Claim, as contemplated under the Settlement Agreement.

2. All Funds to be Paid to Escrow for Benefit of the Settlement Class

The Settlement Agreement obligates AT&T Mobility to transfer all refunded monies related to tax on Data Services, including any refund granted in response to this Refund Claim, to certain Escrow Accounts that are for the sole benefit of the Settlement Class – and not for the benefit of AT&T Mobility. To that end, AT&T Mobility is required to assign to the Settlement Class all of its rights, title and interest in all amounts obtained through Refund Claims.

> With respect to those refund claims filed in the name of AT&T Mobility, to the extent that the Taxing Jurisdiction grants AT&T Mobility a refund, AT&T Mobility shall assign all of its rights, title and interest in such refund to the Settlement Class, subject to any claims or conditions that may be imposed on such refund by the Taxing Jurisdiction. In accordance with this assignment, AT&T Mobility shall seek to have the refunded monies paid directly to the Escrow Accounts by the Taxing Jurisdictions. All monies that are nonetheless received by AT&T Mobility relating to the refund claims filed with the Taxing Jurisdictions shall be transferred by AT&T Mobility to the Escrow Accounts

established at the Depository Bank within seven (7) business days of receipt. The monies transferred by AT&T Mobility to the Escrow Accounts for refunds from a Taxing Jurisdiction shall be segregated by the Escrow Agent pursuant to the Escrow Agreement into separate accounts, each designated as originating from the specific jurisdiction for which the monies in question were received and each for the benefit of those Settlement Class Members who remitted Internet Taxes to AT&T Mobility for payment to such Taxing Jurisdiction making the refund.

All sums deposited in the Escrow Accounts will be assigned to and solely for the benefit of the Settlement Class in accordance with the distribution procedures under the Settlement Agreement.

3. Request that Cash Refunds Be Paid Directly to Settlement Class Escrow Accounts

Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, and in accordance with AT&T Mobility's assignment of its refund rights to the Settlement Class, AT&T Mobility requests that any payment of a cash refund in response to this Refund Claim be made directly to the Escrow Accounts established by the Settlement Agreement. Instructions for such direct payment will be provided upon request.

4. Settlement Class Acknowledges AT&T Mobility Satisfies Any Pre-Payment Requirement

The Settlement Class has acknowledged that its members have already received effective payment of the refund amounts sought in this Refund Claim by virtue of AT&T Mobility's assignment of refund rights to the Settlement Class and its obligation to transfer all refunds received to the Settlement Class, under the terms of the Settlement Agreement and under the supervision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

In light of AT&T Mobility's obligation to pay the refunded or credited Internet Taxes received by AT&T Mobility to the Escrow Accounts, the Settling Parties agree that AT&T Mobility has assigned and refunded to the Settlement Class all Internet Tax refunds to be sought pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.

The Settlement Class thus waives any requirement that AT&T Mobility pay cash refunds to the Settlement Class prior to obtaining a refund or credit from this taxing jurisdiction.

5. Interest

In addition to taxes AT&T Mobility also seeks the payment (or credit) of interest with respect to all amounts sought in the Refund Claim.

6. Credit, Instead of Cash, Refund

In lieu of a cash payment to satisfy this Refund Claim, AT&T Mobility is willing to accept an effective refund of all tax, interest, and any other amounts sought in this Refund Claim through the issuance of credits to be applied to satisfy future tax liabilities of AT&T Mobility ("Credits").

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, upon the receipt from or acknowledgement of such Credits from this taxing jurisdiction AT&T Mobility will make a payment of cash representing the agreed upon value of those Credits to the Escrow Accounts for the benefit of the Settlement Class Members.

* * *

AT&T Mobility and the Settlement Class have consented to the filing of this Refund Claim and to all requests made herein, join in the filing of this Refund Claim to the extent that is permitted, assign to the other party any of its rights necessary to the filing and perfection of this Refund Claim, to the extent possible have waived any requirement that AT&T Mobility pay refunds to the Settlement Class prior to obtaining a refund or credit from this Taxing Jurisdiction, and have waived any other rights that might be inconsistent with the refund claim or the manner in which it has been filed.

EXHIBIT A

Acadiana Cellular GP
AT&T Mobility II LLC
AT&T Mobility of Galveston LLC
AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico Inc
ATC Custom Services, Inc.
Bellingham Cellular Partnership
Bloomington Cellular Telephone Company
Bradenton Cellular Partnership
Bremerton Cellular Telephone Company
Cagal Cellular Communications Corporation
Cagal Cellular Communications Corporation
Cellular Retail LLC
Champaign CellTelCo
Chattanooga MSA LP
Cincinnati SMSA LP
Cingular Wireless Of Texas RSA #11 LP
Cingular Wireless Of Texas RSA #16 LP
Citrus Cellular Limited Partnership
Decatur RSA LP
Florida RSA No 2B
Georgia RSA #3 LP
Hood River Cellular Telephone Company Inc
Houma - Thibodaux Cellular Partnership
Lafayette MSA LP
Louisiana RSA No 7 Cellular GP
Louisiana RSA No 8 LP
Lubbock SMSA LP
Madison SMSA LP
McAllen-Edinburg Mission SMSA LP
Medford Cellular Telephone Company Inc
Melbourne Cellular Telephone Company
Milwaukee SMSA LP
Missouri RSA 11/12 LP
Missouri RSA 8 LP
Missouri RSA 9B1 LP
NE Georgia Limited Partnership
New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC
Ocala Cellular Telephone Company Inc
Oklahoma City SMSA LP
Oklahoma Independent RSA 7 Partnership
Oklahoma RSA 3 LP
Oklahoma RSA 9 LP
Olympia Cellular Telephone Company Inc
Orlando SMSA LP
Pine Bluff Cellular Inc

Provo Cellular Telephone Company
Reno Cellular Telephone Company
Salem Cellular Telephone Company
Santa Barbara Cellular Systems Ltd
Sarasota Cellular Telephone Company
St Cloud Cellular Telephone Company Inc
Telecorp Communications LLC
Texas RSA 18 LP
Texas RSA 19 LP
Texas RSA 2 Limited Partnership
Texas RSA 20B1 LP
Texas RSA 6 LP
Texas RSA 7B1 LP
Texas RSA 9B1 LP
Topeka SMSA LP
Visalia Cellular Telephone Company
Wireless Maritime Services LLC

SECTION 1 – CLAIM INFORMATION (To Be Used by all Claimants)			
PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE			
Claimant's Name Pine Bluff Cingular Inc.			Federal I.D. Number (FEIN) 71-0685006
Address 11760 U.S. Highway 1, West Tower, Suite 600			Social Security Number
City North Palm Beach	State FL	Zip 33408	Claimant's Sales/Use Tax Permit
Telephone Number Area Code (561) 775 - 4319	Best time to Call (Weekday, Daytime Hours)		
This refund is for Sales/Use tax paid during the period 11-01-05 to 9-30-10 **INDICATE THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF REFUND YOU ARE REQUESTING** $ $539,983.33			
Under penalties of law, I declare that the amount of sales or use tax for which I am submitting this claim for refund has NOT been refunded or credited to me by the Department or the seller to whom the tax was previously paid. I will immediately send payment for any such duplicate refund to the Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration; PO Box 1272, Little Rock, AR 72203-1272.			
Print Your Name Linda A. Fisher			Title Assistant Secretary and Director of Tax
Signature of Claimant or Authorized Representative Linda Fisher			Date 11-1-10

- If your claim results from a vendor assignment and includes a refund of sales/use tax paid to more than one vendor, you must attach a separate Section 2 and a separate Section 3 for each vendor and summarize your total refund claim in Section 1. Each Separate vendor must complete Column 12 of Section 2 and Section 3.

Please Mail your Request for Refund to:
Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration
Sales Tax Refund Request
P.O. Box 8054 Room 1340
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203-8054

Questions:
Telephone: 501-682-7130
Fax: 501-682-7667
Website: www.state.ar.us/salestax
Form 2004-6 2/07

State of Arkansas
Department of Finance and Administration
Power of Attorney

Date of Revocation
_____

1 Taxpayer Information

Taxpayer name(s) and address (Please type or print)	Social Security Number(s)	Employer Identification Number
AT&T Mobility LLC . and each Affiliate listed on Exhibit A 11760 US Highway 1, West Tower, Suite 600 North Palm Beach FL 33408	Primary Spouse	74-2955068
	Sales tax permit number	Daytime Telephone Number (561) 775-4319

hereby appoint(s) the following representative(s) as attorney(s)-in-fact:

2 Representative(s)

Name and address (Please type or print)	Telephone Number Fax Number
Each Representative listed on Exhibit B	
Name and address	Telephone Number Fax Number

to represent the taxpayer(s) before the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration for the following tax matters:

3 Tax Matters

Type of Tax (Sales, Use, Income, etc.)	Year(s) or Period(s)
Sales	1-01-2005 – 9-30-2010

4 Acts Authorized

The representatives are authorized, subject to revocation by the taxpayer, to receive and inspect confidential tax information and to perform any and all acts that I (we) can perform with respect to the tax matters described in line 3, including the authority to sign any agreements, consents, waivers or other documents.

The authority does not include the power to receive refund checks, the power to substitute another representative, the power to sign returns, or the power to execute a request for disclosure of tax returns or return information to a third party.

List any specific additions or deletions to the acts otherwise authorized in this power of attorney:

_____

_____

5 Computer generated notices will continue to be sent to taxpayer as required by law (see instructions).

6 Signature of Taxpayer(s)

If signed by a corporate officer, partner, guardian, executor, receiver, administrator, or trustee on behalf of the taxpayer, I certify that I have the authority to execute this form on behalf of the taxpayer. If a tax matter concerns a joint return, **both** husband and wife must sign if joint representation is requested.
If not signed and dated, this power of attorney will be returned.

Signature	Date	Title
Linda Fisher	9-22-10	Asst. Sec. & Director of Tax
Signature	**Date**	**Title**

(Revised 08/05)

Power of Attorney
Taxpayer Information

Taxpayer's FEIN: 74-2955068

EXHIBIT A

INCLUDED AFFILIATES OF AT&T MOBILITY LLC

Name of Affiliate:	FEIN:
Acadiana Cellular GP	58-1887375
AT&T Mobility II LLC	84-1659970
AT&T Mobility of Galveston LLC	75-3244338
AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico Inc	13-3120943
ATC Custom Services, Inc.	26-0497223
Bellingham Cellular Partnership	91-1410480
Bloomington Cellular Telephone Company	91-1433690
Bradenton Cellular Partnership	91-1414365
Bremerton Cellular Telephone Company	91-1430625
Cagal Cellular Communications Corporation	59-2794544
Cagal Cellular Communications Corporation	59-2794544
Cellular Retail LLC	25-1689318
Champaign CellTelCo	36-3665161
Chattanooga MSA LP	58-1616444
Cincinnati SMSA LP	36-3298472
Cingular Wireless Of Texas RSA #11 LP	22-3104693
Cingular Wireless Of Texas RSA #16 LP	22-3104704
Citrus Cellular Limited Partnership	93-1116059
Decatur RSA LP	58-1948295
Florida RSA No 2B	58-1901899
Georgia RSA #3 LP	58-1921807
Hood River Cellular Telephone Company Inc	91-1451869
Houma - Thibodaux Cellular Partnership	72-1326054
Lafayette MSA LP	74-2508690
Louisiana RSA No 7 Cellular GP	58-1887376
Louisiana RSA No 8 LP	58-1887374
Lubbock SMSA LP	75-2176282
Madison SMSA LP	36-3479364
McAllen-Edinburg Mission SMSA LP	75-2694914
Medford Cellular Telephone Company Inc	91-1429384
Melbourne Cellular Telephone Company	91-1430745
Milwaukee SMSA LP	36-3298475
Missouri RSA 11/12 LP	75-2694918
Missouri RSA 8 LP	75-2694916
Missouri RSA 9B1 LP	75-2694917
NE Georgia Limited Partnership	58-1918882
New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC	22-3330080
Ocala Cellular Telephone Company Inc	91-1429238
Oklahoma City SMSA LP	75-2694919
Oklahoma Independent RSA 7 Partnership	73-1398216
Oklahoma RSA 3 LP	75-2694920

Power of Attorney
Taxpayer Information

Taxpayer's FEIN: 74-2955068

EXHIBIT A (continued)

INCLUDED AFFILIATES OF AT&T MOBILITY LLC

Name of Affiliate:	FEIN:
Oklahoma RSA 9 LP	75-2694922
Olympia Cellular Telephone Company Inc	91-1429232
Orlando SMSA LP	58-1596096
Pine Bluff Cellular Inc	71-0685006
Provo Cellular Telephone Company	91-1430747
Reno Cellular Telephone Company	86-0585485
Salem Cellular Telephone Company	91-1430749
Santa Barbara Cellular Systems Ltd	77-0166031
Sarasota Cellular Telephone Company	91-1430748
St Cloud Cellular Telephone Company Inc	91-1496911
Telecorp Communications LLC	52-2105807
Texas RSA 18 LP	75-2298601
Texas RSA 19 LP	75-2298602
Texas RSA 2 Limited Partnership	73-1398219
Texas RSA 20B1 LP	75-2338365
Texas RSA 6 LP	75-2298616
Texas RSA 7B1 LP	75-2298613
Texas RSA 9B1 LP	75-2298610
Topeka SMSA LP	75-2688729
Visalia Cellular Telephone Company	91-1430750
Wireless Maritime Services LLC	20-0781427

RECD 11/22/10

STATE OF ARKANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
REFUNDS UNIT
P.O. BOX 1272, LITTLE ROCK, AR 72203-1272

November 19, 2010

CINGULAR WIRELESS
11760 US HWY ONE, 6TH FL
N PLM BCH FL 33408

Letter ID: L2024274432
Account ID: 00112247-SLS
Audit ID: A366673920
Audit From: November 1, 2005
Audit To: September 30, 2010

RE: Refund Claim Request

DEAR TAXPAYER:

The REFUNDS UNIT received your refund request for the above tax period(s).

Your request has been referred to the Audit Section for further review. Once verification has been completed by the Audit Section, we will notify you.

Refund Request in the amount of $539,983.33 covering November 2005-September 2010 Tax Periods.

If you have questions, please contact a customer service representative at (501) 682-7104 or fax to (501) 682-7904. Provide your Account ID and Letter ID shown above when you call or write about this letter.

Sincerely,

Brian Fry
Fiscal Support Analyst

CC: McDermott Will & Emery
ATTN: Margaret C. Wilson
340 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10173-1922

EXHIBIT
F

STATE OF ARKANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
P.O. BOX 1272
LITTLE ROCK • 72203

02-004



McDermott Will & Emery LLP
ATTN: Margaret C. Wilson
340 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10173-1922

AT&T Mobility
11760 U.S. Highway 1, West Tower
Suite 600
North Palm Beach, FL 33408

June 15, 2012

Arkansas Dept of Finance and Administration
Sales Tax Refund Request
P.O. Box 8054
Room 1340
Little Rock, AR 72203-8054

ATTN: TAX REFUND CLAIM PROCESSING UNIT

Re: SUPPLEMENT to AT&T Mobility Claim for Refund of Tax on Internet Access Charges (Filed on or about November 9, 2010)
Refund Claim filed by: Pine Bluff Cellular Inc (FEIN: 71-0685006, Registration ID: 00112247SLS)

This letter supplements the refund claim previously submitted to your jurisdiction by AT&T Mobility affiliate Pine Bluff Cellular Inc ("AT&T Mobility") seeking a refund of tax attributable to various wireless services providing Internet access, reflected on customer bills as a separately stated charge ("Data Services") for the period November 1, 2005 through September 30, 2010 (the "Refund Claim"). The Refund Claim was filed on or about November 9, 2010.

The Refund Claim that you received identified the amount of tax on Data Services for which a refund is sought, and the Refund Claim package included a DVD with two listings of supporting data breaking out the total tax amount being sought as: (1) a listing of the customers from whom AT&T Mobility collected tax on Data Services on bills issued during the Refund Claim period, and (2) a listing of the total monthly amounts of tax billed on Data Services for the Refund Claim period.

The process of identifying the specific Data Services that provided Internet access for which an unbundled charge was shown on AT&T Mobility customer bills was thorough and careful; however, in the months since that process was undertaken, the company has identified certain tax amounts that should not be included in the amount sought in the Refund Claim. AT&T Mobility has sought to make the Refund Claim verification process as transparent as possible for the taxing jurisdictions involved and, continuing with that forthright approach, AT&T Mobility now brings to your attention the following issues potentially resulting in a reduction of the tax amount being sought in the Refund claim filed with your jurisdiction.

1. Removal of Tax Associated with Certain Charges. AT&T Mobility advises that the total tax amount sought in the Refund Claim for the period November 1, 2005 through September 30, 2010 should be **reduced** by the amount $98,304.85 to reflect the following two issues.

    a. Certain charges for voice services sold on a pay-per-use basis to customers with a monthly data plan that constitutes a Data Service were inadvertently captured in the course of culling the AT&T Mobility computerized billing

EXHIBIT G

records to generate the tax information used to prepare the Refund Claims. The related Data Service monthly plan charges were separately stated on customer bills and the tax associated with those charges was properly included in the Refund Claims. The tax associated with voice pay-per-use charges, also shown as separate line items on customer bills, should be removed from the amount sought in the Refund Claim (the "Voice Service Tax"). To the extent there was an amount of Voice Service Tax inadvertently included in the amount sought in the Refund Claim filed with your jurisdiction, that amount has been identified for the period November 2005 through September 2010 and is reflected in the amount listed above as a specific **reduction** in the total refund of tax being sought. For further details, please contact either the AT&T Mobility representative with whom you are working to verify the Refund Claim or Scott Adams (sa245q@att.com).

b. The AT&T Mobility companies have, historically, used thousands of different combinations of billing codes to identify the various services, including Data Services, sold to customers (with varying pricing and terms). The process of determining which of those billing codes constituted Data Services was exhaustive and thorough. However, in the time since that process was conducted, certain billing codes that were included in generating the tax amounts for the Refund Claims have been identified as not constituting Data Service (the "Excluded Codes"). To the extent there was an amount of tax attributable to Excluded Codes that was inadvertently included in the amount sought in the Refund Claim filed with your jurisdiction, that amount has been identified for the period November 2005 through September 2010 and is reflected in the amount listed above as a specific **reduction** in the total refund of tax being sought. For further details, please contact either the AT&T Mobility representative with whom you are working to verify the Refund Claim or Scott Adams (sa245q@att.com).

2. Adjustments for Bad Debt Credits. The Refund Claims were generated from actual AT&T Mobility billing system data, culled from billions of records maintained on nationwide platforms. Any billing adjustments related to Data Services that had been reflected on current bills were captured and reflected in the amounts sought in the Refund Claims. However, because credits for outstanding customer balances that are written off as "bad debt" are taken in periods subsequent to the billing period for which the tax was remitted, the culling process through which the Refund Claim data was generated did not capture credits taken against tax remittances for bad debts. The AT&T Mobility billing records systems do not tie bad debt amounts back to specific customer charges; as such, it is not possible to trace bad debt credits back to individual Data Service charges that were included in the Refund Claim. The AT&T Mobility companies do maintain records reflecting the percentage of charges written off as bad debt for each jurisdiction in each month. AT&T Mobility submits that a 1.5% Reduction (based on AT&T Mobility's national average bad debt credit percentage for 2009-2010) is an appropriate reduction in the amount of tax that should have been paid or credited by your jurisdiction.

The AT&T Mobility representative with whom you worked on the Refund Claim can make such information available to you for review and discuss with you any proposed resolution.

Please direct any questions you may have regarding the above to the AT&T Mobility representative with whom you are working to verify Refund Claim or to Scott Adams (sa245q@att.com).

Sincerely,

Linda Fisher

Linda A. Fisher
Assistant Secretary and
Director of Tax

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

IN RE: AT&T MOBILITY WIRELESS DATA SERVICES SALES TAX LITIGATION	Case No. 1:10-cv-02278 Judge Amy J. St. Eve
This Document Relates To: All Actions	

GLOBAL CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON & GORNY, P.C.
Edward D. Robertson, Jr.
James P. Frickleton
Mary D. Winter
715 Swifts Highway
Jefferson City, MO 65109

THE HUGE LAW FIRM PLLC
Harry Huge
P.O. Box 57277
Washington, D.C. 20037-0277

Interim Settlement Class Counsel for Class Plaintiffs and Settlement Class

THOMPSON COBURN LLP
Roman P. Wuller
One US Bank Plaza, Suite 3500
St. Louis, MO 63101

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Archis A. Parasharami
1999 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20006

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Thomas M. Durkin
71 S. Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606

Counsel for Defendant AT&T Mobility LLC

EXHIBIT H

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GLOBAL CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Global Class Action Settlement Agreement ("Agreement" or "Settlement Agreement") is entered into as of July 9, 2010, and is between and among AT&T Mobility LLC ("AT&T Mobility") (as defined in paragraph 1.2) and the Class Plaintiffs (as defined in paragraph 1.4) on behalf of themselves and the Settlement Class (as defined in paragraph 1.26), by and through the undersigned for AT&T Mobility and the undersigned Class Plaintiffs and Interim Settlement Class Counsel (as defined in paragraph 1.16) for the Settlement Class. This Agreement is intended by the Settling Parties to fully, finally and forever resolve, discharge and settle all released rights and claims, as set forth below, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein.

RECITALS

WHEREAS, the following cases were filed by plaintiffs in, or were removed to, various United States District Courts and were subsequently transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for all pretrial purposes pursuant to transfer orders from the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation:

	Abbreviated Case Name	N.D. Illinois Case Number	Filed In/ Transferred From
1.	*Armstrong v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02943	D. District of Columbia
2.	*Abel v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-03369	S.D. Florida
3.	*Bendian v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al.*		D. New Jersey
4.	*Bosarge v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02306	S.D. Mississippi
5.	*Bosse v. AT&T Mobility, et al.*	1:10-cv-02324	D. South Carolina (Charleston Division)
6.	*Buchar v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-00842	N.D. Illinois (Eastern Division)
7.	*Bulzone v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02673	S.D. Florida (Ft. Lauderdale Division)
8.	*Cooper v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*		D. Delaware
9.	*Corn v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02326	W.D. Texas
10.	*Cranford v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al.*	1:10-cv-02309	D. Nebraska

11.	*Crose v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02674	E.D. Louisiana
12.	*Devore v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al.*	1:10-cv-02683	D. Utah
13.	*Diethelm v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02279	N.D. Alabama
14.	*Dow v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02678	D. Maryland
15.	*Edmonds v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02321	W.D. Oklahoma
16.	*Erie, et al. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al.*		M.D. Louisiana
17.	*Fox v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02316	E.D. North Carolina (Western Division)
18.	*Girard v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02682	W.D. North Carolina (Charlotte Division)
19.	*Havron v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al.*	1:10-cv-02290	S.D. Illinois
20.	*Hendrix v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02298	D. Kansas
21.	*Herst v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al.*		N.D. Illinois
22.	*Hoke v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02291	N.D. Indiana
23.	*Howell v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02668	N.D. California
24.	*Iannetti v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02322	W.D. Pennsylvania
25.	*Johnson v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02305	E.D. Michigan
26.	*Krein v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-03370	D. New Jersey
27.	*Kyle v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02667	C.D. California
28.	*Leisman v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al.*	1:10-cv-02681	W.D. Missouri (Western Division)
29.	*Macy v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al.*		S.D. New York
30.	*Mazeitis v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02301	W.D. Louisiana
31.	*Meshulam v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02679	D. Maryland
32.	*Munson v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02288	S.D. Florida
33.	*Novick v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*		M.D. Florida
34.	*Pauley v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al.*	1:10-cv-02308	W.D. Missouri (Central Division)
35.	*Rahn v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02300	E.D. Kentucky
36.	*Rock v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02302	D. Connecticut
37.	*Rock v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02671	D. Massachusetts
38.	*Rogers v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02685	D. Vermont
39.	*Shirley v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*		D. Rhode Island
40.	*Shuptrine v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02325	E.D. Tennessee
41.	*Simon v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02666	C.D. California
42.	*Sipple v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al.*	1:10-cv-02669	S.D. California
43.	*Stanczak v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02687	E.D. Wisconsin
44.	*Stewart v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02684	E.D. Virginia
45.	*Taylor v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al.*	1:10-cv-02282	E.D. Arkansas
46.	*Tushaus v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02665	D. Arizona
47.	*Vickery v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02686	W.D. Washington
48.	*Wallace v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02320	S.D. Ohio
49.	*White v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02680	D. Minnesota
50.	*Wiand v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02303	E.D. Michigan
51.	*Wieland v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*		D. Colorado

52.	*Wilhite v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02289	N.D. Georgia
53.	*Wood v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*	1:10-cv-02297	S.D. Iowa
54.	*Wright v. AT&T Mobility LLC*	1:10-cv-02670	S.D. California

WHEREAS, Class Plaintiffs allege in the Actions that AT&T Mobility charges customers for taxes, fees and surcharges on internet access through certain services including iPhone data plans, Blackberry data plans, other smart phone data plans, laptop connect cards and pay-per-use data services in violation of the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1998) (as amended) and other state laws;

WHEREAS, AT&T Mobility has denied, and continues to deny, inter alia, any wrongdoing, and any and all allegations that Class Plaintiffs or Settlement Class Members have suffered any damage whatsoever, have been harmed in any way, or are entitled to any relief as a result of any conduct on the part of AT&T Mobility as alleged by Class Plaintiffs in the Actions.

WHEREAS, Interim Settlement Class Counsel and various co-counsel have conducted a thorough investigation and evaluation of the facts and law relating to the matters set forth in the Actions; and

WHEREAS, Class Plaintiffs and AT&T Mobility desire to avoid the further expense of litigation and to settle and voluntarily compromise any and all claims or causes of action between them that have arisen or that may arise in the future which in any way relate to Class Plaintiffs' claims or the facts alleged in the Actions individually and on behalf of the Settlement Class;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the mutual covenants and conditions contained herein, and with the intention of being legally bound thereby, each of the above parties hereto do covenant and agree as follows:

DEFINITIONS

1. **Definitions.** The following definitions apply to this Agreement and the exhibits hereto:

1.1 **"Actions"** means the MDL Actions and the Related Actions.

1.2 **"AT&T Mobility"** means AT&T Mobility LLC, AT&T Inc. and all of their predecessors in interest, successors in interest and any of their parents, subsidiaries, divisions or affiliates, and their officers, directors, employees, trustees, principals, attorneys, agents, representatives, vendors, shareholders, partners, limited partners, as well as any person acting or purporting to act on their behalf or on behalf of those in privity with AT&T Mobility or AT&T Inc. and the Settlement Class Members. This shall include but not be limited to the list of affiliates attached as Exhibit A.

1.3 **"Class Notice"** which shall be in substantially the same form as Exhibits B, C, D, E and F hereto, shall mean the Court-approved form of notice to the Settlement Class of (i) certification of the Settlement Class, (ii) preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement, (iii) scheduling of the Final Approval Hearing, and (iv) options available to Settlement Class Members.

1.4 **"Class Plaintiffs"** means Andy Armstrong, Ronald Bendian, Michael Bosarge, Eric Bosse, Vicki L. Campbell, Harvey Corn, Pam Corn, Matthew Cranford, Steven A. DeVore, Jane F. Edmonds, Heather Feenstra-Kretschmar, Adrienne M. Fox, Richard Garner, Stephen S. Girard, David Guerrero, Christopher R. Havron, Christopher Hendrix, Martin Hoke, Meri Iannetti, Christopher Jacobs, Kathy J. Johnson, Jamie Kilbreth, Bert Kimble, Vickie C. Leyja, Jonathan Macy, Rick Manrique, Heather Mazeitis, Bonnae Meshulam, Miracles Meyer, Audrey J. Mitchell, Adrienne D. Munson, Jill Murphy, Gira L. Osorio, Sara Parker Pauley,

Joseph Phillips, Heather Rahn, David Rock, Lesley Rock, William J. Rogers, James Marc Ruggerio, Ann Marie Ruggerio, James Shirley, Randall Shuptrine, John W. Simon, Karl Simonsen, Donald Sipple, James K.S. Stewart, Dorothy Taylor, Kirk Tushaus, Matthew Vickery, John W. Wallace, Eleanor T. Wallace, Craig Wellhouser, Aaron White, William A. Wieland, Robert Wilhite, and Penny Annette Wood, who are some of the named Plaintiffs in the Actions and who have executed this Agreement in their individual capacity and as representatives of the Settlement Class as defined in this Agreement.

1.5 **"Costs of Settlement Administration"** shall mean all actual costs associated with or arising from Settlement Administration.

1.6 **"Court"** means the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in which the MDL Actions are pending pursuant to transfer orders of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, and to which presentation of this Agreement for judicial review and approval will be made.

1.7 **"Current Customers"** means those Settlement Class Members who are customers of AT&T Mobility at the time notice is sent to the Settlement Class pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order.

1.8 **"Depository Bank"** means the financial institution holding the Escrow Funds in the Escrow Accounts, or its successor.

1.9 **"Effective Date"** means the date when the order finally approving the Settlement becomes a "Final Order" (as defined in paragraph 1.14).

1.10 **"Escrow Accounts"** means the escrow account and sub-accounts established pursuant to this Settlement Agreement and Exhibit G hereto.

1.11 **"Escrow Agent"** means the financial institution selected by Interim Settlement Class Counsel and approved by AT&T Mobility to hold the Settlement Fund.

1.12 **"Escrow Agreement"** means the escrow agreement executed by the Escrow Agent, Interim Settlement Class Counsel and Counsel for AT&T Mobility, substantially in the form attached as Exhibit G.

1.13 **"Escrow Funds"** means the funds in the Escrow Accounts.

1.14 **"Final Order"** or **"Final Judgment"** means the termination of the Actions after the occurrence of each of the following events:

1.14.1 This Global Class Action Settlement Agreement is approved in all respects by the Court without material modification unless expressly agreed to by AT&T Mobility and the Class Plaintiffs; and

1.14.2 An order and final judgment of dismissal with prejudice is entered by the Court against the Class Plaintiffs and all of the Settlement Class Members who do not opt out as provided in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the time for the filing of any appeals has expired or, if there are appeals, approval of the settlement and judgment has been affirmed in all respects by the appellate court of last resort to which such appeals have been taken and such affirmances are no longer subject to further appeal or review.

1.15 **"Former Customers"** means those Settlement Class Members who are not Current Customers (as defined in paragraph 1.7).

1.16 **"Interim Settlement Class Counsel"** or **"Settlement Class Counsel"** means the law firms: Bartimus, Frickleton, Robertson & Gorny, P.C. and The Huge Law Firm PLLC.

1.17 **"Internet Taxes"** shall mean each and every "tax on Internet access," as that term is defined in the ITFA, collected by AT&T Mobility from its customers and paid to the Taxing Jurisdictions (as defined in paragraph 1.31) listed and as limited on Exhibit H hereto with respect to charges for those services listed on Exhibit I that the Class Plaintiffs agree are for Internet access, including iPhone data plans, Blackberry data plans, other smart phone data plans, laptop connect card plans and pay-per-use data services.

1.18 **"ITFA"** means the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1998) as amended.

1.19 **"MDL Actions"** means MDL No. 2147 including cases identified in the Recitals of this Agreement and all cases transferred or pending transfer to MDL No. 2147 through the Effective Date of the Final Order.

1.20 **"Net Settlement Fund"** means the amount remaining in the Settlement Fund for distribution to Settlement Class Members, after payment of or reserve for escrow expenses, taxes on escrow earnings or tax-related fees and expenses, estimated taxes, Costs of Settlement Administration, all other related costs, incentive awards to Class Representatives and such attorneys' fees and litigation expenses as may be awarded by the Court.

1.21 **"Preliminary Approval Order"** shall mean the order of the Court preliminarily approving this Settlement Agreement, in substantially the same form as Exhibit J hereto.

1.22 **"Publication Notice"** which shall be in substantially the same form as Exhibit E hereto, shall mean the Court approved form of publication notice to the Settlement Class.

1.23 **"Related Actions"** means *Stephen T. Johnson, et al. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*, Case No. 4:09-4104, now pending before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas; and *John Gaffigan, et al. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC*, Case No. 4:10-cv-00503-ERW, now pending before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

1.24 **"Settlement Administration"** shall mean the distribution of proceeds of the Settlement Fund to members of the Settlement Class and other tasks as set forth in this Agreement.

1.25 **"Settlement Administrator"** means Analysis Research Planning Corporation or such other qualified and competent entity chosen by the Class Plaintiffs and Interim Settlement Class Counsel, and authorized by the Court to distribute the Settlement Fund and to undertake other tasks as set forth in this Agreement.

1.26 **"Settlement Class"** means the class defined in paragraph 7 of this Agreement, which the Settling Parties have agreed herein to seek to have certified by the Court solely for purposes of this Settlement Agreement, and their heirs, agents, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns.

1.27 **"Settlement Class Member"** means any person falling within the definition of the Settlement Class defined in paragraph 7 herein (collectively referred to herein as "Settlement Class Members").

1.28 **"Settlement Fund"** means the monies remitted pursuant to paragraph 8 herein by AT&T Mobility or Class Plaintiffs, or otherwise remitted directly by a Taxing Jurisdiction to the Escrow Account, and any interest or other amount earned or accrued on such remittances.

1.29 **"Settling Parties"** means the Class Plaintiffs and AT&T Mobility.

1.30 **"Subsequent Action"** means any action brought in any state or federal court or arbitral proceeding advancing any claims involving or relating to AT&T Mobility's alleged charging of Internet Taxes under any theory of liability, by, or on behalf of, any member of the Settlement Class.

1.31 **"Taxing Jurisdictions"** means the state and local jurisdictions set forth on Exhibit H which include some jurisdictions that collect taxes on behalf of other taxing authorities within the same state.

1.32 **"Vendor's Compensation" "Vendor's Compensation"** shall mean any amounts specifically related to the Internet Taxes that AT&T Mobility was allowed by certain Taxing Jurisdictions in the form of a credit against taxes owing to the Taxing Jurisdiction, which is generally considered to be compensation for the vendor's collecting and remitting taxes to the Taxing Jurisdiction; provided, however that, for purposes of this Settlement Agreement, vendor's compensation shall not include amounts to which AT&T would have been entitled independent of the collection of Internet Taxes based on limitations on the amount of credit allowed pursuant to applicable law.

TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SETTLEMENT

2. **Plaintiffs' Allegations.** The Class Plaintiffs have brought their Actions as class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or under similar state rules of civil procedure, the latter of which have been properly removed to federal court. They allege, among other things, that AT&T Mobility charged certain Internet Taxes to its customers in violation of ITFA and/or various other state statutes and common law doctrines such as breach of contract. Class Plaintiffs allege that AT&T Mobility is liable for damages to the Settlement Class.

3. **Denial of Liability.** AT&T Mobility believes that the Class Plaintiffs' factual and legal allegations in the Actions are incorrect and specifically denies all liability to the Class Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class. In the Actions, AT&T Mobility generally denies Plaintiffs' allegations and possesses a number of defenses to the claims asserted as well as defenses to certification of a class or classes including arbitration agreements, which by their terms preclude class treatment and compel each plaintiff and putative class member to submit his or her claim to arbitration on an individual basis. For purposes of settlement only, and as part of this Agreement, AT&T Mobility agrees not to assert these defenses to Class Plaintiffs' claims.

4. **Negotiations.** Settlement negotiations have taken place between Interim Settlement Class Counsel and several other Plaintiffs' counsel, on the one hand, and AT&T Mobility's counsel, on the other hand. This Settlement Agreement, subject to the approval of the Court, contains all the terms of the Settlement agreed to between AT&T Mobility and the Class Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of the Settlement Class.

5. **Benefits of Settling the Actions.** Class Plaintiffs believe that the claims asserted by them in the Actions have merit and that there is evidence to support their claims. Class Plaintiffs, however, recognize and acknowledge the expense and length of continued litigation

and legal proceedings necessary to prosecute the Actions against AT&T Mobility through trial and through any appeals. Class Plaintiffs also recognize and have taken into account the uncertain outcome and risks associated with litigation and class actions in general, and the Actions in particular, as well as the difficulties and delays inherent in any such litigation.

The Class Plaintiffs are also mindful of the potential problems of proof and the possible defenses to class certification, as well as to the remedies they seek. As a result, the Class Plaintiffs believe that the Settlement set forth in this Agreement provides substantial benefits to Settlement Class Members. The Class Plaintiffs and Interim Settlement Class Counsel have therefore determined that the Settlement, as set forth in this Agreement, is fair, reasonable, adequate and in the best interests of the Settlement Class.

6. **No Admission of Liability.** By entering into this Agreement, the Settling Parties agree that AT&T Mobility is not admitting any liability to the Class Plaintiffs, the Settlement Class, or any other person or entity, and AT&T Mobility expressly denies all such liability. AT&T Mobility's sole motivation for entering into this Settlement Agreement is to dispose expeditiously of the claims that have been asserted against it in the Actions by settlement and compromise rather than incur the expense and uncertainty of protracted litigation. No portion of this Agreement may be admitted into evidence in any action, except as required to enforce this Agreement and/or to cease or enjoin other litigation pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Agreement.

7. **Settlement Class Definition.** The Master Class Action Complaint filed in the MDL Actions seeks relief for a class of Plaintiffs described as follows, which class is agreed to for purposes of settlement only and for no other purpose:

> All persons or entities who are or were customers of AT&T Mobility and who were charged Internet Taxes on bills issued from November 1, 2005 through September 7, 2010.

Excluded from the Settlement Class are: (i) AT&T Mobility, any entity in which AT&T Mobility has a controlling interest or which has a controlling interest in AT&T Mobility, and AT&T Mobility's legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns; (ii) governmental entities; (iii) AT&T Mobility's officers, directors, agents and representatives; and (iv) the Court presiding over any motion to approve this Settlement Agreement.

8. **Settlement Consideration and AT&T Mobility's Obligations.** Subject to the provisions herein, and in full, complete and final Settlement of the Actions, the Settling Parties agree:

AT&T Mobility To Cease Challenged Practice

8.1 Subject to paragraph 8.2 below, and upon entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, AT&T Mobility agrees to cease charging the challenged Internet Taxes on those services set forth on Exhibit I in the Taxing Jurisdictions set forth on Exhibit H hereto as soon as practicable and no later than thirty (30) days after the date of the Preliminary Approval Order.

8.2 AT&T Mobility reserves the right to reinstate charging for Internet Taxes in the Taxing Jurisdictions set forth in Exhibit H if:

(a) The Settlement provided herein is not approved by the Court in accordance with the terms of this Agreement and does not become subject to a Final Order; or

(b) federal, state or local laws, statutes, regulations, administrative decisions or pronouncements, or the interpretation of any of the foregoing specifically requires, authorizes or permits the collection and payment of Internet Taxes on, or on the charges for, any services or products set forth on Exhibit I.

AT&T Mobility To Process And Assist In Processing Refund Claims

8.3 In those Taxing Jurisdictions, as set forth in Exhibit K hereto, in which only AT&T Mobility has standing to seek a refund of the Internet Taxes collected and paid by

AT&T Mobility, AT&T Mobility, on behalf of the Settlement Class but at AT&T Mobility's expense, shall file claims with the Taxing Jurisdictions for refunds of the Internet Taxes for the available period or periods for which refund claims may be filed under each jurisdiction's laws.

8.4 In those Taxing Jurisdictions, as set forth in Exhibit L hereto, in which AT&T Mobility and Class Plaintiffs have standing to seek a refund of the Internet Taxes collected and paid by AT&T Mobility, AT&T Mobility, on behalf of the Settlement Class but at AT&T Mobility's expense, shall file claims joined in by the Settlement Class with the Taxing Jurisdictions for refunds of the Internet Taxes for the period or periods for which refund claims may be filed under each jurisdiction's laws.

8.5 In those Taxing Jurisdictions, as set forth in Exhibit M hereto, in which only the Settlement Class Members have standing to seek a refund of the Internet Taxes collected and paid by AT&T Mobility, AT&T Mobility, on behalf of the Settlement Class but at AT&T Mobility's expense, shall prepare and provide: (i) a template for filing a claim for refund of Internet Taxes, (ii) documentation showing the aggregate Internet Taxes paid to each such jurisdiction for the period or periods for which refund claims may be filed under each jurisdiction's laws, and (iii) such other information reasonably necessary to prepare, file and process the refund claims as is requested by the Settlement Class and is available in AT&T Mobility's records, in a format determined by AT&T Mobility.

8.6 **Interest**

Where permitted by statute, AT&T Mobility and/or Class Plaintiffs will seek interest from the Taxing Jurisdictions with respect to the refund claims.

8.7 **Escrow of AT&T Mobility Payments Required By Taxing Jurisdictions**

To the extent that any Taxing Jurisdiction requires that, prior to the Taxing Jurisdiction's grant and/or payment of a claimed refund of Internet Taxes, AT&T Mobility refund those amounts to the affected customers in the Settlement Class, the Settling Parties agree that such payment shall be made by AT&T Mobility in escrow to a fund (the "Pre-Refund Escrow Fund") that is independent of the Escrow Funds and Escrow Accounts separately provided for in paragraph 8.14 of this Settlement Agreement. Such payment shall be made contemporaneously with the filing of the refund claim, if such requirement is known at such time, or within 15 days after receiving notice of such requirement by the Taxing Jurisdiction. In order to effectuate the provisions of this Settlement Agreement, each Settlement Class Member agrees that, for purposes of satisfying the requirement of any Taxing Jurisdiction, that AT&T Mobility refund taxes to the affected customers prior to granting or paying a refund claim, the payment by AT&T of an amount representing Internet Taxes paid by that Settlement Class Member into the Pre-Refund Escrow Fund will be considered the payment by AT&T of such taxes to such Settlement Class Member. Interim Settlement Class Counsel further agree to take any action reasonably necessary on behalf of the Settlement Class to satisfy a Taxing Jurisdiction that such amounts have been refunded to the affected customers in satisfaction of the Taxing Jurisdiction's requirement, in order to facilitate a refund or credit of the Internet Taxes to AT&T Mobility. Amounts paid to the Pre-Refund Escrow Fund shall be held in a mutually agreeable account maintained by a party unrelated to the Settling Parties, until the occurrence of one of the following "Pre-Refund Escrow Release Events":

(a) the Taxing Jurisdiction in question pays monies to AT&T Mobility or provides tax credits in full or partial satisfaction of the refund claims filed with the Taxing Jurisdiction, at which time AT&T Mobility shall become subject to the provisions of sections 8.10 or 8.11 with respect thereto, or

(b) a final determination has been issued, for which further appeal is either not available or not pursued, by either the Taxing Jurisdiction in question denying all or any portion of the refund claims for Internet Taxes filed with that Taxing Jurisdiction or by a court of competent jurisdiction in an action initiated to compel the Taxing Jurisdiction to act on the refund claim, which action results in no refund or credit being received by AT&T Mobility.

Upon the occurrence of a Pre-Refund Escrow Release Event, all amounts previously paid by AT&T Mobility to the Pre-Refund Escrow Fund, and any interest earned thereon, that are attributable to the refund claims filed with the particular Taxing Jurisdiction at issue shall be paid to AT&T Mobility. In the event of a disagreement that prevents the occurrence of a Pre-Refund Escrow Release Event, the Settling Parties will submit the dispute to the Court under its continuing jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 29 hereof.

8.8 **Settlement Class' Consent to AT&T Mobility's Filing of Claims**

Each Settlement Class Member hereby consents to: (a) AT&T Mobility's filing of the claims for refund of Internet Taxes contemplated by this Settlement Agreement; (b) the payment of refunds or issuance of tax credits by the Taxing Jurisdictions to AT&T Mobility in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement; and (c) the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund in accordance with paragraph 8.19. In light of AT&T Mobility's obligation to pay the refunded or credited Internet Taxes received by AT&T Mobility to the Escrow Accounts, the Settling Parties agree that AT&T Mobility has assigned and refunded to the Settlement Class

all Internet Tax refunds to be sought pursuant to the Settlement Agreement as they related to members of the Settlement Class. To the extent required by the law of any state or local jurisdiction at issue, the Settlement Class assigns AT&T Mobility all rights of the Settlement Class Members to file the refund claims for Internet Taxes contemplated by this Settlement Agreement.

8.9 **Procedures For Filing And Prosecuting Refund Claims**

The procedures for filing refund claims as set forth in the foregoing paragraphs shall be governed by the provisions and subject to the time frames set forth in the Refund Procedures Protocol attached hereto as Exhibit N. AT&T Mobility will respond to inquiries from the Taxing Jurisdictions regarding the claims for refunds. If a Taxing Jurisdiction notifies AT&T Mobility of its denial, in whole or in part, of a refund claim, AT&T Mobility will promptly notify Interim Settlement Class Counsel. Interim Settlement Class Counsel shall notify AT&T Mobility as to whether the Settlement Class wants to appeal or otherwise contest the adverse ruling or decision of the Taxing Jurisdiction on the refund claim. If Interim Settlement Class Counsel determines to appeal the adverse ruling or decision of the Taxing Jurisdiction, AT&T Mobility shall cooperate in the appeal. AT&T Mobility and Interim Settlement Class Counsel shall select independent counsel to prosecute the appeal. Independent counsel shall work at the direction of Interim Settlement Class Counsel. AT&T Mobility shall have the right to review and comment on any filings or positions taken with the Taxing Jurisdiction and the right to prohibit the assertion of any positions in such filings that are made in the name of AT&T Mobility and deemed by AT&T Mobility to be inconsistent with the facts, contrary to law, or damaging to AT&T Mobility. Any fees and expenses payable to the independent counsel shall be paid from any funds generated as a result of the appeal or, if the appeal is unsuccessful, by

Interim Settlement Class Counsel. If the Settling Parties disagree on any aspect on the prosecution of an appeal, they will submit the dispute to the Court under its continuing jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 29 hereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, AT&T Mobility shall retain the right but not the obligation to appeal, otherwise contest, or further prosecute an appeal of any adverse ruling or decision in the event that Settlement Class Counsel declines to do so for any reason.

8.10 **AT&T Mobility's Assignment Of Refunds**

With respect to those refund claims filed in the name of AT&T Mobility, to the extent that the Taxing Jurisdiction grants AT&T Mobility a refund, AT&T Mobility shall assign all of its rights, title and interest in the refund related to the members of the Settlement Class, subject to any claims or conditions that may be imposed on such refund by the Taxing Jurisdiction. In accordance with this assignment, AT&T Mobility shall seek to have the refunded monies paid directly to the Escrow Accounts by the Taxing Jurisdictions. All monies that are nonetheless received by AT&T Mobility relating to the refund claims filed with the Taxing Jurisdictions that relate to members of the Settlement Class shall be transferred by AT&T Mobility to the Escrow Accounts established at the Depository Bank within seven (7) business days of receipt. The monies transferred by AT&T Mobility to the Escrow Accounts for refunds from a Taxing Jurisdiction shall be segregated by the Escrow Agent pursuant to the Escrow Agreement into separate accounts, each designated as originating from the specific jurisdiction for which the monies in question were received and each for the benefit of those Settlement Class Members who remitted Internet Taxes to AT&T Mobility for payment to such Taxing Jurisdiction making the refund.

8.11 **Payments By AT&T Mobility Relating To Tax Credits**

To the extent a Taxing Jurisdiction issues future tax credits to AT&T Mobility in lieu of a refund of monies sought on a refund claim for Internet Taxes, AT&T Mobility shall remit monies in the amount of the credit as they relate to members of the Settlement Class to the Escrow Accounts established at the Depository Bank as quickly as possible but within fourteen (14) business days of receipt of notification of the future tax credits as follows:

(a) If, in the judgment of AT&T Mobility, the use of the future tax credit will be spread over a three (3) year period or less, AT&T Mobility shall remit monies to the Escrow Accounts equal to the total future tax credits as they related to members of the Settlement Class; or

(b) If, in the judgment of AT&T Mobility, the use of the future tax credit will be spread over a period longer than three (3) years, AT&T Mobility shall remit monies to the Escrow Accounts equal to the net present value of such future tax credits as they relate to members of the Settlement Class for the fourth and succeeding years using a 5% discount rate to compute the net present value. The amount of the first three (3) years shall be paid with no discount.

The monies paid by AT&T to the Escrow Accounts as a result of credits issued by a tax jurisdiction in lieu of a refund shall be segregated by the Escrow Agent pursuant to the Escrow Agreement into separate accounts, each designated as originating from the specific jurisdiction issuing the future tax credits in question and each for the benefit of those Settlement Class Members who remitted taxes to AT&T Mobility for payment to such Taxing Jurisdiction issuing the credit.

8.12 **Refunds On Claims Filed By Class Plaintiffs**

With respect to those refund claims filed by Class Plaintiffs on behalf of certain members of the Settlement Class, Class Plaintiffs and Interim Settlement Class Counsel shall direct the Taxing Jurisdiction to pay all monies received on any refund claim which relates to members of the Settlement Class to the Escrow Accounts established at the Depository Bank.

The monies received by Class Plaintiffs and Interim Settlement Class Counsel and paid to the Escrow Accounts and monies that are paid directly to the Escrow Accounts by a Taxing Jurisdiction as a result of a refund of Internet Taxes granted by a Taxing Jurisdiction shall be segregated by the Escrow Agent pursuant to the Escrow Agreement into separate accounts, each designated as originated from the specific jurisdiction from which monies in question were received and each for the benefits of those Settlement Class Members who remitted taxes to AT&T Mobility for payment to such Taxing Jurisdiction making the refund.

8.13 **AT&T Mobility's Payment Of Vendor's Compensation**

Except to the extent a Taxing Jurisdiction's refund on a claim filed by Class Plaintiffs under paragraph 8.12 includes some or all of the Vendor's Compensation related to the Internet Taxes paid to such Taxing Jurisdiction, AT&T Mobility shall remit the Vendor's Compensation collected from Settlement Class Members to the Escrow Accounts established at the Depository Bank within seven (7) business days of receipt of the final disposition of the refund request for each Taxing Jurisdiction. The monies paid by AT&T Mobility to the Escrow Accounts shall be segregated by the Escrow Agent pursuant to the Escrow Agreement into separate accounts, each designated as originating from the specific jurisdiction authorizing the

Vendor's Compensation and each for the benefit of those Settlement Class Members who were charged Internet Taxes from which the Vendor's Compensation at issue was deducted.

8.14 **Escrow Agreement**

The Escrow Accounts shall be established at the Depository Bank and administered by the Escrow Agent under the Court's continuing supervision and control pursuant to the Escrow Agreement executed by the Escrow Agent and Settling Parties

8.15 **Jurisdiction Of Court**

All Settlement Funds transmitted to and held by the Escrow Agent as required by this Agreement shall be deemed and considered to be in custodia legis of the Court, and shall remain subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court, until such time as the Settlement Fund has been completely distributed pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, and/or any further order(s) of the Court.

8.16 **Settlement Fund Tax Status**

Settling Parties agree to treat the Settlement Fund as being at all times a "qualified settlement fund" within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1 (or any successor regulation). In addition, the Escrow Agent shall timely make such elections as necessary or advisable to carry out the provisions of this paragraph, including the "relation-back election" (as defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1) (or any successor regulation) back to the earliest permitted date. Such elections shall be made in compliance with the procedures and requirements contained in such regulations. It shall be the responsibility of the Escrow Agent to timely and properly prepare and deliver the necessary documentation for signature by all necessary parties, and thereafter to cause the appropriate filing to occur.

8.17 **Tax Returns**

For the purpose of Treas. Reg. § 1.468B (or any successor regulation) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, the "administrator" shall be the Escrow Agent. The Escrow Agent shall timely and properly file all informational and other tax returns necessary or advisable with respect to the Settlement Fund (including, without limitation, the returns described in Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-2(k)) (or any successor regulation). Such returns (as well as the election described in paragraph 8.16 above) shall be consistent with this subparagraph and in all events shall reflect that all taxes (including any estimated taxes, interest or penalties) on the income earned by the Settlement Fund shall be paid out of the Settlement Fund as provided in paragraph 8.18 hereof.

8.18 **Tax Payments**

All (a) taxes (including any estimated taxes, interest or penalties) arising with respect to the income earned by the Settlement Fund, including any taxes or tax detriments that may be imposed upon AT&T Mobility with respect to any income earned by the Settlement Fund for any period during which the Settlement Fund does not qualify as a "qualified settlement fund" for federal or state income tax purposes, and (b) expenses and costs incurred in connection with the operation and implementation of this paragraph (including, without limitation, expenses of tax attorneys and/or accountants and mailing and distribution costs and expenses relating to filing (or failing to file) the returns described in paragraph 8.17) shall be paid out of the Settlement Fund. In no event shall AT&T Mobility have any responsibility for or liability with respect to the taxes or tax related expenses. The Escrow Agent shall indemnify and hold AT&T Mobility harmless for taxes and tax related expenses (including, without limitation, taxes payable by reason of any such indemnification). Further, taxes and tax related expenses shall be treated

as, and considered to be, a cost of administration of the Settlement fund and shall be timely paid by the Escrow Agent out of the Settlement Fund without prior order from the Court, and the Escrow Agent shall be obligated (notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary) to withhold from distribution any funds necessary to pay such amounts, including the establishment of adequate reserves for any taxes and tax related expenses (as well as any amounts that may be required to be withheld under Treas. Reg. § 1.468.B-2(1)(2)) (or any successor regulation). AT&T Mobility is not responsible therefore nor shall it have any liability with respect thereto. The Settling Parties hereto agree to cooperate with the Escrow Agent, each other, and their tax attorneys and accountants to the extent reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.

8.19 **Distribution Of Net Settlement Fund**

The Net Settlement Fund shall be distributed to Settlement Class Members in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Plan of Distribution attached hereto as Exhibit O.

9. **Cessation of Litigation Activity.** Immediately upon execution of this Agreement, Class Plaintiffs, Interim Settlement Class Counsel, and AT&T Mobility agree to cease all litigation activity in the MDL Actions (other than any activity to implement this Settlement Agreement), and to request the Court to stay all motions or other pre-trial matters and to continue any hearing or trial settings until each of the conditions precedent to the Settling Parties' obligations to proceed to consummate the settlement provided for herein has been satisfied or waived.

10. **Class Certification for Settlement Purposes Only.** If the settlement provided for herein is not approved by the Court in complete accordance with the terms of this Agreement

and does not become subject to a Final Order following preliminary approval, no class will be deemed certified by or as a result of this Agreement, and any order certifying a settlement class will be void for all purposes. In such event, AT&T Mobility will not be deemed to have consented to certification of any class.

11. **Class Notification.** For purposes of Court-approved class notices and establishing that the best practicable notice has been given, membership in the Settlement Class shall be determined exclusively from the records of AT&T Mobility.

12. **Application for Attorneys' Fees, Expenses and Class Representative Compensation.** Interim Settlement Class Counsel agree that they will seek an order approving attorneys' fees that will reflect the results obtained and the work and effort required finally to obtain recoveries for the Settlement Class, and will seek such recovery from the funds obtained for the Settlement Class. Interim Settlement Class Counsel agree that they will seek a fee no greater than the lesser of ten percent (10%) of the aggregate value of the settlement or twenty-five percent (25%) of the amounts refunded by Taxing Jurisdictions to the Settlement Class. Interim Settlement Class Counsel will also seek reimbursement for their reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred in pursuing this litigation on behalf of the Settlement Class from funds obtained for the Settlement Class under this Settlement Agreement. Finally, Interim Settlement Class Counsel will seek compensation to the Class Representatives in an amount not to exceed $5,000 for each state-specific subclass representative from the funds obtained for the Settlement Class.

13. **Dismissal.** Upon the final approval of this Agreement by the Court, Class Plaintiffs and Interim Settlement Class Counsel shall move to dismiss the Actions. Class Plaintiffs and Interim Settlement Class Counsel will seek dismissal without prejudice for the

limited purpose of allowing the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Agreement. The Settling Parties stipulate that the dismissal will be treated for all purposes as a dismissal with prejudice, except when an enforcement action is pending.

14. **Release of AT&T Mobility.** Subject to and effective upon entry of a Final Order, Class Plaintiffs on their own behalf and on behalf of all Settlement Class Members who do not opt out of the Settlement Class, for and in consideration of the terms and undertakings herein, the sufficiency and fairness of which are acknowledged, hereby release and forever discharge AT&T Mobility (as defined in paragraph 1.2) from any and all claims, demands, debts, liabilities, actions, causes of action of every kind and nature, obligations, damages, losses, and costs, whether known or unknown, actual or potential, suspected or unsuspected, direct or indirect, contingent or fixed, that were or could have been asserted or sought in the Actions, relating in any way or arising out of (a) AT&T Mobility's charging of the Internet Taxes (as defined in paragraph 1.17) and (b) any and all claims that were asserted or could have been asserted by the Settlement Class in the Actions with respect to AT&T Mobility's charging of taxes, fees or surcharges on internet access allegedly in violation of ITFA, state and local laws.

"Unknown" claims as released herein means any and all claims that any member of the Settlement Class does not know to exist against AT&T Mobility which, if known, might have affected his or her decision to enter into or to be bound by the terms of this Settlement. The Class Plaintiffs and the members of the Settlement Class acknowledge that they may hereafter discover facts in addition to or different from those that they now know or believe to be true concerning the subject matter of this release, but nevertheless fully, finally, and forever settle and release any and all claims, known or unknown, derivative or direct, suspected or unsuspected, accrued or unaccrued, asserted or unasserted, in law or equity, including, without limitation,

claims that have been asserted or could have been asserted in the Actions against AT&T Mobility with respect to AT&T Mobility's charging of taxes, fees or surcharges on internet access allegedly in violation of ITFA, state and local laws, that they now have, ever had, or may have had as of the date the Final Order becomes final. The foregoing waiver includes, without limitation, an express waiver to the fullest extent permitted by law, by the Class Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members of any and all rights under California Civil Code § 1542 or any similar law of any other state or of the United States, which provides:

> **A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER MIGHT HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR.**

The Settling Parties acknowledge, and the Settlement Class Members shall be deemed by operation of the Final Order to have acknowledged, that the foregoing waiver was separately bargained for and a key element of the Settlement of which this release is a part.

15. **Administration and Cost of Settlement.** AT&T Mobility will bear the responsibility for implementing the Class Notice and for paying the costs of mailing, publication, and printing the notices detailed in paragraph 16 hereof to be given to the Settlement Class pursuant to this Agreement.

The Settlement Administrator shall establish a website with the particulars of the Settlement. The Settlement Administrator also shall establish an automated 1-800 number for Settlement Class Members to obtain further information on the Settlement. The Settlement Administrator shall distribute the Net Settlement Fund to the Settlement Class Members. AT&T Mobility, at its expense, shall provide to the Settlement Administrator a database from its records

of the names and addresses of the Settlement Class Members, including the total amount of Internet Taxes actually paid by each Settlement Class Member with respect to each of the Taxing Jurisdictions for which a refund claim was filed pursuant to this Settlement Agreement. The Costs of Administration shall be paid from the Settlement Fund prior to distribution of the Net Settlement Fund.

16. **Form of Notice to Settlement Class Members.** Class Plaintiffs and AT&T Mobility agree that, if the Court authorizes Class Notice to be disseminated to the Settlement Class Members as provided for in this Agreement, AT&T Mobility will issue a bill message and text message in the forms of Exhibits B and C attached hereto to each Settlement Class Member who is a Current Customer at the time notice is disseminated as identified from AT&T Mobility's records. Any Settlement Class Members who request a long-form notice will receive the document attached hereto as Exhibit D. It is agreed, subject to approval of the Court, that there shall be a single issuance of notice to the Current Customers in the Settlement Class.

In addition to mailing, it is agreed, subject to approval of the Court, that AT&T Mobility will provide for the publication of the Publication Notice twice in the *USA Today*. The form of the Publication Notice is contained in Exhibit E attached hereto. To the extent AT&T Mobility has e-mail addresses of Former Customers, AT&T Mobility will provide Notice in the form of Exhibit E by e-mail to such Former Customers. AT&T Mobility shall use the last known e-mail address of the Former Customers. With respect to those Former Customers who AT&T Mobility does not have e-mail addresses, AT&T Mobility agrees, subject to approval of the Court, to serve a postcard notice in substantially the form attached hereto as Exhibit F to the last known address of such Former Customers as reflected in AT&T Mobility's records.

It is stipulated and agreed that the foregoing terms with respect to the Class Notice are material conditions precedent to AT&T Mobility's obligations under this Agreement. If the extent of Class Notice provided for in this Agreement is not approved by the Court in all material respects, it is understood that AT&T Mobility will not be obligated to proceed with the settlement provided for herein.

17. **Receipt of Requests for Exclusion.** Interim Settlement Class Counsel shall be responsible for obtaining a United States Post Office Box, for the purpose of receiving requests for exclusion that are submitted in accordance with Class Notice. Interim Settlement Class Counsel shall also be responsible for promptly giving notice of the receipt of any such requests for exclusion by providing complete copies thereof to counsel for AT&T Mobility.

18. **Court Submission.** Interim Settlement Class Counsel and AT&T Mobility's counsel will submit this Agreement and the exhibits hereto, along with such other supporting papers as may be appropriate, to the Court for preliminary approval of this Agreement pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the Court declines to grant preliminary approval of this Settlement Agreement and to order notice of hearing with respect to the proposed Settlement Class, or if the Court declines to grant final approval to the foregoing after such notice and hearing, this Agreement will terminate as soon as the Court enters an order unconditionally and finally adjudicating that this Settlement Agreement will not be approved.

19. **Final Judgment.** The Settling Parties agree that the settlement provided herein is expressly conditioned upon dismissal with prejudice of the Actions and, upon final distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, entry of a Final Order dismissing the Actions with prejudice.

20. **AT&T Mobility's Right to Set Aside Settlement.** AT&T Mobility shall have the right to set aside or rescind this Agreement, in the good faith exercise of its discretion, if any of the following events occur.

20.1 Opt-Outs. Opt-outs from Settlement Class Members represent more than five percent (5%) of the dollar amount of the Internet Taxes;

20.2 Objection(s) to Settlement Sustained. If any objections to the proposed settlement are sustained;

20.3 Modification(s) by the Court. If there are any material modifications to this Agreement, including exhibits, by the Court, by any other court, or by any tribunal, agency, entity, or person.

20.4 The Settling Parties agree that pursuant to settled law and under this Agreement, no Settlement Class Member possesses the right to opt-out a class of others from the Settlement. If the Court nevertheless affords this right to any Settlement Class Member, AT&T Mobility shall have the right to set aside or rescind this Agreement.

In the event AT&T Mobility exercises its discretion to set aside the Settlement, this Agreement and all negotiations, proceedings, documents prepared, and statements made in connection herewith shall be without prejudice to the Settling Parties, shall not be deemed or construed to be an admission or confession by the Settling Parties of any fact, matter, or proposition of law, and shall not be used in any manner for any purpose, and all parties to the Actions shall stand in the same position as if this Agreement had not been negotiated, made, or filed with the Court. In such event, the parties to the Actions shall move the Court to vacate any and all orders entered by the Court pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement.

21. **Integration Clause.** This Settlement Agreement contains a full, complete, and integrated statement of each and every term and provision agreed to by and among the Settling Parties and supersedes any prior writings or agreements (written or oral) between or among the Settling Parties, which prior agreements may no longer be relied upon for any purpose. This Settlement Agreement shall not be orally modified in any respect and can be modified only by the written agreement of the Settling Parties supported by acknowledged written consideration. In the event a dispute arises between the Settling Parties over the meaning or intent of this Agreement, the Settling Parties agree that prior drafts, notes, memoranda, discussions or any other oral communications or documents regarding the negotiations, meaning or intent of this Agreement shall not be offered or admitted into evidence. Class Plaintiffs and Interim Settlement Class Counsel acknowledge that, in entering into this Settlement Agreement, they have not relied upon any representations, statements, actions, or inaction by AT&T Mobility or its counsel that are not expressly set forth herein.

22. **Headings.** Headings contained in this Agreement are for convenience of reference only and are not intended to alter or vary the construction and meaning of this Agreement.

23. **Governing Law.** To the extent not governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the contractual terms of this Agreement shall be interpreted and enforced in accordance with the substantive law of the State of Georgia.

24. **Mutual Interpretation.** The Settling Parties agree and stipulate that this Agreement was negotiated on an "arms-length" basis between parties of equal bargaining power. Also, the Agreement has been drafted jointly by Interim Settlement Class Counsel and counsel

for AT&T Mobility. Accordingly, this Agreement shall be neutral and no ambiguity shall be construed in favor of or against any of the Settling Parties.

25. **Notice.** Whenever any written notice is required by the terms of this Agreement, it shall be deemed effective on the delivered date, service to be by First-Class Mail addressed as follows:

If to the Class Plaintiffs or Settlement Class, to:

Edward D. Robertson, Jr.
James P. Frickleton
Mary D. Winter
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON
ROBERTSON & GORNY, P.C.
715 Swifts Highway
Jefferson City, MO 65109

Harry Huge
THE HUGE LAW FIRM PLLC
1080 Wisconsin Ave., N.W.
Suite 3016
Washington, D.C. 20007

If to AT&T Mobility to:

Roman P. Wuller
THOMPSON COBURN LLP
One US Bank Plaza
Suite 3500
St. Louis, Missouri 63101

Archis A. Parasharami
MAYER BROWN LLP
1999 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20006

Notice also shall be given to other parties as directed by the court.

26. **Counterpart Execution.** This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts and will be binding when it has been executed and delivered by the last signatory

hereto. A facsimile signature shall be deemed to constitute an original signature for purposes of this Agreement. After execution of counterparts by each designated signatory, AT&T Mobility agrees to furnish each party with a composite conformed copy of this Agreement reflecting all counterpart signatures.

27. **Binding Upon Successors.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Settling Parties hereof and their representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns.

28. **Severability.** In the event any one or more of the provisions contained in this Agreement shall for any reason be held invalid, illegal, or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provisions if the Settling Parties and their counsel mutually elect by written stipulation to be filed with the Court within twenty (20) days to proceed as if such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provisions had never been included in this Agreement.

29. **Continuing Jurisdiction.** Without affecting the finality of the Final Judgment, the Court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the Actions and the Settling Parties, including all members of the Settlement Class, the administration and enforcement of the Settlement, and the benefits to the Settlement Class hereunder, including for such purposes as supervising the implementation, enforcement, construction, and interpretation of this Settlement Agreement, the order preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement, and the Final Judgment, and hearing and determining an application by Class Counsel for an award of attorneys' fees, expenses and Class Representative compensation. Any dispute or controversies arising with respect to the interpretation, enforcement, or implementation of the Settlement Agreement shall be presented by motion to the Court, exclusively.

30. **Warranty of Counsel.** Interim Settlement Class Counsel unconditionally represent and warrant that they are fully authorized to execute and deliver this Agreement on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs.

The undersigned parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first above written.

BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON
& GORNY, P.C.

DATED: 6-24-10

By _____
Edward D. Robertson, Jr.
James P. Frickleton
Mary D. Winter
715 Swifts Highway
Jefferson City, MO 65109

Interim Settlement Class Counsel

THE HUGE LAW FIRM PLLC

DATED: 6-24-10

By _____
Harry Huge
1080 Wisconsin Ave., N.W.
Suite 3016
Washington, D.C. 20007

Interim Settlement Class Counsel

THOMPSON COBURN LLP

DATED: June 24, 2010

By R P. Wuller

Roman P. Wuller
One U.S. Bank Plaza, Suite 3500
St. Louis, MO 63101

Counsel for Defendant AT&T Mobility LLC

MAYER BROWN

DATED: 6/24/10

By _____

Evan M. Tager
Archis A. Parasharami
1999 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20006

Counsel for Defendant AT&T Mobility LLC

AT&T MOBILITY LLC
By: AT&T Mobility Corporation, its Manager

DATED: June 25, 2010

By _____

Title Chief Financial Officer

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of June, 2010.

_____
Notary Public

My Commission Expires: August 27, 2013



Original Image of 789 F.Supp.2d 935 (PDF)

789 F.Supp.2d 935
United States District Court,
N.D. Illinois,
Eastern Division.

In re AT & T MOBILITY WIRELESS DATA SERVICES SALES TAX LITIGATION.

No. MDL 2147. | No. 10 C 2278. | June 2, 2011.

Synopsis

Background: Following United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation's (JPML) centralizing of 28 actions against mobile phone company, mobile phone customers brought consolidated class action against company for its collection of certain state and local taxes in alleged violation of Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA). Parties moved for final approval of class-action settlement.

Holdings: The District Court, Amy J. Saint Eve, J., held that:

[1] proposed settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, as required for district court's final approval of settlement;

[2] class action notice was adequate; and

[3] class notice provided notice of class counsels' attorney fees in proposed settlement.

Motion granted.

West Headnotes (22)

[1] **Compromise and Settlement**
Fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness

To evaluate the fairness of a settlement agreement that would bind class members, a court must consider the strength of plaintiffs' case compared to the amount of defendants' settlement offer, an assessment of the likely complexity, length and expense of the litigation, an evaluation of the amount of opposition to settlement among affected parties, the opinion of competent counsel, and the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the time of settlement. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[2] **Compromise and Settlement**
Factors, Standards and Considerations; Discretion Generally

The most important factor relevant to the fairness of a class action settlement is the strength of plaintiffs' case on the merits balanced against the amount offered in the settlement, and in conducting this analysis, the district court should begin by quantifying the net expected value of continued litigation to the class by estimating the range of possible outcomes and ascribing a probability to each point on the range. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.

Cases that cite this headnote

[3] **Compromise and Settlement**
Factors, Standards and Considerations; Discretion Generally

District courts must exercise the highest degree of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[4] **Compromise and Settlement**
Particular applications

Strength of action brought by class of mobile phone service customers against mobile phone company for alleged violations of Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), when balanced against amount offered by company in settlement, supported finding that proposed settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, as required for district court's final approval of settlement; class members would realize significant benefits from settlement in form of expected $956,160,000 and company's promise to stop collecting taxes at issue absent change in law, company had

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EXHIBIT 1

variety of potentially meritorious defenses to class action, and class members would have faced uphill battle in obtaining their sought-after relief at trial. Internet Tax Freedom Act, § 1100 et seq., 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[5] **Compromise and Settlement**
⇦ Particular applications

Likely level of complexity, length, and expense of multidistrict litigation between class of mobile phone service customers and mobile phone company supported finding that proposed settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, as required for district court's final approval of settlement in action for alleged violations of Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA); if court denied approval protracted litigation over many years would likely ensue, given that company maintained it would move to compel named plaintiffs to arbitrate their respective claims, file interlocutory appeal if motion to compel failed, and file motion to dismiss if arbitration efforts failed, and parties would have to engage in lengthy, expensive, and complex discovery if they went to trial. Internet Tax Freedom Act, § 1100 et seq., 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note; ; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.

Cases that cite this headnote

[6] **Compromise and Settlement**
⇦ Particular applications

Small amount of opposition by affected parties to proposed settlement between mobile phone service customers and mobile phone company supported finding that settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, as required for district court's approval of settlement in consolidated class action for alleged violations of Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA); only 235 out of over 32 million class members opted out, and class members filed only 10 objections with specific arguments. Internet Tax Freedom Act, § 1100 et seq., 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[7] **Compromise and Settlement**
⇦ Particular applications

Opinion of competent counsel regarding proposed settlement in consolidated class action by mobile phone service customers against mobile phone company supported finding that settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, as required for district court's approval of settlement in action for alleged violations of Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA); class counsel believed that settlement was beneficial to class and met class-certification requirements, and expert on class actions explained why settlement met class certification requirements. Internet Tax Freedom Act, § 1100 et seq., 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[8] **Compromise and Settlement**
⇦ Fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness

The opinion of competent counsel is relevant to the question whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate under class actions rule. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[9] **Compromise and Settlement**
⇦ Particular applications

Stage of proceedings and amount of discovery completed at time of proposed settlement between class of mobile phone service customers and mobile phone company supported finding that settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, as required for district court's approval of settlement in action for alleged violations of Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA); although formal discovery had not taken place prior to entering into agreement, parties had engaged in considerable, and expensive informal discovery, and information obtained during informal discovery was sufficient to enable court and parties to evaluate claims. Internet Tax Freedom

Act, § 1100 et seq., 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[10] **Constitutional Law**
⇦ Class Actions

Due process does not require that every class member receive notice of a class action. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 5.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[11] **Compromise and Settlement**
⇦ Notice and communications

Constitutional Law
⇦ Compromise and settlement

Federal Civil Procedure
⇦ Sufficiency

Notice of class action settlement regarding mobile phone company's alleged violations of Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), sent to class members by mobile phone company, was adequate under class action rule and as matter of due process, where company mailed notice to its 22.5 million then-existing customers with their bills, which included Spanish translation where relevant, company sent notice by text message to more than 32 million class members who were customers at that time, company published notice in national edition of national newspaper, and notice administrator sent email notice to over one million former customers and postcard notice to over nine million former customers. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; Internet Tax Freedom Act, § 1100 et seq., 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.

Cases that cite this headnote

[12] **Federal Civil Procedure**
⇦ Consumers, purchasers, borrowers, and debtors

Class definition encapsulating all persons or entities who were customers of mobile phone company and who were charged internet taxes on bills issued during specified period of time was sufficiently definite, in class action by mobile phone service customers against mobile phone company for alleged violations of Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA). Internet Tax Freedom Act, § 1100 et seq., 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note.

Cases that cite this headnote

[13] **Compromise and Settlement**
⇦ Notice and communications

Apprising objectors to a proposed class action settlement of their legal rights and obligations is entirely proper, even if such notification has a marginal deterrent effect.

Cases that cite this headnote

[14] **Federal Civil Procedure**
⇦ Notice and Communications

Notice of attorney fees is a constituent part of an effective class notice. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[15] **Compromise and Settlement**
⇦ Notice and communications

Federal Civil Procedure
⇦ Sufficiency

Class notice provided notice of class counsels' attorney fees in proposed settlement between class of mobile phone service customers and mobile phone company, as required to be effective class notice, under class action rule, in action for alleged violations of Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), where notice provided that class members could obtain more detailed description of terms of proposed settlement and to read full notice of proposed settlement, which more fully described members rights, by visiting website, or by calling toll-free number, and later notice of pendency of proposed settlement provided counsel would apply to court for award of attorney fees no greater than lesser of 10 percent of aggregate value of settlement or 25 percent of amounts refunded by taxing jurisdictions to class. Internet Tax Freedom Act, § 1100 et seq., 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[16] **Compromise and Settlement**
⇦ Notice and communications

Federal Civil Procedure
⇦ Sufficiency

Text-message notice provided to mobile phone service customer, which stated that customer might be entitled to benefits under class action settlement and directed customer to website or phone number, was effective notice, under class action rule, of class action by mobile phone service customers against mobile phone company, alleging violations of Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA); both website and phone number provided detailed information concerning class members' options, as well as various deadlines. Internet Tax Freedom Act, § 1100 et seq., 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.

Cases that cite this headnote

[17] **Compromise and Settlement**
⇦ Notice and communications

Federal Civil Procedure
⇦ Sufficiency

Class notice provided to mobile phone service customers adequately disclosed amount of expenses and costs for which class attorneys sought reimbursement, as required to create adequate class action notice, under class action rule, in action alleging that mobile phone company violated Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), where notice stated that settlement class counsel would seek reimbursement for their reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred in pursuing litigation on behalf of class. Internet Tax Freedom Act, § 1100 et seq., 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.

Cases that cite this headnote

[18] **Federal Civil Procedure**
⇦ Common interest in subject matter, questions and relief; damages issues

Settlement of a class action does not relieve a district court of its duty to perform a robust analysis of the plaintiffs' predominance showing under rule provision regarding types of class actions allowed. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(b)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.

Cases that cite this headnote

[19] **Alternative Dispute Resolution**
⇦ Remedies and Proceedings for Enforcement in General

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not impose an affirmative obligation on courts to compel arbitration independent of any application by a party. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.

Cases that cite this headnote

[20] **Compromise and Settlement**
⇦ Factors, Standards and Considerations; Discretion Generally

There is no rule that class settlements benefit all class members equally as long as the settlement terms are rationally based on legitimate considerations.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

[21] **Federal Courts**
⇦ Effect of transfer and subsequent proceedings

District court had jurisdiction to entertain mobile phone service customers' class action against mobile phone company for alleged violations of Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), even though action was multidistrict litigation and consolidated master class-action complaint sought, amongst other remedies, injunctive relief; proposed settlement did not provide for injunctive relief, and so any defect in underlying complaint did not afflict propriety of the ultimate agreement disposing of litigation. Internet Tax Freedom Act, § 1100 et seq., 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note.

Cases that cite this headnote

[22] **Compromise and Settlement**
⊕ Particular applications

District court could consistently approve class action settlement agreement, finding it to be fair, reasonable, and adequate, while also finding that requested attorney fee was unreasonable; settlement agreement was not contingent on court's approval of class counsel's motion for attorney fees. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

Opinion

939 *MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Judge:

This consolidated class action arises from numerous cases brought against AT & T Mobility, L.L.C. ("AT & T"), for its collection of certain state and local taxes in alleged violation of the Internet Tax Freedom Act ("ITFA"). The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("the JPML") centralized twenty-eight actions against AT & T pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1408 in this Court. (R. 1.) On June 24, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Consolidated Master Class Action Complaint. (R. 48.) On August 11, 2010, the Court granted in large part the parties' joint motion for class certification, preliminary approval of class settlement, approval of notice, and appointment of notice administrator.[1] (R. 96.) Since then, the parties have filed memoranda in support of their motion for final approval of the class-action settlement, and a number of objectors (as well as certain states) have filed briefs in opposition to the Settlement Agreement ("the Agreement" or "the Settlement"). The Court held a fairness hearing on March 10, 2011, and allowed further time for amici to file briefs. (R. 169.)

Having studied the Agreement and the relevant briefing, the Court grants the motion for final approval of the Settlement (R. 154), finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Court will address in a separate order Class Counsel's motion for approval of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, and for approval of incentive awards for class representatives (R. 124).

***940 BACKGROUND**

I. The History of the Litigation

The ITFA provides that no state shall impose taxes on Internet access, or multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce, beginning November 1, 2003, and ending November 1, 2014. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1998) (as amended). AT & T remitted a variety of sales and use taxes to certain state and local taxing authorities, which led numerous plaintiffs, who contended that the ITFA forbade such taxes, to bring suit. (R. 156 at 15.) AT & T subsequently moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to transfer those actions for consolidated proceedings. (R. 1 at 1.) On April 7, 2010, the JPML transferred the cases to this Court, but declined to transfer the single case of *Johnson v. AT & T*, No. 4:09–CV–4014. (*Id.* at 3–7.) Plaintiffs in the *Wiand* action pending in the Eastern District of Michigan and the *Johnson* action pending in the Southern District of Texas opposed inclusion of their actions in centralized proceedings. (*Id.* at 1.)

The JPML carefully considered certain Plaintiffs' arguments that the application of the ITFA will vary from state to state and that centralization could have the negative effect of allowing AT & T later to argue against class certification based on the distinct tax rules of each state. (R. 1 at 2.) Nevertheless, the panel concluded that "the benefits of centralization are significant," and thus found that the relevant actions met the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The JPML determined, however, that the *Johnson* action was sufficiently distinct to warrant exclusion from the centralized proceedings. (*Id.*)

On June 24, 2010, AT & T and 57 plaintiffs in the consolidated actions filed a joint motion for an order certifying the proposed class and subclasses for settlement purposes, preliminarily approving the settlement agreement, approving the notice plan, ordering the dissemination of notice as set out in the Settlement Agreement, and appointing Analysis Research Planning Corporation ("ARPC") as the Notice and Settlement Administrator. (R. 49.) On August 11, 2010, the Court granted the joint motion for class certification, preliminary approval of class settlement, approval of notice, and appointment of notice administrator, but reserved judgment on whether to appoint ARPC as settlement administrator. (R. 96.)

In preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement, the Court weighed the strength of Plaintiffs' case against that of AT & T. (R. 97 at 20–24.) It observed that Plaintiffs' action faces "significant hurdles," but noted that AT & T had agreed for the purpose of the proposed settlement not to argue that (1) Plaintiffs must arbitrate their claims; (2) the Court cannot certify the proposed class; (3) Plaintiffs lack standing; (4) the ITFA does not preempt the relevant taxes; and (5) the voluntary-payment doctrine bars Plaintiffs' claims. (*Id.* at 21.) The Court further observed the relevance of discounting to present value, which means that, even if the Plaintiffs were ultimately to prevail in the future, a dollar then would not be equivalent to a dollar now. (*Id.* at 21–22.) This constituted a benefit to the Proposed Settlement, which would provide immediate benefits. (*Id.* at 22.) In addition, the Court noted AT & T's agreement that it would stop collecting taxes on Internet-access services within 30 days of the Court's preliminary approval. (*Id.*)

Further benefits to class members as a result of the Agreement involved AT & T's creation of an escrow account and coordination of tax refunds and credits without requiring class members to submit any claim forms. (*Id.*) Within 90 days of preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement, AT & T had to begin filing refund and credit applications. (*Id.*) The Court ***941** also observed the creation of state-specific subclass accounts, which would facilitate recovery in light of different states' distinct procedures for allowing refunds. (*Id.* at 22–23.) In addition, AT & T agreed to waive its opposition to class certification and to pay the cost of notifying the class. (Id. at 23.) The Court concluded its discussion of the relative strengths of the parties' cases by observing:

> Movants have represented that hundreds of millions of dollars are at issue in this action, but they have not provided a more-definite figure of how much is at issue or exactly how much Plaintiffs can expect to recover. That is not problematic at this stage, however, because it appears that Plaintiffs would receive a high percentage of what is at issue—whatever that dollar value may be—under the Proposed Settlement Agreement. As such, this factor favors preliminary approval.

(*Id.* at 24.)

The likely complexity, length, and expense of litigation favored granting preliminary approval of the Settlement because AT & T's service agreements contain mandatory arbitration clauses. (*Id.* at 25–26.) In relying on the opinion of AT & T's counsel and the Interim Settlement Class Counsel, the Court deemed it relevant that "class counsel will only be paid from state-specific escrow accounts if those accounts are funded through refunds or credits from the taxing jurisdictions, and they have agreed to seek fees that are no greater than the lesser of ten percent of the aggregate value of the settlement or twenty-five percent of the aggregate value of the class damages actually recovered." (*Id.* at 26–27.)

Although formal discovery had not taken place, that fact alone did not preclude approval of the Settlement in light of the significant amount of informal discovery that the parties had conducted. (*Id.* at 27.) The Court emphasized the unique circumstances of the case, in that Defendant acted as a pass-through to taxing authorities, but stressed that it "will require additional information, including detailed financial information, before giving final approval." (*Id.* at 28.)

The proposed notice satisfied Rule 23. The notice plan entailed AT & T's sending both a message with each customer's monthly bill and a text message to its current customers. (*Id.* at 30.) Former customers would receive notice via email, if they had provided the same to AT & T, or by U.S. Mail otherwise. (*Id.*) In addition, AT & T agreed to publish a notice twice in the *USA Today* newspaper. (*Id.*) The details contained in the various forms of notice met the requirements of Rule 23. (*Id.* at 30–33.)

II. The Settlement Agreement

The Court briefly summarizes the more important provisions of the Settlement Agreement, which acknowledges Plaintiffs' allegation that AT & T charged Internet Taxes to its customers in violation of the ITFA and/or various state statutes and common-law doctrines, thus rendering AT & T liable for damages, but makes clear that AT & T views these allegations as incorrect and denies all liability. (R. 50–3 at 13.)

The Agreement defines the relevant class as follows:

> All persons or entities who are or were customers of AT & T Mobility and who were charged Internet Taxes on bills issued from November 1, 2005 through [the final date on which AT & T Mobility issues bills to customers prior to implementing the billing system changes pursuant to Section 8.1].

> Excluded from the Settlement Class are: (i) AT & T Mobility, any entity in which AT & T Mobility has a controlling interest *942 or which has a controlling interest in AT & T Mobility, and AT & T Mobility's legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns; (ii) governmental entities; (iii) AT & T Mobility's employees, officers, directors, agents and representatives; and (iv) the Court presiding over any motion to approve this Settlement Agreement.

(R. 50–3 at 14–15.) The Court certified this Class on August 11, 2010.[2] (R. 97 at 34.) The Court further certified District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and forty-five state-specific subclasses for:

> All persons or entities who are or were customers of AT & T Mobility and who were charged Internet Taxes in [STATE] on bills issued from November 1, 2005 through the final date on which AT & T Mobility issues bills to customers prior to implementing the billing system changes pursuant to Section 8.1 of the Settlement Agreement. Excluded from the [State] Settlement Class are: (i) AT & T Mobility, any entity in which AT & T Mobility has a controlling interest or which has a controlling interest in AT & T Mobility, and AT & T Mobility's legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns; (ii) governmental entities; (iii) AT & T Mobility's employees, officers, directors, agents and representatives; and (iv) the Court presiding over any motion to approve this Settlement Agreement.
>
> (R. 97 at 34–35.)

The Agreement imposes a variety of obligations on AT & T. First, the company must cease charging the challenged Internet Taxes, though it may reinstate such charges if the Court does not approve the Agreement or if "federal, state or local laws, statutes, regulations, administrative decisions or pronouncements, or the interpretation of any of the foregoing specifically requires, authorizes or permits the collection and payment of Internet Taxes on, or on the charge for, any services or products set forth on Exhibit I." (*Id.* at 15.) Second, AT & T must process and assist in processing refund claims on behalf of class members. The Agreement contemplates that the taxing jurisdictions have different methods for seeking reimbursement of the taxes. Specifically:

> 8.3. In those Taxing Jurisdictions ... in which only AT & T Mobility has standing to seek a refund of the Internet Taxes collected and paid by AT & T Mobility, AT & T Mobility, on behalf of the Settlement Class but at AT & T Mobility's expense, shall file claims with the Taxing Jurisdictions for refunds of the Internet Taxes for the available period or periods for which refund claims may be filed under each jurisdiction's laws.
>
> 8.4. In those Taxing Jurisdictions ... in which AT & T Mobility and Class Plaintiffs have standing to seek a refund of the Internet Taxes collected and paid by AT & T Mobility, AT & T Mobility, on behalf of the Settlement Class but at AT & T Mobility's expense, shall file claims joined in by the Settlement Class with the Taxing Jurisdictions for refunds of the Internet Taxes for the period or periods for which refund claims may be filed under each jurisdiction's laws.
>
> 8.5 In those Taxing Jurisdictions ... in which only the Settlement Class Members have standing to seek a refund of the Internet Taxes collected and paid by AT & T Mobility, AT & T Mobility, on behalf of the Settlement Class but at AT & T Mobility's expense, shall prepare *943 and provide: (i) a template for filing a claim for refund of Internet Taxes, (ii) documentation showing the aggregate Internet Taxes paid to each such jurisdiction for the period or periods for which refund claims may be filed under each jurisdiction's laws, and (iii) such other information reasonably necessary to prepare, file and process the refund claims as is requested by the Settlement Class and is available in AT & T Mobility's records, in a format determined by AT & T Mobility.
>
> (R. 50–3 at 15–16.)

Third, the Agreement provides that AT & T and the Class Plaintiffs will seek interest from the Taxing Jurisdictions with respect to the refund claims when permitted by statute. (*Id.* at 16.)

Fourth, for those Taxing Jurisdictions that require AT & T to refund the relevant Internet Taxes to affected customers before those jurisdictions will grant a claimed refund, AT & T will make such a payment in escrow to a fund contemporaneously with the filing of the refund claim. (*Id.* at 17.) Pursuant to the Agreement, "each Settlement Class Member agrees that, for purposes of satisfying the requirement of any Taxing Jurisdiction, that [*sic*] AT & T Mobility refund taxes to the affected customers prior to granting or paying a refund claim, the payment by AT & T of an amount representing Internet Taxes paid by that

Settlement Class Member into the Pre–Refund Escrow Fund will be considered the payment by AT & T of such taxes to such Settlement Class Member." (*Id.*) An entity unrelated to the Settling Parties will maintain the amounts paid into the escrow fund until one of two possible release events occurs, upon which time AT & T will receive back all amounts, plus any interest earned, it paid to the fund. (*Id.* at 17–18.)

Fifth, the Class Members consent to AT & T's filing of claims and to the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund. (*Id.* at 18.) Sixth, the Agreement explains procedures for filing and prosecuting refund claims. (*Id.* at 19–20.) Should a taxing jurisdiction deny a refund claim, AT & T shall promptly notify Class Counsel and, if the latter decide to appeal, AT & T will cooperate in that process. (*Id.* at 19.) Independent counsel shall conduct any such appeals and will be paid from any funds realized by the appeal or, in the event that the appeal is unsuccessful, by Class Counsel.

The Agreement next provides that AT & T shall assign all of its rights in a refund to the Settlement Class and will seek to have the taxing authorities pay the refunded amounts directly to the Escrow Accounts. (*Id.* at 20.) To the extent AT & T directly receives refunds, it will transfer them to the Escrow Accounts within seven business days. (*Id.*) Importantly, "[t]he monies transferred by AT & T Mobility to the Escrow Accounts for refunds from a Taxing Jurisdiction shall be segregated ... into separate accounts, each designated as originating from the specific jurisdiction for which the monies in questions were received ..." (*Id.*)

If a taxing jurisdiction issues future tax credits in lieu of a pecuniary refund, AT & T shall "remit monies in the amount of the credit ... to the Escrow Accounts" within fourteen business days. (*Id.* at 21.) AT & T will apply no discount rate to compute the net present value of future tax credits spread over three years or less, but will apply a 5% discount rate for future tax credits that extend into fourth and succeeding years. (*Id.*)

The Agreement further provides that AT & T shall remit the Vendor's Compensation collected from Class Members to the Escrow Accounts within seven business days, and the Escrow Agent shall segregate the monies into separate accounts, ***944** "each designated as originating from the specific jurisdiction authorizing the Vendor's Compensation and each for the benefit of those Settlement Class Members who were charged Internet Taxes from which the Vendor's Compensation at issue was deducted." (*Id.* at 22–23.)

Upon entry of a final order, the Agreement provides that Class Members who do not opt out and Class Plaintiffs "release and forever discharge AT & T Mobility from any and all claims ... causes of action, obligations, ... and costs, whether known or unknown ... that were or could have been asserted or sought in the Actions, relating in any way or arising out of (a) AT & T Mobility's charging of the Internet Taxes ... and (b) any and all claims that were asserted or could have been asserted by the Settlement Class in the Actions with respect to AT & T Mobility's charging of taxes, fees or surcharges on internet access allegedly in violation of ITFA, state and local laws." (*Id.* at 27.) The Agreement includes an express waiver to the fullest extent permitted by law and provides that "[t]he Settling Parties acknowledge, and the Settlement Class Members shall be deemed by operation of the Final Order to have acknowledged, that the foregoing waiver was separately bargained for and a key element of the Settlement of which this release is a part." (*Id.* at 28.)

Furthermore, AT & T has the right to set aside or rescind the Agreement if "any objections to the proposed settlement are sustained" or if "there are any material modifications to this Agreement, including exhibits, by the Court [.]" (*Id.* at 31.) Finally, the Agreement provides that the Court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the Actions and the Settling Parties and that "[a]ny dispute or controversies arising with respect to the interpretation, enforcement, or implementation of the Settlement Agreement shall be presented by motion to the Court, exclusively." (*Id.* at 34.)

III. Class–Member Objections

A. Douglas Cherry, individually and on behalf of Kraft Foods Global, Inc.

Douglas W. Cherry, individually and as attorney for Kraft Foods Global, Inc., objects to the Settlement on the ground that Kraft has reimbursed Cherry and thousands of its other employees for Internet-access taxes that AT & T charged to those employees. (R. 136.) Kraft Foods thus challenges AT & T's issuing refunds to its employees who are Class Members instead of to Kraft. (*Id.* at 1–2.) Cherry and Kraft Foods thus propose that, "in these situations, the employer (in this case Kraft) that actually paid the taxes be substituted as a member of the settlement class for all such individuals with respect to all such amounts." (*Id.* at 2.) They submit that "[t]he employer is the real party in interest with respect to all such amounts under the law of subrogation." (*Id.*)

B. Paige Nash

Objector Paige Nash contends that the notice provided to Class Members in this case falls short of the notice requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, violates those members' due-process rights, and contravenes the decisions of *Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), and *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). (R. 147.) Nash does not explain how the Settlement runs afoul of these decisions. Nash does contend, however, that due process requires that every single class member receive notice. (*Id.* at 1.) Furthermore, Nash submits that the lawyers for the class will file the fee petition after the objection deadline and argues that this sequence also violates due ***945** process, Rule 23(h), and the Ninth Circuit's decision in *In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir.2010). (*Id.* at 1–2.). Finally, Nash states that "[a]ny discussion on attorney [*sic*] fees should not be made until after the amount collected is known. Right now there is no basis upon which to support an award of attorney [*sic*] fees." (*Id.* at 2.)

In a supplemental filing, Nash specifically incorporates Texas's objections to the settlement that "Texas consumers will recover nothing, though they will be bound by the release negotiated on their behalf"; "Texas law provides remedies for tax challenge"; "Texas is grandfathered under ITFA and the Lawyers knew it"; and "AT & T's customers fare better under Texas law than under the settlement." (R. 172 at 1–2.) She further objects that the alleged monetary relief to the Texas subclass is illusory and that the settling parties have not met their burden of proof. (*Id.* at 2.)

C. Mike Hale, et al.

Michael Hale, Summer Hogan, Michael Schulz, and Omar Rivero ("Hale") raise a variety of objections to the Agreement. (R. 141.) As a preliminary matter, Hale objects to the class definition because of its failsafe definition, which depends on the determination of an ultimate merits issue in this case. (*Id.* at 2.) Hale then articulates a series of further objections, specifically that: (1) the class notice improperly (though truthfully) states that objectors may be subject to depositions; (2) proponents of the Settlement have not carried their burden of proof that the settlement is reasonable, adequate, and fair; (3) there may be a disparity in the refunds that Class Members of different states receive; (4) the class notice does not provide sufficient information by which one could determine the actual dollar amount of fees sought by Class Counsel; (5) the sought-after attorneys' fees are excessive under a lodestar analysis or a percentage-of-recovery analysis; (6) the class notice does not disclose the amount of expenses and costs that the attorneys seek reimbursement for and that amount may be excessive; (7) proponents of the Settlement cannot discharge their burden of proof on commonality, typicality, and predominance; and (8) the class definition is vague and ambiguous. (*Id.* at 2–3.)

D. Travis Cox and Margaret Johnson

Travis Cox and Margaret Johnson, who are both members of the proposed Texas subclass, object to the settlement. (R. 132.) In addition to objecting generally to the class notice, which they deem insufficient, Cox and Johnson make a number of objections with respect to the Settlement itself. They first note that the parties have reached a settlement without the benefit of formal discovery. (*Id.* at 2.) Observing Texas's difficult financial situation, they also express concern that the relevant taxing jurisdictions will not pay refunds. (*Id.* at 2–3.) Cox and Johnson also worry that Class Counsel will neglect AT & T customers in certain states in favor of customers in those states in which counsel will receive large fees on refunds. (*Id.* at 3.) Cox and Johnson further assert, without explanation, that the incentive payments to class representatives are excessive. (*Id.*)

Cox and Johnson object with greater specificity to the fee petition. (*Id.* at 3–6.) They contend that "Class Counsel will not file an attorney fee application prior to the objection deadline on March 10, 2011."[3] ***946** (*Id.* at 3.) They therefore submit that "[c]lass members ... were not given a reasonable time to evaluate and object to the motion," which they argue violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h). (*Id.* at 3–4.) Cox and Johnson also rely on *Mercury*, 618 F.3d at 988, for the proposition that it is improper to set objection deadlines prior to the deadline for filing motions for attorneys' fees in class actions. (*Id.* at 4–6.) Finally, "they object that [i]n this case there will not even be the opportunity to cross check using the lodestar method." (*Id.* at 6.)

E. Angela Vrana and Barbara M. Fisher

Angela Vrana and Barbara M. Fisher object to the Settlement. (R. 143.) They argue that it would violate the parties' contract, which explicitly provides that the parties would resolve all disputes between them through arbitration. (*Id.* at 2–5.) Vrana and Fisher submit that, "[j]ust as that very agreement prevents one party to the transaction from resolving a dispute through a court or class action, the agreement also prevents

ATTM from resolving a dispute through a court or class action." (*Id.* at 2.) They contend that the parties entered into the arbitration agreement because they expected that it would allow consumers to enjoy better recoveries than would be available in class actions. (*Id.* at 3.) They further submit that the Federal Arbitration Act compels AT & T to abide by its agreement to arbitrate, and argue that the law estops AT & T from contesting the enforceability of the arbitration agreement. (*Id.* at 4–6.) Vrana and Fisher thus request the Court to stay proceedings until the parties engage in arbitration. (*Id.* at 6.)

In the event that the Court declines to enter a stay, Vrana and Fisher articulate a variety of objections to the settlement. (*Id.* at 7–14.) They observe that, where—as here—settlement approval takes place before formal class certification, the law requires a higher standard of fairness. (*Id.* at 7.) They then proceed to make a number of criticisms. First, they contend that AT & T cannot obtain a refund from Texas because the state requires a person seeking a refund first to refund all relevant taxes and interest "to the person from whom the taxes were collected." (*Id.* at 8.) Vrana and Fisher submit that ¶ 8.7 of the settlement agreement will be inefficacious in this respect because a "pre-refund escrow fund" is not a refund and the parties' agreement that AT & T's payment into the escrow fund "will be considered payment by AT & T of such taxes to" the Class Member will not solve the problem. (*Id.* at 9.) They opine further:

> [C]lass members have no interest in or right to the money in the Pre–Refund Escrow Fund. More importantly, the state is not bound by the class members' agreement. The statute requires actual payment of the refund to the person who paid it, not an agreement by the payer that the ATTM has refunded the tax when, in fact, it has not refunded the tax.

(*Id.* at 9) (emphasis omitted).

Vrana and Fisher also express concern that AT & T's agreement to stop collecting taxes is illusory because it contains an exception that eliminates the promise. (*Id.* at 9–10.) Specifically, they point to language that gives AT & T the right to reinstate charges for Internet taxes if its "interpretation" of "federal, state or local laws, statutes, regulations, administrative decisions or pronouncements" requires or permits it. (*Id.* at 10.) Finally, Vrana and Fisher object that the $5,000 incentive *947 awards are excessive because the class representatives "never had to respond to a single discovery request or deposition." (*Id.*)

F. Karen Wiand

Karen Wiand offers a rather detailed objection to the Settlement, and her counsel appeared at the fairness hearing to express these objections. (R. 116.) She broadly objects to the nature of the Agreement, which purports immediately to relieve AT & T of all related breach-of-contract claims against it, while only imposing a future obligation on AT & T to help the Class Members obtain refunds from state and local governments. (*Id.* at 1.) Wiand also contends that her state, Michigan, has a tax statute of limitations, which precludes any recovery of "tax refunds back to 2005." (*Id.*) In addition, Wiand questions paragraph 8.2 of the Settlement Agreement, which she reads to permit AT & T to resume monthly billing upon expiration of the ITFA in 2014, even if state laws to the contrary then exist. (*Id.* at 1–2.) She further objects to the fact that the Agreement seeks to "saddle" the Class Members with the administration costs and attorneys' fees. (*Id.* at 2.) In addition, Wiand maintains that AT & T's improper tax collections underlying the present lawsuit are criminal violations of Michigan law, which render AT & T's cessation of the same to be invalid consideration for the Settlement. (*Id.*) Furthermore, Wiand considers the notice to be inadequate because "many consumers" did not receive the relevant text, the notice did not provide any information as to the amount consumers would receive under the Settlement, and because the notice "fails to apprise consumers that statutes of limitations would bar recovery for portions of the time period that are touted as encompassed by the settlement." (*Id.* at 6.) Wiand also objects to the $5,000 award that the Agreement purports to provide each named Plaintiff because none of those Plaintiffs responded to any written discovery, appeared for a deposition, or contributed in any other way to the litigation. (*Id.*)

Finally, Wiand contends that Class Counsel have conducted the present litigation inadequately. (*Id.* at 2–6.) She specifically objects on the following grounds: (1) Class Counsel agreed to settle without conducting any formal discovery and thus seek to settle without "determining which states will pay refunds ... [and] the specific actual procedure for refunds which the various states would require"; (2) Class Counsel have failed to establish a procedure for proposed tax refunds for Michigan residents; (3) Class Counsel have improperly purported to represent Michigan class members via a Michigan law firm in which one of the partners testified

as an expert at the request of AT & T in support of its motion to dismiss a similar consumer lawsuit; and (4) Class Counsel face a conflict of interest because, although they purport to represent consumers in all states, they "will receive payments of huge fees from refunds paid in some states even if consumers in other states receive little or nothing." (*Id.* at 3–6.) On this last point, Wiand further explains:

> Class counsel's disingenuous ploy to overcome this conflict is facile and immoral—arguing that this arrangement is perfectly fine because they will get little or no contingent fees from consumers in states where refunds are little or nothing—leaving totally unanswered the fact that those consumers would be sacrificed via permanent dismissal of their claims in favor of consumers in other states.

(*Id.* at 5.)

G. Shelley Stevens

Shelley Stevens, a Class Member, objects to the Settlement on the following ***948** grounds: (1) every Class Member is entitled to personal service because AT & T knows their contact information; (2) the post card Stevens received did not provide information concerning Class Members' options or the deadline for objecting, opting out, or even filing a claim; (3) if AT & T wrongly collected taxes, then it should pay the Class Members; (4) the Settlement lacks cohesion because of divergent state (and circuit) laws, some of which may bar refunds due to statutes of limitations; and (5) Class Counsel and AT & T had not informed Stevens of the sought-after attorneys' fees. (R. 151.)

H. Margaret Strohlein

Objector Margaret Strohlein has filed a detailed objection. (R. 156–4.) Observing AT & T's "seemingly overt violations of the ITFA," Strohlein argues that the strength of Plaintiffs' case does not support settlement. (*Id.* at 3–4.) In this respect, she considers Defendant's potential defenses, as well as impediments to Plaintiffs' ability to recover independent of the Settlement, to be "hollow." (*Id.*) She further observes that the parties filed their joint motion for preliminary settlement only 70 days after consolidation, notes that the docket is devoid of conflict between the parties, and points out that there is no way to know whether the Agreement is beneficial to the Class because the parties did not conduct discovery. (*Id.*)

Strohlein also objects to the terms of the Settlement. (*Id.* at 4–8.) She contends that the requested fee is unreasonable and does not reflect what the attorneys would have received from a paying client in a similar case. (*Id.* at 4–5.) Strohlein observes that Lead Counsel estimate the maximum monetary recovery at $956,160,000, and request 25% of the same, which amounts to $239,040,500.[4] (*Id.* at 5.) Strohlein points out that, based on the number of days between consolidation and the fairness hearing, "92 attorneys will be entitled to a daily salary of $7,873.53, seven days a week, for 11 months of work." (*Id.*) She concludes that, "[t]o reward each attorney an average of $2.59 million dollars for such an uncertain reward after this protracted litigation is not even close to the going market rate." (*Id.*)

Strohlein next argues that the reward to Class Members is uncertain "[d]ue to the wildly disparate laws among the states." (*Id.* at 5–6.) She then objects to the lack of a lodestar cross-check, which the Seventh Circuit has noted is a guard against the over-compensation of attorneys that can accompany a percentage or common-fund approach. (*Id.* at 6) (quoting *Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc.*, 945 F.2d 969, 974 (7th Cir.1991).) She observes that Class Counsel's motion does not even disclose the lodestar amount, "making this Objector curious as to how many hours were actually spent in settling this case." (*Id.* at 7.) She points out that it would not be difficult to conduct a lodestar cross-check because attorneys routinely keep track of their hours and, because the case has not been protracted, the Court would not have to review voluminous billing records. (*Id.* at 7.)

Class Counsel's argument that a lodestar approach is inappropriate because the lodestar amount would increase post-settlement does not convince Strohlein. (*Id.* at 7–8, 11–13.) She points out that "[t]heir economic expert, Dr. Landes, was capable of estimating future tax rates in 2,000 taxing jurisdictions" and suggests that "she could also estimate the attorney hours required going forward." (*Id.* at 8.) Strohlein also observes that, according to the terms of the Agreement itself, Class Counsel will have a limited role in managing the claims. (*Id.*) She explains:

> ***949** [T]he Settlement Administrator and Escrow Agent (entities and individuals independent of Class Counsel) will be managing the

> collection and distribution of funds. The Administrator and Escrow Agent will be paid for by the Class (5% of every refund shall be contributed from each Class Member to the administration of this fund) ... Additionally, it is AT & T that will conduct the bulk of the work in recouping the recoveries. Of the three 'types' of taxing Jurisdictions, AT & T is permitted to collect on behalf of the Class Members in two of those jurisdictions. In the third type, the Class Member must claim its own refund[,] so, AT & T will fill out all necessary paperwork and provide it to each Class Member in those jurisdictions. It is therefore unclear what extensive attorneys' fees Class Counsel will continue to accrue during the disbursement of the Class Members' rewards.

(*Id.* at 8) (internal citations omitted.)

Strohlein reminds the Court that Class Counsel's experts, though highly qualified, are nevertheless effective employees of Class Counsel, and so the Court should discount their opinions accordingly. (*Id.* at 9.) Strohlein disputes the substance of Dr. Landes's expert report, which calculates the present value of benefits that the class would realize by virtue of the Settlement at $2.02 billion.[5] (*Id.* at 9–11.) She argues that Dr. Landes could have used a more accurate method for calculating a common "tax rate" that AT & T might otherwise collect in the future but for the Settlement. (*Id.* at 10.) Strohlein characterizes Dr. Landes's averaging all the states' and jurisdictions' tax rates as speculative. (*Id.*) She also criticizes Dr. Landes's method for calculating the relevant discount rate, which involved using the yield on an index of U.S. bonds with short-term maturities issued by utilities and phone companies as a proxy for AT & T's debt rate. (*Id.* at 10–11.) Strohlein criticizes Dr. Landes for failing to explain how those other companies' debt rates are comparable to those of AT & T. (*Id.*)

Finally, Strohlein argues that the certified class does not meet the predominance requirements of Rule 23(b) because "each state provides different remedies for consumer protection statutes and different tax rates for each city and state." (*Id.* at 13–14.)

I. Robert Shattuck

Robert Shattuck expresses concern with class actions that implicate the rights of many people, where those affected rights are significant in the aggregate, but minimal at the level of the individual owner. (R. 156–6.) He worries that class-action settlements, including the one presently before the Court, foster collusion between corporate management and plaintiffs' lawyers. (*Id.* at 4–5.)

With respect to the Settlement Agreement specifically, Shattuck objects that it will prevent AT & T's shareholders from determining whether the company's management was corrupt or negligent and further argues that customers have alternative avenues by which to seek compensation, and that it overrides rules and limitations put in place by lawmaking bodies and violates the business-judgment rule. (*Id.* at 7–8.) Shattuck further submits that the Court should not award attorneys' fees in excess of $100,000. (*Id.* at 9.)

***950 IV. Amicus Briefs**

A number of states have filed amicus briefs, asking the Court to reject the Settlement Agreement.

A. Texas

Texas states that it "is not willing to submit to an agreement between private parties that a made-up procedure, in conflict with Texas law, will be used" and submits that "[a]n order from this Court approving the private agreement has no bearing on this fact." (R. 178 at 8.) It contends that the Settlement Agreement "will control and interfere with Texas tax collection procedures" and thus "asks that the Court remove the Texas Subclass from the case for two reasons." (*Id.* at 8–9.) These reasons are, first, that the only federal interest in this case concerns the ITFA, which, Texas maintains, grandfathers the state such that "the ITFA does not apply to collection of sales taxes from AT & T's Texas customers." (*Id.* at 9.) Second, Texas argues that, "[u]nder the Settlement Agreement[,] each member of the Texas Subclass is likely to receive a zero recovery while forfeiting possibly valid claims under a broad release of AT & T." (*Id.* at 9, 21–24.)

Texas further contends that its laws require AT & T to collect taxes on Internet-access service, such that the Agreement's

provision requiring AT & T to stop collecting or remitting these taxes would violate Texas law. (*Id.* at 10.) It also submits that, absent the Agreement, AT & T could assign its refund rights to its Texas customers, thus enabling them to receive 100% of any refund. (*Id.* at 11.) Furthermore, the state maintains that Plaintiffs seek relief beyond the power of this Court to grant, "namely an injunction against AT & T [*sic*] collecting state sales taxes on Internet access charges in Texas [.]" (*Id.* at 12.) Texas thus argues that the parties' private agreement does not "confer power on this Court to excuse AT & T from its duties under Texas law." (*Id.* at 13.)

The state appeals to the Tax Injunction Act ("TIA"), which it contends forbids "federal district courts to 'enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law,' provided that an adequate remedy is available in the state courts." (*Id.* at 14 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341).) Texas quotes the Seventh Circuit to the effect that, "if the relief sought would diminish or encumber state tax revenue, then the [TIA] bars federal jurisdiction over claims seeking such relief." (*Id.* at 15) (citing *Levy v. Pappas*, 510 F.3d 755, 762 (7th Cir.2007), *abrogated by Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc.*, 560 U.S. 413, 130 S.Ct. 2323, 2329, 176 L.Ed.2d 1131 (2010).) The state concludes that the TIA "strips this Court of jurisdiction to prevent or interfere with AT & T's collection of Texas sales taxes." (*Id.* at 16–19.) It forewarns that, "when a Texas court inevitably orders AT & T to resume the collection of state taxes, as is required under state law, AT & T may refuse to do so, citing its federal consent decree." (*Id.* at 18.) Texas also argues that comity "restrains federal courts from entertaining claims for relief that risk disrupting state tax administration." (*Id.* at 15–16.)

In addition, Texas contends that the parties "hope to use orders from this Court to force states to acknowledge compliance with state law when there is no compliance." (*Id.* at 24.) Quoting Paragraph 8.7 of the Agreement that payment by AT & T into the Pre-Refund Escrow Fund "will be considered the payment by AT & T of such taxes to such Settlement Class Member," the state reads this language as "an attempt by the parties to force the Texas Comptroller to adhere to their agreement concerning Texas tax law." (*Id.* at 28)

***951 B. Ohio**

Ohio has filed an amicus brief, submitting that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction due to the TIA and principles of comity. (R. 171.) The state submits that "the TIA bars a federal district court from granting the 'injunctive' relief sought by the Plaintiffs" because "where, as here, there are 'plain, speedy, and efficient remedies' available to the Plaintiff class in state courts, the TIA expressly bars federal district courts from issuing order to 'enjoin the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under State law.' " (*Id.* at 2.) Ohio further explains that, "[b]y seeking to enjoin AT & T from collecting certain Ohio sales taxes, the Plaintiffs' Complaint thereby impermissibly seeks this Court to enjoin Ohio from collecting the tax." (*Id.*) It concludes by asserting that "any agreement by AT & T with its customers to cease collection of validly imposed Ohio sales taxes may not properly bind Ohio." (*Id.*)

C. Colorado, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Utah, and Wyoming

Colorado, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Utah, and Wyoming have collectively filed an amicus brief, similarly arguing that the TIA and principles of comity bar federal district-court review. (R. 179.) They also submit that Class Members will receive less-favorable treatment than if they were simply to file for refunds themselves, and contend that the Settlement Agreement's provisions conflict with state law, thus creating uncertainty as to the operation of the same. (*Id.*)

Focusing on the language of the TIA, which provides that "district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State[,]" amici first observe that the statute prohibits the Court "from enjoining the collection of any tax, not just taxes collected by a state." (*Id.* at 5) (emphasis omitted.) They then point out that "each state named in the Complaint provides for a plain, speedy and efficient remedy [.]" (*Id.*) Submitting that the Court thus lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, amici urge the Court to dismiss the present action in its entirety. (*Id.* at 7.)

Amici also argue that the Court should dismiss this action pursuant to principles of comity. (*Id.* at 7–10.) They submit that Congress did not create a private right of action to enforce the ITFA, and thus conclude that "the plaintiffs have no right of action to pursue a federal lawsuit to enjoin the collection of these taxes." (*Id.* at 8–9.)

The states next contend that the Settlement Agreement is unfair to taxpayers because they would reap a greater benefit if they availed themselves of the states' existing mechanisms

for recovering improperly collected taxes. (*Id.* at 10–12.) They further contend that AT & T will not be liable for any damages, costs, or expenses, but submit that, instead, "AT & T Mobility's customers—the members of the Plaintiff class in this action—bear all of the costs, including attorney fees." (*Id.* at 11.)

Amici further submit that Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees is exorbitant because they vastly exceed the value that Counsel have realized for the Class. (*Id.* at 13.) The states contend that no class action was necessary because taxpayers could have availed of the various states' refund mechanisms. (*Id.*) They also characterize the monetary award as speculative. (*Id.* at 14.) Pointing to Colorado law, which provides that a person's right to a refund shall not be assignable, ***952** the states argue that "the claimed refunds at issue in this litigation cannot be assigned by the taxpayer to AT & T Mobility." (*Id.* at 15–16.) They conclude by observing that, "[p]ursuant to the TIA, any [order that requires Colorado to issue refund vouchers to AT & T] ... cannot emanate from a federal court; it must issue from a Colorado court, which can properly exercise jurisdiction over the Department." (*Id.* at 16.)

V. The Fairness Hearing

On March 10, 2011, the Court held a fairness hearing at which the parties had several witnesses testify and the Court entertained any objections to the Settlement. (R. 169.) During the hearing, the Court assessed the credibility of each of the witnesses.

A. Dr. Elisabeth Landes

Dr. Elisabeth Landes, a Senior Vice President at Compass Lexecon who holds a Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University, testified for the settling parties. Dr. Landes provided a convincing expert opinion as to the value of the continuing tax savings that Class Members will receive due to AT & T's no longer collecting the challenged taxes.

In conducting her analysis, Dr. Landes testified that she did not assess the varied details of state-specific tax collections because it would have been both difficult and misleading, creating a false sense of precision. Instead, she looked at data on state-by-state unauthorized tax collections, which she used to determine the average tax rate. She also relied on the predictions of independent industry investment analysts as to AT & T's anticipated future revenues from wireless data services, explaining that economists regularly rely on such information.

Dr. Landes testified that AT & T's fourth-quarter financial results, which "came in somewhat under the analyst projections[,]" caused analysts to revise their ongoing projections, which she in turn relied upon. In performing her calculations, Dr. Landes estimated the value of the continuing tax savings to the Class until November 1, 2014, when the ITFA expires. In calculating the value to the Class, Dr. Landes determined that the relevant discount rate was equal to AT & T's debt rate. Because she could not find publicly available data as to AT & T's debt rate, however, she relied upon data published by Merrill Lynch with respect to a portfolio of corporate bonds issued by utilities and telephone companies with short-term maturities.

In her original report, Dr. Landes estimated the value to the Class of AT & T's agreement to cease collecting the challenged taxes at approximately $2.02 billion. In light of the updated information that became available to her, including AT & T's fourth-quarter earnings report, however, Dr. Landes revised the relevant value to $1,986,263,000.

B. Dr. Barry Thomas Florence

Dr. Barry Thomas Florence, president of ARPC—a research and consulting firm in Washington, D.C. that the Court appointed as interim settlement administrator (R. 122)—testified at the hearing. Dr. Florence, who has a Ph.D. in research design of statistics from Michigan State University, testified that, in addition to his work as notice administrator for the Settlement, he evaluated the methodology that AT & T had used to determine the customers whom the Internet-access tax affected. He assisted in the interviews and selection of potential escrow banks for the Settlement, and monitored the status of the electronic-reading room that had been established pursuant to the Agreement.

***953** Dr. Florence had numerous meetings with AT & T to evaluate the company's retrieval of information necessary to implement the Settlement. In those meetings, he sought to understand the data structures of the databases that maintain records on AT & T's subscribers, what services those subscribers use, how AT & T charges them, how it maintains the billing, and how the company charged and collected taxes from those users. In identifying the Internet-access services that AT & T used, its tax department identified over 20,000 combinations of so-called feature and service-order codes ("SOCs"). PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PwC") tested

this process to validate the code listings, and determined that an additional 4,000 feature SOC codes might include Internet-access services. After eliminating duplicative codes, as well as those that applied to non-taxing jurisdictions, Dr. Florence, in conjunction with AT & T and PwC, finally identified approximately 13,900 feature SOC combinations. AT & T then applied the final list of codes to its customer-bill database, and identified the amount of tax that was subject to a refund for each individual customer. It identified 46–million relevant billing records and about 29–million actual account holders. Dr. Florence explained that this process was the same that AT & T used to obtain the data that serves as the basis for the refund claims in the taxing jurisdictions. He credibly concluded that the preceding approach taken by AT & T was reasonable.

Dr. Florence then testified about his function as notice administrator. He explained that the class notice included multiple types of notice, including inserts into current customers' bills, text messaging, publication, and email. AT & T performed the bill-insert, text-message, and publication forms of notice, which focused on current customers, while ARPC, with AT & T's assistance, accomplished email and direct-mail notice, focusing on Defendant's former customers. ARPC assisted in the creation of a website and 1–800 number service, which conveyed detailed information regarding the Settlement Agreement, the Court's orders, and the long-form notice.

Dr. Florence explained that AT & T provided him with records pertaining to over 11 million of its former customers. Employing a successful-delivery-verification procedure, ARPC sent email notice to the roughly 3.5 million of those customers for whom AT & T had email addresses. It successfully delivered approximately 1.1 million emails. For the roughly 10 million former customers to whom ARPC could not send emails, it sent 9.1 million post cards. AT & T paid the costs involved. [6]

Next, Dr. Florence testified as to ARPC's monitoring of the refund status. He pointed out that the total tax for Internet-access service remitted over of a five-year period from 2005 to 2010 was about $1.15 billion. Dr. Florence looked at the last three years of the remittance because many taxing jurisdictions have three-year statutes of limitations for refunds. He explained that the total amount remitted within the three years prior to November 2010 was 83% of the five-year amount, or slightly over $950 million. In addition, he testified that the system that the parties and ARPC have put in place will facilitate a prompt process for sending checks to Class Members when refund money flows *954 in from any given state. Dr. Florence also observed that, in his experience, the fact that Class Members need not make a claim of any type is unusual. Furthermore, he testified that the parties have applied for a total of about $1.1 billion in refunds from the various taxing jurisdictions.

C. Donald Sipple

Donald Sipple, a marketing consultant and a Class Representative, also testified at the March 10, 2011, hearing. He explained that his reason for acting as a representative was driven by the principle that he should not pay taxes that the law does not obligate him to pay. He also stated that he had agreed to do everything necessary to be a Class Representative, including flying to Chicago to testify at the hearing. Sipple had no problem "at all" with the requested attorneys' fee.

D. Alice London

Alice London, an attorney with the Texas law firm of Bishop London & Dodds, which is co-counsel in the present case, testified as to the legal research that her firm conducted, and continues to conduct, on Texas law. After determining that AT & T was in fact charging a tax on Internet access, the firm filed a lawsuit on January 11, 2010. Shortly thereafter, she and her colleagues at Bishop London learned of the motion to consolidate and subsequently kept themselves informed of settlement negotiations in the present MDL. She opined that the Settlement Agreement works well under Texas law, reasoning as follows:

> [I]t provides an inherent advantage in that the consumers get to share the expenses, AT & T waives the defenses which in Texas just litigating the defenses would cost more than the benefit. So, this settlement agreement is efficient in terms of time, the advantage of getting it done now versus arbitrating or litigating for years is an inherent advantage. And the fact that AT & T has assumed the responsibility not only in terms of the burden of proof, but collecting the data and the time of going through the Texas process, which is a very administrative intense process

> provides an enormous advantage to Texas consumers.... [Our client] was highly in favor because it involved no effort on the part of consumers. They didn't have to go back and dig up four years' worth of bills.... [It] did not require any time and effort on the part. He particularly liked the fact that AT & T was going to collect the data and submit the claim to the ... comptroller[.]

Ms. London further testified that she had read Texas's letter to the Court, which, she believed, did not raise any new issues that her firm had not researched in anticipation of the lawsuit and Settlement. Ms. London testified that the fact that the Texas "refund request might have to be litigated" did not change her opinion about "whether it was worth pursuing." None of the issues raised in that letter changed her opinion that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Ms. London's firm did not contact the Texas Comptroller's office to inquire how it would deal with a refund request because, had it done so, there would be no telling whom one would end up speaking with on the phone and because informal discussion does not bind the comptroller. She credibly concluded that "[m]y experience with the comptroller's office is [that] you don't know what the outcome is until you go through the process."

E. Joel Grant Woods

Mr. Joel Grant Woods, an attorney and former Attorney General for Arizona for eight years, also testified at the fairness *955 hearing. The Court found Mr. Woods's testimony to be particularly valuable.

Mr. Woods took part in the negotiation sessions with AT & T in the present case and offered his view that the Agreement constitutes "an outstanding settlement." He opined that the fact that AT & T had stopped collecting the relevant taxes was an important factor, and further explained that he had made contact with Arizona's revenue department and was certain that the state had everything it needed from AT & T. With respect to Arizona, he testified that he did not "believe [that] the state has much of a choice here at all and if the state chose to litigate this ... there's a variety of administrative hoops you have to jump through ... including ultimately the director of the department of revenue. And when that is completed, you would then go to the superior court and then you could go to the Court of Appeals. And if you had to, you could try to petition the Arizona Supreme Court.... So, the bottom line on this as far as I can see is nothing's changed since I was Attorney General. The department of revenue and state of Arizona is [sic] expected to follow the law. The law is very clear in the state of Arizona. And I expect that they will follow the law." Mr. Woods further testified that the Settlement Agreement commits him to pursue litigation if Arizona initially refuses to issue a refund, and that he would be willing to do so on a contingent-fee basis "because the law is clear and I expect the state of Arizona, much as I would expect the state of Texas and the state of Michigan for that matter, to follow the law."

When asked about potential problems in obtaining refunds pursuant to the Settlement in Michigan, Mr. Woods testified that he had met with the state's department of revenue in Lansing, Michigan, and did not anticipate a problem. Finally, he testified that the fees that he will incur in going through the refund process, and potentially appealing, are subsumed within the attorneys' fees limit of 25% of the cash recovered for the Class. Separately, in response to the same question, Mr. Edward Robertson testified that, "as the lead counsel, you won't see us back with our hand out."

F. Edward Robertson

Edward Robertson, lead counsel for the Class, was next to testify. He described the circumstances and research that led to his filing a variety of lawsuits against AT & T, and recounted the details of the ensuing negotiations with the company. With respect to objections to the Agreement that settlement is taking place without formal discovery, Mr. Robertson explained that plaintiffs' counsel had spent close to a million dollars on the case and opined that the informal discovery that had taken place was akin to formal discovery. In fact, he thought it was more helpful given the manner in which AT & T provided it. He contrasted AT & T's "nicely arranged" and forthcoming provision of information with the having to "find a particular piece of hay in a haystack" that typically characterizes formal discovery.

With respect to putting the Agreement into operation, Mr. Robertson testified that "all of the refund applications that were required to be filed have now been filed." He explained that, as of March 2011, they had obtained a little less than a million dollars, including the credit offered by the city of Tuscon, but also said that he thought a lot more is coming. He noted that AT & T has been "cooperating really unbelievably

well with us[.]" He noted, however, that some authorities have told them that they are not going to deal with them until the Court finally approves the Agreement. Mr. Robertson also opined that a little more than 50% of the total *956 work involved in implementing the Settlement remains to be done. He explained that some cities have said that they "are not going to pay unless there's a judgment against them in these times. And that's what we're prepared to do."

Mr. Robertson testified that 92 lawyers are involved in implementing the refund process under the Settlement. He explained that there are 44 different contingency agreements to the effect that "all of these local-counsel law firms ... will get a percentage of the fee for that state in which they have undertaken the representation."

An important subject of testimony involved the question whether the lawyers charged with implementing the Agreement could decide in the face of recalcitrant taxing jurisdictions that the cost of pursuing refunds outweighs the benefits. Mr. Robertson explained that the attorneys "responsible for a local state get[ ] paid out of that state's fund. There is no national pot of money. It's all 44 different state pots. The way we've arranged it with all these lawyers is, is that your state is what you have to concentrate on and that's how you will be paid if you get paid."

As to his view why the Court should approve the Settlement, Mr. Robertson opined:

> [T]his is a case that was going to be a long, hard-fought case. We thought we had a chance to do some good in it. But the truth of the matter is they had some defenses. And this could have gone on for a very long time. And if we'd have just pursued a breach-of-contract action or something like that, I think we'd be in front of Judge St. Eve eight years from now having fought through the class fight and all the defenses if we hadn't been thrown into arbitration because the United States Supreme Court had ruled in favor of AT & T in the *Concepcion* case. So, this would have been a very difficult case, a very expensive case and I don't think frankly that we would have done much better at the end of the day than we did with this settlement in terms of getting relief quickly to the customers, stopping the tax, and creating a system which gave them an opportunity to get back a substantial amount of the money that they had paid out without doing anything except opening their mailbox one day.

Finally, Mr. Robertson summarized the costs that AT & T has borne to date, noting that the company had paid back, or will pay back after final approval, all of the vendor's compensation it got to keep from the states for collecting and passing on the relevant taxes. This amounts to $2.2 million. He also explained that AT & T paid the full cost of notice, which is substantial, and has an ongoing responsibility to provide the relevant information to facilitate the acquisition of refunds.

G. Dean Robert Klonoff

Finally, Robert Klonoff, the Dean of Lewis & Clark Law School and an expert on class actions, testified at the fairness hearing. He provided a detailed explanation as to why, in his view, the Settlement Agreement is fair and reasonable.

Dean Klonoff identified the strength of the case compared to the amount of the offer as being of "critical importance," and observed that Plaintiffs' case had "enormous complications[,]" pointing out the arbitration agreements and voluntary-payment doctrine as "a huge problem" and identifying the questions of standing and private rights of action as "enormously difficult." Plaintiffs' conservative probability of success, he thought, was less than 50%. Viewed in light of these difficulties, and the significant length of time it would take to litigate the case to judgment, he testified that "this is an exceptional settlement. *957 The class is getting—has already gotten going forward relief worth about $2 billion and they have the prospect now for recovering a substantial portion of their out-of-pocket losses." As to AT & T's ability to compel arbitration, Dean Klonoff opined that, if the company had chosen to exercise that ability, "the reality is most of these people wouldn't have pursued it and most of these people would never have gotten relief. And that's why I think this is such an important settlement and why I think it's such a good settlement."

Dean Klonoff particularly praised the fact that the Settlement allows the Class to obtain recovery very quickly, and contended that AT & T had gone beyond what he would have advised it to do had he been its counsel. Beyond the going-

forward relief, Dean Klonoff pointed to AT & T's actions with respect to vendor's compensation, the cost of notice, and putting money into escrow if a taxing jurisdiction requires such action as a prerequisite to granting a refund. Separately, he rejected the contention that the Settlement is unfair because AT & T is "not paying billions of dollars" on the ground that this case involved a pass through, in which "AT & T collected the money. And other than these small fees, they got nothing out of this."

As further evidence of the Settlement's fairness, Dean Klonoff observed the fact that there has been "[v]ery, very little opposition" amongst Class Members. He pointed out that "[t]here were 10 objections filed ..., representing a total of 16 people. About 235 opt-outs.... [U]sually in a case like this, you'll see with potentially 35 million class members, you'll see thousands of opt-outs." He also cited the fact of early settlement, made after due diligence, as an attractive feature of the Agreement. He noted that "the informal discovery that was done was really everything that would have been done in discovery." When asked to compare the Settlement Agreement to others he had seen, he opined that "[t]his is one of the best settlements I've ever seen.... I would say this is the stronger consumer settlement I've ever seen in terms of value to the class."

Dean Klonoff then proceeded to address the reasonableness of the sought attorneys' fee, which is 25% of the cash that Counsel recover for the Class. He testified that the ten-percent alternative "isn't going to arise here because that would only arise if the refunds exceeded the amount of the going-forward relief." He then explained why he considered a percentage-of-the-fund approach to be superior to a lodestar approach in common-fund cases, observing that the latter approach "provides incentives for lawyers to keep on putting in time long after they need to or should be. It doesn't really correlate with the value of what's been [achieved] for the class.... [T]he percentage of fund is a better method because it best aligns the incentives of the lawyers and the class." He also agreed that "the maximum [attorneys'] fees that could ever be paid if every penny of potential tax revenue is actually collected is 8.1 percent of the value of the settlement[.]" Dean Klonoff pointed out, however, that it will likely "be something below eight percent." He further explained that he prefers "to talk about the 8 percent and not the 25 percent because the 25 percent is only 25 percent of the cash, but the cash is just one part of the overall settlement."

Defining "mega-fund" cases as those involving "in the order of a hundred million and above," he observed that, as an empirical matter, "8 percent is low, even for mega-fund cases." He also agreed that, if one were to evaluate the Settlement as 44 separate subclasses, "a fee request of 8.1 percent of the total value would be very much on the low end[.]" He contrasted this fee request with many contingent-fee *958 agreements that are "in the neighborhood of 33 percent." Finally, he pointed out that, even if one were to look only at auction cases, "8 percent ... is comfortably on the low end [.]" He observed that most auction cases are securities-fraud cases that involve significant government work on the front end and less risk.

Dean Klonoff next addressed the reasonableness of the sought incentive payments for the Class Representatives. He thought that these sums are "a very small amount of money" in the scheme of things. He cited empirical work finding the average incentive payment to be approximately $16,000 and the median payment to be about $4,000. Dean Klonoff concluded that "we're right in the ballpark." As to the Representatives themselves, Dean Klonoff observed that they "had no idea what they'd be required to do, but they agreed to step up and participate in discovery, to be here today, ... and to do whatever it took to make sure that the settlement achieved the result for the client."

Finally, Dean Klonoff testified that he had reviewed the objections filed against the Settlement Agreement "very carefully," and had rejected them. In particular, he considered that the objections were devoid of details that would make the Settlement better. He concluded that, if "the Court were to agree with the objections and invalidate the settlement, the end result would be the Class would suffer because, of the 36 million people, I would say you probably have hundreds at most that [*sic*] would pursue the arbitration or other remedies. The rest would be left without anything."

LEGAL STANDARD

[1] A court may approve a settlement that would bind class members only if it determines after a hearing that the proposed settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(3). To evaluate the fairness of a settlement, a court must consider "the strength of plaintiffs' case compared to the amount of defendants' settlement offer, an assessment of the likely complexity, length and expense of the litigation, an evaluation of the amount of opposition to

settlement among affected parties, the opinion of competent counsel, and the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the time of settlement." *Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc.*, 463 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir.2006) (quoting *Isby v. Bayh*, 75 F.3d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir.1996)).

[2] "The 'most important factor relevant to the fairness of a class action settlement' is the first one listed: 'the strength of plaintiff's case on the merits balanced against the amount offered in the settlement.' " *Synfuel*, 463 F.3d at 653 (quoting *In re Gen. Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig.*, 594 F.2d 1106, 1132 (7th Cir.1979)). Furthermore, "[i]n conducting this analysis, the district court should begin by 'quantifying the net expected value of continued litigation to the class.' To do so, the court should 'estimate the range of possible outcomes and ascribe a probability to each point on the range.' " *Id.* (quoting *Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank*, 288 F.3d 277, 284–85 (7th Cir.2002)).

[3] "Federal courts naturally favor the settlement of class action litigation." *Isby*, 75 F.3d at 1196. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has warned that "the structure of class actions under Rule 23 ... gives class action lawyers an incentive to negotiate settlements that enrich themselves but give scant reward to class members, while at the same time the burden of responding to class plaintiffs' discovery demands gives defendants an incentive to agree to early settlement that may treat the class action lawyers better than the class." *Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 627 F.3d 289, 293 (7th Cir.2010) (emphasis ***959** omitted). District courts must therefore "exercise the highest degree of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions." *Synfuel*, 463 F.3d at 652.

DISCUSSION

I. The Settlement Satisfies Rule 23 Because It Is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate

Applying the five factors identified in *Synfuel*, 463 F.3d at 653, the Settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate" and thus meets the requirements of Rule 23. Indeed, each of these factors support this Court's approval of the Settlement.

A. The Class Members' Recovery Under the Settlement Strongly Supports the Settlement's Fairness in Light of the Weighty Arguments that AT & T Could Raise Should the Class Action Proceed Toward Trial

[4] As noted above, the "most important factor" in determining whether a proposed settlement satisfies Rule 23 is the "strength of plaintiff's case on the merits balanced against the amount offered in the settlement." *Synfuel*, 463 F.3d at 653. Because the Settlement promises to yield benefits to the class that are significant in light of AT & T's potentially strong defenses should the case proceed to trial, the first factor under *Synfuel* counsels approval.

1. The Class Members Will Realize Significant Benefits from the Settlement

Following the Court's opinion granting preliminary approval, the parties have produced more-specific evidence of the benefits that the Class Members will realize as a result of the Settlement. This evidence reveals that the Class Members will realize significant value as a result of the Agreement.

Based on the evidence presented at the fairness hearing, as well as on the relevant briefing, the Court finds that the aggregate expected benefits to the Class Members from the Settlement, in terms of obtaining refunds, significantly exceeds both (1) the expected return of proceeding to trial in the case and (2) the amounts that the Class Members would obtain if they proceeded individually against AT & T through arbitration. As explored below, AT & T has a number of significant defenses that would make it difficult for Plaintiffs to proceed to trial and, once there, to win. Furthermore, the Court credits Dean Klonoff's convincing testimony that, were AT & T to compel arbitration, "the reality is most of these people wouldn't have pursued it and most of these people would never have gotten relief." In addition, a highly desirable feature of the Settlement is that Class Counsel "will only be paid from state-specific escrow accounts if those accounts are funded through refunds or credits from the taxing jurisdictions[.]" (R. 97 at 26.) Counsel for each state-specific subclass have an incentive to pursue claims from their assigned state, which they will not abandon due to cross-subsidization from other, more lucrative states.

The financial benefits that the Class Members will realize from the Settlement are far from academic. By March 8, 2011, the parties had requested refunds or credits from 1,193 taxing authorities in 44 states and territories, totaling $1.152 billion.[7] (R. 164 at 11–12.) As of April 12, 2011, the parties have requested local-level ***960** refunds of $147,598,738

and state-level amounts of $1,006,532,347, for a combined total of $1.154 billion. (R. 185–1; R. 185–2.) As of the same date, the parties have received payment of $1,660,958 at the local level and $4,739 at the state level. (*Id.*) As AT & T collected and passed on approximately 17% of the relevant taxes prior to November 2007, and as the majority of taxing jurisdictions have a three-year statute of limitations, Class Counsel estimate the maximum expected cash portion of the recovery for the Class to be $956,160,000 (83% of $1.152 billion). (*Id.*; R. 156 at 34.) The Court thus finds that the expected cash value of the Settlement to the Class strongly counsels approval.

The second major benefit to the Class Members concerns AT & T's obligation under the Agreement "to cease charging the challenged Internet Taxes[.]" (R. 50–3.) As explored above, Dr. Elisabeth Landes filed an expert report and testified at the March 10, 2011, fairness hearing. At that hearing, Dr. Landes conservatively estimated the value of AT & T's no longer collecting the challenged taxes at approximately $1.98 billion.[8] This figure, she asserted, significantly underestimates the value of the Settlement to AT & T's subscribers as a whole, not all of whom are Class Members. Dr. Landes calculated the value to AT & T's subscribers at over $4.1 billion.[9] (R. 163–2 at 5.)

Having reviewed Dr. Landes's report, having studied her methodology, and having observed her testimony at the fairness hearing, the Court finds her conclusions to be convincing, with one qualification. Although it accepts her calculation that the Class Members will experience $1.98 billion in value from AT & T's cessation of the challenged activity, that figure overestimates the value that is specific to the Agreement because Dr. Landes's analysis implicitly assumes that, but for the Agreement, AT & T would have continued charging the relevant taxes. The Settlement's value to consumers in requiring Defendant to cease collecting the Internet taxes, however, depends on the probability that AT & T would have voluntarily ceased those collections independent of the Agreement. If AT & T would have stopped charging those taxes regardless of whether it entered into the Agreement, for example, then the marginal value to the Class of the Agreement with respect to stopping the impugned conduct would be zero. Conversely, if—as the parties and Dr. Landes assume—Defendant would have kept charging the relevant taxes but for the Settlement, then the benefits that the Class Members would realize from the Agreement's provision requiring AT & T to cease collecting Internet Taxes would indeed be $1.98 billion.

There is compelling evidence, however, that Defendant would have ceased charging the relevant taxes regardless of whether it had entered into the Settlement. In the first place, there is a genuine question whether AT & T's collection of Internet Taxes violated the ITFA, and so the company had a significant incentive independent of the Agreement to cease an activity ***961** that may be illegal and liability inducing. Of course, the company's collection of such taxes have already attracted a significant number of lawsuits, resulting in the instant MDL. Furthermore, AT & T has an economic incentive independent of potential liability to avoid paying unnecessary taxes. As Dean Klonoff testified at the fairness hearing:

> I don't think AT & T has any strong interest, by the way, right now in starting [to] tax again. I mean, it's a competitive industry. The last thing they want to do is be taxing and turning over money to the state and raising the price of their service. They're just going to have other people looking at their bills and switching companies or having their auditors question it.

It necessarily follows that the $1.98 billion figure overestimates the value of the Settlement to the Class in requiring AT & T to cease collecting the relevant taxes.

It does not follow, however, that the value of the "going-forward" relief provided by the Agreement is zero. It is unlikely that AT & T would have discontinued charging Internet-access taxes on a ubiquitous basis as quickly as it did pursuant to the Settlement. In addition, there is real value to the Class from the fact that the Agreement contractually requires AT & T not to charge those taxes absent a change in the law. The Court therefore finds that the Settlement's provision that requires AT & T to stop charging the challenged Internet Taxes provides significant benefits to the Class, albeit benefits that are less than $1.98 billion. This feature of the Settlement will benefit the Class Members, and thus supports this Court's approving the Agreement.

The Court therefore finds that the Settlement will bestow considerable benefits on the Class Members.

2. AT & T Has a Variety of Potentially Meritorious Defenses to the Class Action

Although the Class Members stand to reap considerable benefits from the Settlement, an important question concerns the Class Members' expected recovery should the case proceed to trial vis-à-vis the benefits they will obtain from the instant Settlement. That is, if the Court declined to grant final approval, could the Class Members ultimately expect to obtain more favorable relief?

A dollar recovered today is worth more than a dollar recovered in the future, which is relevant because the Settlement provides for a combination of present and future benefits. (R. 97 at 21–22) (quoting *Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank,* 288 F.3d 277, 284 (7th Cir.2002)). Were the Class Members required to await the outcome of a trial and inevitable appeal, however, they would not receive benefits for many years, if indeed they received any at all.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs would face considerable hurdles in proceeding to trial. First, Plaintiffs would have to establish that the ITFA permits a private cause of action, even though the statute does not explicitly create one. This argument presents a potentially significant legal challenge for Plaintiffs. (R. 156 at 26–27.) Indeed, the Supreme Court recently reiterated that "implied causes of action are disfavored ..." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal,* 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); *see also Alexander v. Sandoval,* 532 U.S. 275, 286–87, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (holding that, without statutory intent as to a private remedy, a "cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute"). Furthermore, not all states' consumer-protection ***962** laws permit private rights of action or class actions, which would hinder class certification for trial. (R. 156 at 26 nn. 10–12) (citing IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 714.16 *et seq.;* ALA.CODE § 8–19–10(f); GA.CODE ANN. § 10–1–399; LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(a); MISS.CODE ANN. § 75–24–15(4); MONT.CODE ANN. § 30–13–133(a); S.C.CODE ANN. § 39–5–140(a)).

Second, AT & T's service agreements contain mandatory arbitration provisions. The only states that AT & T previously pointed to as prohibiting such arbitration agreements are California and Washington. (R. 67 at 27.) On April 27, 2011, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California law that class waivers in consumer arbitration agreements are unconscionable if such agreements are in adhesion contracts, disputes between the parties are likely to involve small amounts of damages, and the party with inferior bargaining power alleges a deliberate scheme to defraud. *AT & T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion,* —— U.S. ——, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011). In light of the Supreme Court's recent holding, A & T has a strong argument to compel the Class Representatives to arbitrate their claims, rather than proceeding with their class action. Of course, Class Members subject to mandatory arbitration could not obtain recovery in court. *See, e.g., Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners,* 611 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.2010) ("Arbitration replaces the right to go to court, including the right to a jury and the right to participate in a class action or similar proceeding."). The arbitration proceedings would further delay any potential recovery for Plaintiffs.

Third, should Plaintiffs attempt to proceed to trial, they would have to demonstrate the manageability of the case. *Cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,* 521 U.S. 591, 620, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) ("Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems for the proposal is that there be no trial.") (citations omitted). AT & T would argue that proof of its alleged overcharge would require a painstaking jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction factual analysis, as well as legal analysis as to the meaning of "Internet access" and the breadth of the applicable prohibition on taxation of the same. (R. 156 at 29–30.)

Fourth, Plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that each of the jurisdictions in which they seek relief actually prohibited AT & T's tax collections. Defendant observes that tax scholars disagree on how many jurisdictions fall within the ITFA's "grandfather" exemption contained in Section 1104. (R. 156 at 30.) AT & T also points out that New Hampshire, from which the parties have sought a refund, has indicated an inclination to deny the same because it is grandfathered and thus exempt. (*Id.* at 30.) To the extent that any jurisdiction is indeed grandfathered, AT & T's tax collection was not improper and so Plaintiffs would have no claim against the company. Even putting the grandfather issue aside, in order to recover from Defendant directly, Plaintiffs would have to establish that AT & T is liable for the collections and not merely an agent of the taxing authority. (*Id.* at 31.)

Furthermore, AT & T would rely on the voluntary-payment doctrine to argue that Class Members who voluntarily paid the disclosed tax charge cannot later recover the same. (*Id.* at 31) (citing, *inter alia, Spivey v. Adaptive Mktg., L.L.C.*, 622 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir.2010).) AT & T could prevail on such an argument. *See, e.g., Elmdale Dev., L.L.C. v. City of Des Plaines*, No. 05–CV–1696, 2005 WL 2007184, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 15, 2005) ***963** ("Under the voluntary-payment doctrine, a taxpayer may not recover taxes voluntarily paid, even if the taxing body improperly assessed the taxes absent statutory authorization. A taxpayer may, however, recover involuntarily paid taxes. Taxes are paid involuntarily when (1) the taxpayer lacked knowledge of the facts upon which to protest the taxes at the time they were paid or (2) the taxpayer paid the taxes under duress."); *Antosh v. City of College Park*, 341 F.Supp.2d 565, 569 (D.Md.2004) ("Maryland law incorporates the 'voluntary payment doctrine' that denies monetary relief to someone who voluntarily paid tax under a mistake of law unless a statutory remedy is provided."). To the extent Defendant successfully asserted this defense against Class Members, it would bar their recovery.

3. The Settlement Is Fair in Light of the Strength of Plaintiffs' Case

The uncertain nature of the legal issues implicated by proceeding to trial makes it difficult to calculate a precise probability of success. *Cf. Synfuel*, 463 F.3d at 653 ("In conducting this analysis, the district court should begin by 'quantifying the net expected value of continued litigation to the class.' ") (quoting *Reynolds*, 288 F.3d at 284–85). Nevertheless, in light of the potentially serious impediments to success that Plaintiffs would experience should they attempt to continue this litigation, the net expected value to the Class Members of following that course is significantly less than the aggregate recoveries sought in the constituent actions in this MDL proceeding. This is because numerous obstacles could undo the litigation, thus leaving either certain Class Members, or all of them, without any relief whatsoever.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs would face an uphill battle in obtaining their sought-after relief at trial. *Accord* R. 163–3 at 5. Illustratively, having analyzed the nature of the instant case, Dean Klonoff's expert report concluded that, "[c]onservatively, there was at least a 50/50 chance of no recovery." (R. 163–3 at 5.) Viewed from this perspective, the Settlement is generous indeed. Beyond the fact that it has already yielded significant benefits to the Class Members with AT & T's cessation of tax charges—benefits that Dr. Landes calculated as being close to $2 billion to the Class Members alone, which does not include positive spillover effects—the Agreement puts in place a well-thought-out framework for recovering those already-paid charges from the relevant taxing jurisdictions. Indeed, as of April 12, 2011, the parties have requested refunds or credits totaling $1.154 billion. (R. 185–1; R. 185–2.) Furthermore, the fee structure in the present case creates a powerful incentive for Class Counsel to recover the maximum possible refund from each of the taxing jurisdictions.

In short, the Settlement provides value to the Class Members that significantly exceeds their expected recovery from proceeding to trial, which is the key consideration. Plaintiffs unquestionably would have incurred significant costs in conducting extensive fact discovery, and expert testimony would surely have been necessary. Further, if they prevailed at trial, counsel would likely seek fees equal to a percentage of any recovery. Finally, and as the Seventh Circuit has observed, "[t]he essence of settlement is compromise" and "the parties to a settlement will not be heard to complain that the relief afforded is substantially less than what they would have received from a successful resolution after trial." *E.E.O.C. v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc.*, 768 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir.1985).

Thus, the "most important factor" in determining whether a proposed settlement satisfies Rule 23—namely the "strength of plaintiff's case on the merits balanced against the amount offered in the ***964** settlement," *Synfuel*, 463 F.3d at 653—supports approving the Settlement Agreement in the present case.

B. The Likely Complexity, Length, and Expense of the Litigation Suggest that the Court Should Approve the Settlement

[5] The Seventh Circuit has held that the likely complexity, length, and expense of continued litigation are relevant factors in determining whether a class-action settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. *Synfuel*, 463 F.3d at 653. Those factors strongly support approval of the Settlement Agreement in this case.

If the Court approves the Agreement, the present MDL will come to an end and the Class Members will realize both immediate and future benefits as a result. If the Court denies approval, however, protracted litigation over many years

would likely ensue. As Defendant explains, it would first file motions to compel the named Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims. (R. 156 at 36.) If it were successful in this endeavor, AT & T maintains, the present action would come to a close without any in-court recovery to the Class Members. (*Id.*) The individual Plaintiffs would then have to arbitrate their respective claims. If its efforts failed, AT & T suggests that it would file an interlocutory appeal under Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which would stay proceedings in this Court. (*Id.*) (citing *Bradford–Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc.*, 128 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir.1997).) If AT & T's arbitration efforts did not succeed, it likely would file a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs would also file a motion to certify the class—a doubtless contested issue under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The parties would also engage in complex discovery, which would have to address the nuanced factual questions attendant upon each taxing jurisdiction. The costs associated with discovery in complex class actions can be significant. *See, e.g.*, Nicola Faith Sharpe, *Corporate Cooperation Through Cost–Sharing*, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.REV. 109, 110 (2009) ("Discovery accounts for about 50% of all litigation costs and up to 90% of the costs in the top 5% of the most expensive case.") (citation omitted).

If the case were to survive the summary-judgment stage, it would proceed to trial. Dean Klonoff provided uncontested testimony that proceeding to trial would be an "uphill battle" that would go on for "many years." Given the complex factual issues implicated by this MDL, a trial would be both lengthy and expensive. Furthermore, the JPML transferred the relevant cases to this Court "for coordinated or consolidated *pretrial* proceedings." (R. 1 at 3 (emphasis added).) Thus, following discovery, there is some possibility that the individual cases would return to the jurisdictions where they started. Following trial (or a series of different trials), given the stakes at issue, it is almost certain that the losing party would appeal.

In contrast to this drawn-out, complex, and costly litigation process, which would provide Class Members with either no in-court recovery or some recovery many years from now, the Settlement both brings to a close the complained-of behavior by AT & T and puts in place a realistic mechanism for recovering the relevant Internet charges. As a result, the likely complexity, length, and expense of continuing this litigation strongly support approving the Settlement.

C. The Fact of Scant Opposition to the Settlement Supports Approval

[6] The Seventh Circuit has instructed district courts to evaluate the amount of opposition to a settlement among affected parties in deciding whether to approve a class-action settlement. *Synfuel*, 463 F.3d at 653. A very small percentage of affected *965 parties have opposed the Settlement Agreement. Only 235 out of over 32 million Class Members have opted out, which is less than 0.01%. (R. 156 at 38.) Class Members have filed only 10 objections with specific arguments. (Id.) Such a remarkably low level of opposition supports the Settlement. *See, e.g., In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig.*, 164 F.Supp.2d 1002, 1021 (N.D.Ill.2000) (holding that the fact that more than "99.9% of class members have neither opted out nor filed objections ... is strong circumstantial evidence in favor of the settlement"), *aff'd*, 267 F.3d 743 (7th Cir.2001); *cf. The Authors Guild et al. v. Google, Inc.*, 770 F.Supp.2d 666, 676, 2011 WL 986049, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011) (denying approval of Google's class action, in part because "an extremely high number of class members—some 6800—opted out" and because "the objections [were] great in number"). As Dean Klonoff testified at the fairness hearing, in a settlement with this many potential class members, there are typically "thousands of opt-outs."

Below, the Court considers the substantive objections that a small subset of Class Members have filed, and finds that they do not warrant denying approval. Beyond the fact that these objections do not raise significant concerns, it is illuminative that only a tiny fraction of the Class Members saw fit to opt out or to object. This factor supports approval. [10]

D. The Opinion of Competent Counsel Supports Approval

[7] [8] The opinion of competent counsel is relevant to the question whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23. *Synfuel*, 463 F.3d at 653. In its prior decision granting preliminary approval of the Settlement, the Court observed that "counsel for Defendant and Interim Settlement Class Counsel are highly competent" and noted that "there is no indication that the Proposed Settlement Agreement is the victim of collusion." (R. 97 at 26.) The Court sees no reason to revisit that determination. Class Counsel believe that the Settlement is beneficial to the Class and meets the class-certification requirements of Rule 23. (R. 163 at 63.)

In addition, Dean Klonoff, an expert on class actions, explained in considerable detail why, in his reasoned opinion, the Settlement meets the requirements of Rule 23. (R. 163–3.) He testified that it is "one of the best settlements" he had ever seen and that it was "exceptional." Also, as Mr. Robertson testified, there are 92 lawyers involved in implementing the refund process under the Settlement. He explained that there are 44 different contingency agreements to the effect that "all of these local-counsel law firms ... will get a percentage of the fee for that state in which they have undertaken the representation." Dean Klonoff separately noted that the "lawyers from across the country representing sub classes have done their own due diligence."

The Court thus finds that the opinion of competent counsel in this case supports its approval of the Settlement. *Accord Retsky Fam. Ltd. v. Price Waterhouse L.L.P.*, No. 97–CV–7694, 2001 WL 1568856, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 10, 2001) ("[T]heir opinion ***966** that the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate also favors approval of the settlement.").

E. The Stage of the Proceedings and the Amount of Discovery Completed at the Time of Settlement Support the Settlement

The last factor that the Seventh Circuit deems relevant to the question whether a class-action settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate concerns the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed. *Synfuel,* 463 F.3d at 653. This factor is relevant because it determines "how fully the district court and counsel are able to evaluate the merits of plaintiffs' claims." *Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of City of Milwaukee,* 616 F.2d 305, 325 (7th Cir.1980), *overruled on other grounds by Felzen v. Andreas,* 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir.1998).

[9] Although no formal discovery has taken place in this MDL litigation prior to the parties' entering into the Settlement Agreement, the parties have nevertheless engaged in considerable, extensive informal discovery. (R. 156 at 40; R. 163 at 61.) Class Counsel obtained information about all the relevant issues during the half-year-long settlement negotiations, which included finding out: (1) whether AT & T paid the taxes to the relevant taxing authorities or kept the money for itself; (2) the number of consumers involved; (3) which services were Internet-access services; (4) how much money AT & T collected as taxes for those services; (5) to which jurisdiction AT & T paid the taxes, in what amount, and when; (6) whether Defendant could identify the customers whom it charged; (7) whether one could break down such customer-specific data; (8) how AT & T made the mistake of charging the pertinent taxes; (9) how long it would take AT & T to cease collecting the relevant taxes; (10) what information Defendant kept about its former customers; and (11) how much vendor's compensation AT & T retained and from whom. (R. 163 at 61.) Moreover, the testimony at the fairness hearing established that AT & T provided such information to Class Counsel in an orderly manner, rather than dumping large amounts of discovery information on them and requiring them to shift through and find the pertinent facts. AT & T also gave Class Counsel access to certain key employees who could answer relevant questions.

Such information is more than sufficient to enable the Court and the parties to evaluate Plaintiffs' claims. As the Court previously determined in preliminarily approving the Settlement, "this factor does not weigh against approval." (R. 97 at 27.) Indeed, it is not clear how formal discovery would have produced appreciable benefits to the Court and to the parties that the informal discovery conducted by the parties did not bestow. Conversely, though, there would have been considerable costs to Class Counsel, AT & T, and hence to the Class Members of engaging in formal discovery. As the Southern District of New York has noted:

> [T]he question that this Court must answer is not how much or how little discovery was completed by the parties before they agreed to the settlement, but rather whether the discovery that was completed was sufficient for 'effective representation.' ... Intervenors ... have not explained how additional discovery would have been in the interest of the class. Discovery has costs, and further discovery would have taken additional time and resulted in the expenditure of additional funds on both sides, neither of which is in plaintiffs' interests.... [C]lass counsel's decision to forgo additional discovery in the hopes of minimizing costs and achieving ***967** a quick recovery for their clients appears to be both fair and reasonable[.]

McBean v. City of New York, 233 F.R.D. 377, 384–85 (S.D.N.Y.2006). Indeed, the label of "discovery" is not what

matters. Instead, the pertinent inquiry is what facts and information have been provided.

For these reasons, the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed support this Court's approving the Settlement Agreement. *See In re Elan Secs. Litig.*, 385 F.Supp.2d 363, 370 (S.D.N.Y.2005) ("[T]he stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed' ... also supports the Settlement. Although there has been little or no formal discovery to date, Class Counsel has, among other things, interviewed former Elan employees, received and analyzed hundreds of thousands of pages of documents and deposition summaries produced by Elan in connection with the SEC investigation, worked with forensic accountants to evaluate the alleged financial improprieties, and retained two experts to analyze potential damages."); *see also Molski v. Gleich*, 318 F.3d 937, 959 (9th Cir.2003) ("Early dispute resolution is salutary, and we should not encourage the unnecessary expense, delay, and uncertainty caused by lengthy litigation when the parties are prepared to compromise. Nor should we hold ... that a prompt settlement necessarily suggests a failure to prosecute or defend the action with due diligence and reasonable prudence. To the contrary, an early resolution may demonstrate that the parties and their counsel are well prepared and well aware of the strength and weaknesses of their positions and of the interests to be served by an amicable end to the case.") (Graber, J., concurring), *overruled by Dukes v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc.*, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.2010).

II. Objections to the Settlement Are Misplaced

For the preceding reasons, the five factors outlined by the Seventh Circuit support approving the Settlement Agreement. Nevertheless, Class Members have filed ten objections, which collectively articulate a number of specific arguments why the Court should not approve the Settlement. The Court now addresses these arguments in turn.

A. The Class Members' Objections Are Not Well Founded

Above, the Court discussed each Objector's respective opposition to the Settlement. It now considers, in turn, each substantive argument raised by the Objectors. None of them warrants denying approval.

1. It is not an impediment to settlement that an employer previously reimbursed a Class Member employee for the Internet-access taxes

One objection asserts that the Settlement will improperly benefit employees who paid the relevant taxes, but whom their employers separately reimbursed. (R. 136.) Objector Douglas W. Cherry proposes that, in such cases, the parties should reimburse the employers instead of the employees, as the former are the true parties in interest. (*Id.* at 2.)

This objection is not an obstacle to approving the Settlement. If employees of a company were AT & T customers against whom Defendant charged Internet Taxes during the relevant period, then they are Class Members. (R. 97 at 34.) If third-party employers subsequently reimbursed Class Members for the pertinent tax charges, then the question whether such Class Members must in turn reimburse their employers is a separate matter involving a question of law and equity between the employer and employee.

*968 2. Notice was sufficient

A number of Objectors argue that the notice effected by AT & T was deficient. (R. 116; R. 147; R. 151; R. 132.) Paige Nash submits that due-process considerations, as well as the decisions of *Mullane v. Ctrl. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), and *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974), require that each Class Member in fact receive personal notice. (R. 147 at 1.) Shelley Stevens echoes this view. (R. 151.)

[10] These objections are misplaced. Due process does not require that every class member receive notice. *See, e.g., In re VMS Ltd. P'ship Secs. Litig.*, No. 90–CV–2412, 1995 WL 355722, at *1 (N.D.Ill. June 12, 1995) ("The dictates of due process do not require that every class member actually receive notice."); *Peters v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.*, 966 F.2d 1483, 1486 (D.C.Cir.1992) ("[T]he due process clause does not amount to a guarantee of notice to a class member."); *Carlough v. Amchem. Prod., Inc.*, 158 F.R.D. 314, 325 (E.D.Pa.1993) ("Receipt of actual notice by all class members is required by neither Rule 23 nor the Constitution."); *In re Nat'l Life Ins. Co.*, 247 F.Supp.2d 486, 492 (D.Vt.2002) ("An alleged failure to receive notice will not sustain a due process challenge as long as reasonable measures were

taken to provide individualized notice to identifiable class members."); *see also Burns v. Elrod,* 757 F.2d 151, 157 (7th Cir.1985) ("While defendants did not have to exhaust every conceivable method of identification, they were required, within the limits of practicability, to send such notice as was reasonably calculated to reach most interested parties."). Indeed, the Supreme Court in *Mullane* itself made this clear: "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections ... [I]f with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met the constitutional requirements are satisfied." *Mullane,* 339 U.S. at 314–15, 70 S.Ct. 652.

[11] In the present case, notice was more than adequate both under Rule 23 and as a matter of due process. In October 2010, AT & T mailed notice to its 22.5 million then-existing customers with their bills, which included a Spanish translation where relevant. (R. 156 at 20.) The following month, AT & T sent notice by text message to more than 32–million Class Members who were customers as of September 14, 2010. (*Id.*) AT & T published notice on November 16 and 23, 2010, in the national edition of *USA Today.* (*Id.* at 21.) On December 15, 2010, the notice administrator sent an e-mail notice to over one-million former customers and a postcard notice to over nine-million former customers. (*Id.* at 21.)

Karen Wiand contends that notice was inadequate because "it has been sent to consumers via text message where it is clear that many consumers have not received this text." (R. 116 at 6, 34.) In support, Ms. Wiand proffers the declarations of four AT & T cell-phone customers who had internet access as part of their plan and who declare that they "have no recollection of receiving, nor does [their] review of recent messages reveal, a text message from AT & T advising me of a lawsuit settlement involving AT & T[.]" (R. 116–3.) In the first place, these declarations do not state that the four customers did not actually receive the messages. Second, Ms. Wiand does not explain why an imperfect sending of text-message notice *969 would, when viewed in light of the other forms of notice AT & T provided to Class Members, fall short of that required by Rule 23 or due process. Furthermore, AT & T has produced compelling evidence that it sent text messages to at least three of these four customers. (R. 156–3.) Ms. Wiand's argument that notice was inadequate fails.

3. The objection deadline did not precede the attorney-fee-application deadline

Travis Cox and Margaret Johnson have objected that "Class Counsel will not file an attorney fee application prior to the objection deadline on March 10, 2011." (R. 132 at 3.) Citing *In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Secs. Litig.,* 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir.2010), they argue that "rule 23(h) and due process require the fee motion to precede the objection deadline." (*Id.* at 4.) Paige Nash similarly objects that, "[a]s the case is now scheduled, the fee petition will be filed after the objection deadline. This sequence of events violates due process, the express terms of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(h) and the decision in" *In re Mercury.* (R. 147 at 2.)

These objections are misplaced. The Court required Class Members to file objections by February 2, 2011, and Class Counsel to file its application for Class Representatives' fees, attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses by January 26, 2011. (R. 108 at 1–2.) Class Counsel in fact filed its motion for approval of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses, and for approval of incentive awards on January 26, 2011. (R. 124.) Objectors are therefore incorrect that Class Counsel did not file an attorney-fee application prior to the objection deadline.

4. The class definition is sufficiently definite

Mike Hale, Summer Hogan, Michael Schulz, and Omar Rivero object that the class definition is "failsafe" because it defines the class "in terms of those who were charged a 'tax on internet access' as that expression is defined under the Internet Tax Freedom Act." (R. 141 at 2.) They argue further that "[t]his is a definition of the class that depends on the determination of an ultimate merits issue in this case, i.e., whether a particular charge meets the definition of a tax on internet access under the ITFA." (*Id.*)

[12] The Court disagrees. As a threshold matter, the Objectors do not articulate an alternative class definition that would be simultaneously efficacious and free of the alleged "failsafe" problem. More fundamentally, however, the class definition is sufficiently definite that the Court can readily determine whether a particular individual is indeed a Class Member. *See, e.g., Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co.,* 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir.2006) (observing that a class must be sufficiently definite that one can ascertain the class members); *cf. Sadowski v. Med1 Online, L.L.C.,* No. 07–CV–2973, 2008

WL 489360, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 20, 2008) ("If a class definition requires 'the court to conduct an inquiry into the merits of each class member's claim,' then it is not sufficiently definite.") (quoting *Pastor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, No. 05–CV–1459, 2005 WL 2453900, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 30, 2005), *aff'd*, 487 F.3d 1042 (7th Cir.2007)).

The definition in the present case encapsulates "[a]ll persons or entities who are or were customers of AT & T Mobility and who were charged Internet Taxes on bills issued from November 1, 2005 through the final date on which AT & T Mobility issues bills to customers prior to implementing the billing system changes pursuant to Section 8.1." (R. 97 at 34–35.) The Court can readily ascertain the Class Members from this class definition, and so the Court discerns no problem with it.

***970** With respect to the Subclasses, which make reference to those "who were charged Internet Taxes," the Court does not discern a significant problem. The Agreement defines "Internet Taxes" as "every 'tax on Internet Access,' as that terms is defined in the ITFA, collected by AT & T Mobility from its customers and paid to the Taxing Jurisdictions[.]" (R. 50–3 at 10.) The Court need not determine, however, whether AT & T violated the ITFA with respect to each of Defendant's customers to conclude whether those customers are Class Members. It need not conclude whether any of the substantive defenses that AT & T could raise apply with respect to any consumer. Because the Court can readily identify the identity of those who comprise the Class, the class definition is proper. *Cf., e.g., G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Brink's Mfg. Co.*, No. 09–CV–5528, 2011 WL 248511, at *10 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 25, 2011) ("[T]he proposed class definition ... closely track[s] the language of the relevant statute. In many respects, the Court's demarcating the boundaries of the class, and identifying the individuals who comprise it, would be tantamount to resolving the merits of the underlying action."); *Nudell v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.*, No. A3–01–41, 2002 WL 1543725, at *3 (D.N.D. July 11, 2002) (finding a class definition impermissible because "individual questions abound ... many of them related to the ultimate issues of liability at issue in the case.... [E]ven accepting that the definition might not lead to the classic failsafe class, it still too closely identifies the class definition with a merits determination").

5. The class notice properly states that objectors may be subject to depositions

Mike Hale, Summer Hogan, Michael Schulz, and Omar Rivero object to the statement in the class notice that objectors may be subject to depositions. (R. 141 at 2.) They do not explain why this feature of the class notice is objectionable. *Cf., e.g., Stern v. AT & T Mobility Corp.*, No. 10–CV–85, 2011 WL 607135, at *1 (N.D.Ohio Feb. 11, 2011) (observing that "the California judge presiding over the class action suit ... allowed objectors to be deposed"); *see also* Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(a)(1) ("A party may, by oral questions, depose any person[.]"). Indeed, they concede that "it may be true" that objectors can be subject to depositions. (*Id.*) Their hostility to this element of the notice is that "to include this language in a class notice serves the purpose only of discouraging objections." (R. 141 at 2.)

[13] This is not a well-founded objection. Apprising objectors of their legal rights and obligations is entirely proper, even if such notification has a marginal deterrent effect. Moreover, the objectors have not presented any evidence that this notice deterred anyone from objecting, including themselves.

6. Proponents of the settlement have carried their burden of establishing that the settlement is reasonable, adequate, and fair

A further objection is that the proponents of the settlement have failed to carry their burden of establishing that the settlement is reasonable, adequate, and fair. (R. 141 at 2–3.) For the reasons discussed in detail above, the Settlement Agreement meets each of the five factors highlighted by the Seventh Circuit in *Synfuel Techs.* The Agreement promises to yield significant benefits to the Class Members, and those benefits exceed the expected return to Plaintiffs of proceeding to trial. Viewed from this perspective, the strength of Plaintiffs' case compared to the amount of AT & T's settlement offer strongly supports approval. In addition, continuing the litigation would doubtless involve a protracted, complicated, and expensive ***971** process, which also counsels approval. Furthermore, opposition to the Settlement has been very light, and both the opinion of competent counsel and the informal discovery completed to date warrant approval. For these reasons, the parties

have indeed carried their burden of demonstrating that the Settlement is reasonable, adequate, and fair.

7. The possibility that there may be a disparity in the refunds that Class Members of different states receive does not warrant denying approval

Another objection is that "there may or will be a potential disparity of [*sic*] the refunds between members of different states." (R. 141 at 3.) This is not a creditable objection to the Settlement.

The circumstances surrounding this litigation are obviously complex, as several states display idiosyncracies that are material to recovery of the Internet-tax charges. Key features of the Settlement, however, include the fact that it utilizes distinct procedures for different groups of states that impose differing refund requirements and the fact that it ties attorney compensation directly to the amount of money realized for the class. These features create an incentive framework that promises to maximize value to the Class Members. To the extent an asymmetry arises between the refunds earned by Class Members of different states, that phenomenon would likely be the result of those states' differing rules, procedures, and laws. It would not be the result of a systemic flaw in the Settlement itself. Because the Agreement puts in place a realistic framework for recovering the greatest possible amount for the Class Members, the possibility that Class Members of some states will benefit proportionally more than others is not an impediment to approving the Settlement. Such an outcome would simply reflect the unremarkable fact that some states may prove more receptive to the refund requests than others.

8. The class notice provides sufficient information about the fees sought by Class Counsel

A number of objectors contend that the class notice was inadequate because it did "not provide sufficient information by which one [could] determine the actual dollar amount of fees sought by counsel." (R. 141 at 3.) Shelley Stevens objects: "The attorney fees are unknown to me. How can I decide whether to agree to the attorney fees when I do not know how much they will be or what work has been done to earn them[?]" (R. 151 at 2.)

[14] [15] It is true that notice of attorneys' fees is a constituent part of an effective class notice. *See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d 938, 963 n. 15 (9th Cir.2003) ("Notice of the amount of fees serves as 'adequate notice of class counsel's interest in the settlement.' ") (quoting *Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co.*, 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir.1993)). In the present case, however, the mailed notice provided that Class Members could obtain "a more detailed description of the terms of the proposed Settlement and to read the full Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement, which more fully describes your rights" by visiting "the website, www.attmsettlement.com" or by calling a 1–800 number. (R. 97 at 32–33.) The Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement and Hearing provided the following information on attorneys' fees:

> Settlement Class Counsel will apply to the Court for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses and Class Representatives' compensation.
>
> Settlement Class Counsel plan on seeking an order approving attorneys' fees that reflect the results obtained and the work and effort required finally to obtain recoveries for the Settlement Class, ***972** and will seek such recovery from the funds obtained for the Settlement Class. Settlement Class Counsel agree that they will seek a fee no greater than the lesser of ten percent (10%) of the aggregate value of the Settlement or twenty-five percent (25%) of the amounts refunded by taxing jurisdictions to the Settlement Class. Settlement Class Counsel also will seek reimbursement for their reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred in pursuing this litigation on behalf of the Settlement Class from funds obtained for the Settlement Class under the Settlement Agreement. Finally, Settlement Class Counsel will seek compensation to the Class Representatives in an amount not to exceed $5,000 for each state-specific subclass representative from the funds obtained for the Settlement Class.

(R. 50–3 at 108.)

Objectors contend that this information is inadequate because it does not lend itself to an identifiable dollar figure. (R. 141 at 3; R. 151 at 2.) The parties could not realistically include such information, however, because the attorneys' fees depend on the amount Class Counsel successfully obtain for the Class Members. This is not a problematic feature of the Settlement, but an attractive one. *Cf. Staton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d 938, 963 n. 15 (9th Cir.2003) ("Where the class was informed of the amount of fees only indirectly and where the

failure to give more explicit notice could itself be the result of counsel's self-interest, the courts must be all the more vigilant in protecting the interests of class members with regard to the fee award."). As the Court previously observed, the present case is in many respects unique. (R. 97 at 27–28.) Except for the so-called "vendor's compensation," which it will return pursuant to the Agreement, AT & T did not keep the taxes that it collected. Instead, the company acted as a conduit for the relevant taxing jurisdictions. (*Id.*) It is a positive feature of the Settlement Agreement that it does not create a set dollar amount in fees for counsel. Such a fixed reward would create an incentive for Class Counsel to recover a sufficient amount in refunds to cover their own compensation, but considerably weaker incentives to recover more.

Ultimately, the fact that the class notice enabled Class Members to learn that Class Counsel would seek "a fee no greater than the lesser of ten percent (10%) of the aggregate value of the Settlement or twenty-five percent (25%) of the amounts refunded by taxing jurisdictions to the Settlement Class" constituted adequate notice. *Cf., e.g., In re Bisys Secs. Litig.*, No. 04–CV–3840, 2007 WL 2049726, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007) (observing that "no class member was on notice of the actual attorneys' fees requested at the time objections were due" but noting that "members of the class were plainly on notice that the attorneys' fees might be as much as one-third of the fund and so had every reason to raise an objection if they thought this was excessive"); *see also Hartless v. Clorox Co.*, 273 F.R.D. 630, 643 (S.D.Cal.2011) ("Objector Newman contends that the class has not been provided any information regarding the details of the fee request. Class counsel, however, indicated on the class notice that it would be filing its motion for attorneys' fees on or around November 22, 2010 and the document would be available via the website or mail by calling the toll-free number. Thus, the class members could have obtained a copy of the documents filed in support of the motion for attorneys' fees by calling the toll free number.").

9. The class notice contained sufficient information concerning Class Members' options

[16] Shelley Stevens objects to the class notice because "the post card I received *973 did not tell me any of the options nor did it tell me the deadline dates for objecting, opting out or even filing a claim." (R. 151 at 2.) This objection is unavailing. The text-message notice provided: "NOTICE OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT—You may be entitled to benefits under a class action settlement. Go to www.attmsettlement.com or call [the 1–800 number]." (R. 50–3 at 99.) Both the website and 1–800 number provided detailed information concerning Class Members' options, as well as the various deadlines. The postcard notice was more than sufficient. *See, e.g., In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig.*, No. 04–CV–15861, 2010 WL 2342413, at *7 (D.Md. May 19, 2010) (approving use of postcard notice); *Larson v. Sprint Nextel Corp.*, No. 07–CV–5325, 2010 WL 234934, at *7–8 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2010) (same).

10. The class notice sufficiently disclosed the amount of expenses and costs for which the attorneys seek reimbursement

[17] A further objection is that "the class notice is inadequate in that it does not disclose the amount of expenses and costs sought to be reimbursed [.]" (R. 141 at 3.) The Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement and Hearing provided that "Settlement Class Counsel ... will seek reimbursement for their reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred in pursuing this litigation on behalf of the Settlement Class from funds obtained for the Settlement Class under the Settlement Agreement." (R. 50–3 at 108.) Thus, although the class notice did not provide the specific dollar figure that Class Counsel would seek in expenses and costs, it did apprise Class Members of the fact that Class Counsel would seek those sums. (*Id.*) Class Counsel subsequently filed its motion for costs and expenses on January 26, 2011. (R. 124.) This date was before the deadline for filing objections of February 2, 2011. (R. 108 at 2.)

The Class Notice was sufficient with respect to the costs and expenses that Counsel would likely seek. *Cf., e.g., In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig.*, Nos. 04–MD–15863, 04–CV–560, 2010 WL 4780244, at *2 (D.Md. Nov. 15, 2010) ("The mere fact that the class notice stated only that Plaintiffs' Counsel would seek 'reasonable out-of-pocket expenses' does not make the notice inadequate under the PSLRA.... [T]he failure to assign a numerical value to projected expenses constitutes a much less egregious oversight-if, indeed, it is an oversight at all. Unlike the [*In re*] *Delphi* [*Corp. Securities, Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation*, 248 F.R.D. 483 (E.D.Mich.2008)] case, the Putnam class members here were still informed that Plaintiffs' Counsel would seek 'reasonable out-of-pocket expenses,' and they had the opportunity to object to this provision. Thus, the content of the Putnam class notice was adequate under the PSLRA.").

11. Proponents of the settlement have discharged their burden of proof on commonality, typicality, and predominance

Numerous objectors contend that proponents of the settlement have failed to discharge their burden of proof on commonality, typicality, and predominance. (R. 141 at 3; R. 156–4 at 13–14; R. 151 at 2.) Objectors Mike Hale, Summer Hogan, Michael Schulz, and Omar Rivero make this assertion gratuitously, without offering any explanation as to why the certified Class does not meet these certification requirements. (R. 141.) Separately, Margaret Strohlein argues that the diversity of the Class, with its many differing causes of action, "will prove to be very difficult" and, "[a]s a result, issues of predominance under 23(b) arise." (R. 156–4 at 13.) She further contends that the divergent remedies ***974** in different states render claims in some jurisdictions more valuable than others, thus defeating predominance. (*Id.*)

[18] These objections fail. Notably, the Court certified the present Class for settlement purposes only. (R. 97 at 16.) It is true that "[s]ettlement does not relieve the Court of its duty to perform a robust analysis of the plaintiffs' predominance showing." *In re Grand Theft Auto Video Game Consumer Litig.*, 251 F.R.D. 139 (S.D.N.Y.2008). The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that "settlement is a factor in the calculus" whether "certification is proper." *Amchem*, 521 U.S. at 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231.

The Supreme Court has explained that the "Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation." *Amchem*, 521 U.S. at 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231. The Court previously concluded that the allegation that AT & T's standardized conduct violated laws common within each subclass demonstrates that the Class and Subclasses will be cohesive. (R. 97 at 16.) The Court sees no reason to revisit that conclusion.

Although it is true that the Supreme Court in *Amchem* found that a class certified for settlement failed the predominance requirement of Rule 23, that finding was based on the myriad disparate questions that proved fatal to class cohesion. *Amchem*, 521 U.S. at 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231. Specifically, in that case, "[c]lass members were exposed to different asbestos-containing products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods. Some class members suffer no physical injury or have only asymptomatic pleural changes, while others suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from mesothelioma.... Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry." (*Id.* at 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231) (quoting *Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc.*, 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir.1996)).

The present MDL is eminently distinguishable, and the certified settlement Class does not present comparable difficulties to cohesion. The major issues in the class action are applicable to the class as a whole. Plaintiffs' claims all arise from the same alleged conduct of AT & T, namely the improper charging and collecting of taxes over "Internet access." The claims also involve the interpretation of the ITFA. The fact that the claims also implicate the laws of different states does not defeat predominance for the purpose of certifying a settlement class. *See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.*, 391 F.3d 516, 529–30 (3d Cir.2004) ("Although there may be situations where variations in state laws are so significant so as to defeat ... predominance even in a settlement class certification, this is not such a case. We agree ... that the fact that there may be variations in the rights and remedies available to injured class members under the various laws of the fifty states in this matter does not defeat commonality and predominance."); *In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig.*, 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir.1998) ("We ... reject Krell's contention that predominance is defeated because the class claims are subject to the laws of the fifty states."). Ultimately, "the instant action presents more than a mere common interest in a fair compromise." *In re Serzone Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 231 F.R.D. 221, 239 (S.D.W.Va.2005). The Court abides by its conclusion that the certified class meets the predominance requirement of Rule 23.

12. The class definition is not vague and ambiguous

A number of objectors contend that the class definition is vague and ambiguous, and is not tied to objective criteria. (R. 141 at 3.) The Court does not agree. As ***975** explained above, the class definition is both clear and objective, being comprised of "[a]ll persons or entities who are or were customers of AT & T Mobility and who were charged Internet Taxes on bills issued from November 1, 2005 through the final date on which AT & T Mobility issues bills to customers prior to implementing the billing system changes pursuant to Section 8.1." (R. 50–3 at 14.) The objectors do not explain

how this definition is vague and/or ambiguous. Nor can the Court discern a basis by which to reach such a conclusion.

13. The parties properly reached a settlement without the benefit of formal discovery

Several objectors take issue with the fact that the parties have reached a settlement without the benefit of formal discovery. (R. 116 at 3; R. 132 at 2; R. 156–4.) Karen Wiand submits that "[c]lass counsel has proposed to settle without having discovered the amount of money at issue, without determining which states will pay refunds [and] without determining the specific actual procedure for refunds[.]" (R. 116 at 3.) Travis Cox simply asserts, without explanation as to the basis for his objection, that "[t]he settlement has been reached without any formal discovery." (R. 132 at 2.) Margaret Strohlein contends that, without discovery, there is no way to know whether settlement will be of greater benefit to the Class Members than continuing the litigation. (R. 156–4 at 4.)

In fact, the informal discovery in this case is more than adequate to allow both the Court and the parties to make informed judgments with respect to the Settlement. The informal discovery has been extensive. Indeed, and as explained in detail above, requiring formal discovery would entail significant expenditures in resources and time—both at cost to the Class Members—with limited marginal value. The lack of formal discovery is not an impediment to approval of the Settlement.

14. The fact that some states currently face difficult financial situations is not an impediment to the Settlement

A number of Class Members object to the Settlement on the ground that, given some states' budget deficits, it is unlikely that some states will give refunds. (R. 132 at 2–3.) The Court does not consider this to be a valid objection. If the law obliges particular taxing jurisdictions to issue refunds, it is reasonable for the Court to assume that states will comply with the law. Defendant also points out that it is common for states to issue future tax credits, which the Agreement provides for. (R. 156 at 11.) In addition, to the extent that a number of states are currently penurious, then former and current AT & T customers who attempt independently to procure refunds from the state would face exactly the same problem that the parties will have to tackle pursuant to the Settlement. Furthermore, the Settlement provides for appeal procedures if taxing authorities refuse to pay refunds. (R. 50–3 at 19.)

15. Class Counsel will not neglect Class Members of certain states in favor of customers in those states in which counsel will receive large fees on refunds

A number of Class Members contend that "class counsel will receive large fees on refunds from some states even if AT & T customers in other states receive little if anything. The result is some AT & T customers will be sacrificed in favor of AT & T customers in other states." (R. 132 at 3.) Objector Karen Wiand shares this concern. (R. 116 at 3.)

The Court is satisfied that the parties have structured the Settlement Agreement in such a way that Class Counsel do not have an incentive to abandon Class Members who are residents of less lucrative ***976** states in favor of those in which higher refunds are owed. The extent of each local Plaintiffs' lawyer's compensation depends on the amount that lawyer recovers for the relevant Subclass. As noted previously, "class counsel will only be paid from state-specific escrow accounts if those accounts are funded through refunds or credits from the taxing jurisdictions[.]" (R. 97 at 26.) It is also relevant that the parties have already requested refunds from all the taxing jurisdictions. (R. 164 at 11.)

16. The Settlement does not violate the parties' contracts, which provide that the parties would resolve all disputes between them through arbitration

A small number of Class Members object to the Settlement on the ground that it violates the parties' contract. (R. 143 at 2–4, 7.) They point out that the contract between AT & T and the Class Members provides that they "agree to arbitrate all disputes and claims between us" and that they are "waiving the right ... to participate in a class action." (*Id.* at 2.) The Settlement Agreement, the objectors submit, is improper because the arbitration provision "prevents ATTM from resolving a dispute through a court or class action." (*Id.*)

This objection misconceives the nature of the present Class Action. AT & T is free to attempt to enforce the arbitration provision against the Class Representatives and other Class Members, but has elected to waive that right as part of

the Settlement Agreement. (R. 156 at 16.) Class Members also had the right to enforce the arbitration provision. Those who agreed to the Settlement Agreement by not opting out, agree-like AT & T-not to enforce that provision. Those Class Members who wished to enforce their right to arbitration could have done so by opting out. Ultimately, the objectors are mistaken in asserting that an arbitration agreement prevents the parties to the same from ever reaching a subsequent agreement. *See, e.g., Gabbanelli Accordions & Imports, L.L.C. v. Gabbanelli,* 575 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir.2009) ("[P]arties to an arbitration agreement can always waive the agreement and decide to duke out their dispute in court.").

[19] The objectors also submit that the Federal Arbitration Act ("the FAA") requires the Court to enforce the arbitration agreement. (R. 143 at 4–5.) They quote Section 3 of the FAA to the effect that, "[i]f any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending ... shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement[.]" (*Id.*) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3.) As AT & T correctly points out, however, this provision clearly requires that a party make an application to the relevant court. (R. 156 at 56.) The FAA does not impose an affirmative obligation on courts to compel arbitration independent of any application by a party.

17. The Settlement puts a well-thought-out process in place for AT & T to obtain refunds from states that require a person seeking a refund first to refund all relevant taxes and interest to the person from whom the taxes were collected

Angela Vrana and Barbara M. Fisher object that the Settlement Agreement will not realize refunds for Class Members in certain states. (R. 143 at 8–9.) They submit that, under Texas law, AT & T will not be able to obtain a refund unless it first refunds "all the taxes and interest to *977 the person from whom the taxes were collected." (R. 143 at 8) (quoting Tex. Tax Code § 111.104(f).) They point out that, under the Agreement, AT & T will pay the amount of the refunds into a "Pre–Refund Escrow Fund." (*Id.* at 8–9.) They further observe that the name of the fund itself demonstrates that money deposited within it is not a refund to consumers, but rather a "pre-refund," and further contend that Class Members have no rights with respect to the money in that fund. (*Id.* at 9.) These objections thus assert that Texas will not issue a refund. (*Id.*)

The Agreement has put in place a mechanism for obtaining refunds from those jurisdictions that condition granting refunds in the above-mentioned manner. (R. 50–3 at 17–20.) In such settings, the Agreement requires AT & T to pay an amount equal to the refund to the Pre–Refund Escrow Fund contemporaneously with the filing of a refund claim. (*Id.* at 17.) The parties agree that "the payment by AT & T of an amount representing Internet Taxes paid by that Settlement Class Member into the Pre–Refund Escrow Fund will be considered the payment by AT & T of such taxes to such Settlement Class Member." (*Id.*) Contrary to Vrana's and Fisher's contention the Class Members will have no rights with respect to the money in the Pre–Refund Escrow Fund, the Agreement provides that, "[w]ith respect to those refund claims filed in the name of AT & T Mobility, to the extent that the Taxing Jurisdiction grants AT & T Mobility a refund, AT & T Mobility shall assign all of its rights ... in the refund to the members of the Settlement Class." (*Id.* at 20.)

Ultimately, there is no absolute guarantee that taxing authorities in states with such laws will prove receptive to the refund procedures outlined in the Settlement Agreement. Nevertheless, the parties have put in place a well-thought-out procedure that appears to satisfy these jurisdictions' requirements. The Court is also encouraged by two further features of the Settlement Agreement. First, "Class Counsel ... agree to take any action reasonably necessary on behalf of the Settlement Class to satisfy a Taxing Jurisdiction that such amounts have been refunded to the affected customers in satisfaction of the Taxing Jurisdiction's requirement, in order to facilitate a refund or credit of the Internet Taxes to AT & T Mobility." (R. 50–3 at 17.) Second, the Agreement requires AT & T to cooperate with Class Counsel in the event that a taxing jurisdiction denies a refund claim and Class Counsel appeal. (*Id.* at 19–20; R. 156 at 18.)

18. AT & T's agreement to stop collecting taxes is not illusory

Angela Vrana and Barbara M. Fisher object to the provision in the Settlement Agreement that "AT & T Mobility reserves the right to reinstate charging for Internet Taxes in the Taxing Jurisdictions if ... federal, state or local laws, statutes, regulations, administrative decisions or pronouncements, or

the interpretation of any of the foregoing specifically requires, authorizes or permits the collection and payment of Internet Taxes[.]" (R. 143 at 9–10.) Vrana and Fisher worry that AT & T could reinstate charges for Internet Taxes at any time because its official position remains that its prior collections did not violate the law. (*Id.* at 10.) Karen Wiand echoes this objection. (R. 116 at 1–2.)

The Court does not share their concern. As part of the Settlement, AT & T expressly "agrees to cease charging the challenged Internet Taxes ... as soon as practicable." (R. 50–3 at 15.) In fact, as of February 23, 2011, AT & T had stopped charging these taxes in all jurisdictions, with the exception of 16 or fewer local Nevada jurisdictions and a single Missouri *978 jurisdiction, for which the company continued to charge Internet-access taxes due to a programming error. (R. 156 at 21–22.) The provision that permits Defendant to reinstate this practice addresses a possible situation in which a change in the law explicitly allows the collection of such taxes. As the Court previously noted, "[i]f a jurisdiction were to give AT & T the express authority to collect these taxes, it would be difficult to fault AT & T for resuming such taxation." (R. 97 at 23.)

The objectors essentially fear bad faith on AT & T's part. The Court discerns no basis for assuming the same. As Defendant notes, "the provision does not allow AT & T to issue its own interpretations of the applicable laws as a pretext for resuming collection of the fees.... In any event ... the Court retains jurisdiction to deal with 'any dispute or controversies arising with respect to the interpretation, enforcement, or implementation' of the agreement. Thus, if ... AT & T were to resume collection of the challenged taxes in bad faith, this Court could readily put a stop to such behavior." (R. 156 at 50–51) (emphasis and citations omitted.) The Court agrees. The Settlement Agreement provides that "Class Plaintiffs and Interim Settlement Class Counsel will seek dismissal without prejudice for the limited purpose of allowing the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Agreement." (R. 50–3 at 26–27.)

19. There is no force to the objection that, because AT & T improperly collected taxes, it must reimburse Class Members

Another objection is that AT & T is the entity that wrongfully collected the relevant taxes and should thus bear the responsibility for making the Class Members whole. (R. 132 at 3; R. 147 at 2.) These objectors mistakenly assume that no conceivable question exists as to Defendant's liability. As explained above, AT & T had a number of potentially meritorious defenses. Consistent with the compromise that defines any settlement, the Agreement observes Plaintiffs' allegations and Defendant's denial of the same, and imposes a variety of obligations on the parties. One of the conditions is that AT & T agree not to assert its defenses. (R. 50–3 at 13.)

The objectors' contention that AT & T should directly pay Class Members treats the Settlement as equivalent to a complete victory on the merits for Plaintiffs at trial. This fundamentally misconceives the nature of a settlement. Indeed, the Settlement Agreement makes clear that AT & T specifically denies all liability to the Class Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class, and further provides that, "[b]y entering into this Agreement, the Settling Parties agree that AT & T Mobility is not admitting any liability to the Class Plaintiffs, the Settlement Class, or any other person or entity, and AT & T Mobility expressly denies all such liability." (R. 50–3 at 13–14.)

20. State statutes of limitations do not warrant denying approval to the Agreement

Karen Wiand objects to the Settlement on the ground that "[v]arious states ... have tax law statute of limitation [*sic*] bars preventing recovery of the tax refunds back to 2005 represented by settlement counsel as the promised refund consideration time period." (R. 116 at 1.) Citing a Michigan law that provides that "a claim for refund based upon the validity of a tax law based on the laws or constitution of the United States or the state constitution of 1963 shall not be paid unless the claim is filed within 90 days after the date set for filing a return," she explains that Michigan law would bar recoveries "for anything farther back than the most recent 90 days[.]" (*Id.* at 6–7.) Wiand argues that this creates a cross-subsidization problem because those Class *979 Members who would otherwise have a right to a complete refund under the operative statute of limitations would "have their refunds pooled into a common pot with all other Michigan consumers, including those whose service was solely in the early years of the settlement time frame whose claims would otherwise be partially or totally time barred[.]" (*Id.* at 7.) As a solution, Wiand submits that "[t]he class for each state should be defined commensurate with the applicable statute of limitations time period[.]" (*Id.* at 8.)

Finally, Wiand observes that Michigan is not the only state that will create cross-subsidization problems. (*Id.* at 8–9.) She points to an Illinois law that provides that, with respect to "any claim for credit or refund ..., no amounts erroneously paid more than three years prior to such January 1 and July 1, respectively, shall be credited or refunded[.]" 35 ILL. COMP. STAT.. 630/10. As a result, she submits, "the Illinois class ..., like the Michigan class, would receive far less than identically situated class members in states without short refund statutes of limitations (a blatant inter-state conflict of interest); and the 100% valid claims of recent consumers would be diluted in order to pay refunds on expired invalid time-barred claims of other consumers [.]" (*Id.* at 8–9.) Objector Shelley Stevens make a similar point. (R. 151 at 2) (objecting to the Agreement because "the laws of the states are different" and "some states [*sic*] refunds may be barred by limitations").

[20] The Court disagrees with these objections. In the first place, the argument that different states' varying statutes of limitations create an inter-state conflict of interest fails in light of the fact that the Settlement Agreement creates distinct state-specific subclasses and separate local representation. (R. 156 at 49.) Second, the 90–day provision of Michigan law on which Wiand relies does not apply when a person files a refund claim with respect to taxes that violate state law. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.27a(2). As AT & T explains, "the basis of the refund claim filed in Michigan is that Michigan law does not authorize the challenged taxes[.]" (R. 156 at 46) (emphasis omitted.) Last, Wiand's cross-subsidization objection does not support subdividing the Subclasses into additional subclasses based on statutes of limitations because such an arrangement would be unworkable. *See, e.g., Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers v. GMC,* 497 F.3d 615, 629 (6th Cir.2007) ("[I]f every distinction drawn ... by a settlement required a new subclass, class counsel would need to confine settlement terms to the simplest imaginable or risk fragmenting the class beyond repair."). Furthermore, and with respect to objectors' cross-subsidization concern, "there is no rule that settlements benefit all class members equally ... as long as the settlement terms are 'rationally based on legitimate considerations.' " *UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp.,* No. 05–CV–73991, 2006 WL 891151, at *28 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 31, 2006) (quoting *In re PaineWebber Ltd. P'ships Litig.,* 171 F.R.D. 104, 131 (S.D.N.Y.1997)). In the present case, the Settlement will provide the Class Members with significant benefits.

21. The Agreement Does Not Improperly Saddle the Class Members with the Administration Costs and Attorneys' Fees

Karen Wiand also objects that the Agreement saddles the "class member victims of AT & T's illegal breach of contract ... with settlement administration costs and attorney fees." (R. 116 at 2.) This objection misconstrues the legal status of the parties' conduct. There has been no finding that AT & T violated the law. Nor has this, or any other, Court found AT & T liable to the Class Members for Defendant's ***980** collection of the challenged tax charges. The Settlement Agreement currently before the Court does not constitute an admission of liability or any violation of the law on AT & T's part, but instead preserves the parties' conflicting positions on this matter. (R. 50–3 at 10.) As explained above, given the legal issues involved, it is not certain that Plaintiffs would prevail at trial should the Court elect not to approve the Settlement.

The Agreement provides that the "Cost of Administration shall be paid from the Settlement Fund prior to distribution of the Net Settlement Fund." (R. 50–3 at 29.) The fact that the parties will use refunds to pay for the settlement administration costs and attorneys' fees, however, does not defeat the legitimacy of the Settlement. *See, e.g., In re PaineWebber,* 171 F.R.D. at 131 ("Naturally, the settlement does not provide for a full recovery of legal damages; but that is the hallmark of compromise. Given the very considerable litigation risks that would be faced by the Class at trial, the amount of the settlement cash fund is very much within the 'range of reasonableness' required for judicial approval."). For the reasons outlined above, the Court finds that the Settlement meets the requirements of Rule 23.

22. Class counsel have established a well-thought-out procedure for obtaining refunds in Michigan

Karen Wiand next objects that the Settlement fails to establish a procedure for proposed tax refunds for Michigan residents. (R. 116 at 3.) To the contrary, the Agreement puts in place a methodology for obtaining refunds from the various states that have differing rules with respect to the same. Wiand's objection as to Michigan is misplaced. Indeed, AT & T has already submitted a refund claim in that jurisdiction. (R. 156 at 51.)

23. It is appropriate for the Michigan law firm to work with Class Counsel

Karen Wiand also objects that Class Counsel purport to represent Michigan class members "via a co-counsel Michigan law firm in which one of the two partners of the firm recently testified as an 'expert' at the request of AT & T Mobility in support of its motion to dismiss a similar consumer lawsuit." (R. 116 at 4.) The partner to whom Wiand refers is Wolfgang Mueller, who submitted an affidavit on behalf of AT & T in a separate case to the effect that AT & T's "arbitration provision would not prevent a plaintiff from obtaining competent counsel to represent him or her on an individual case basis." (R. 116–2 at 1–4.) The Court did not consider this prosaic detail to be a creditable objection in its earlier opinion, which granted preliminary approval. (R. 97 at 14 n. 14.) Wiand does not now explain why this affidavit reveals that the Michigan law firm is ill placed to work with Class Counsel. (R. 116 at 4.) This objection is not well founded.

24. The strength of Plaintiffs' case supports the Settlement

Margaret Strohlein objects that, "[a]lthough Class Counsel claims the strength of Plaintiffs' causes of action were tenuous, the short life cycle of the case coupled with the, almost immediate, settlement for both monetary and injunctive relief indicates otherwise." (R. 156–4 at 3.) She further submits that AT & T's "seemingly overt violations of the ITFA make Lead Counsels' pleas after the fact seem hollow." (*Id.* at 4.) The Court does not agree. As explained above, Defendant has a number of potentially effective defenses to the instant action, which could deny the Class Members much or all of their sought-after relief. The Settlement Agreement, by contrast, promises to yield significant benefits ***981** to the Class Members. Viewed in light of the strength of Plaintiffs' case, the Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Strohlein also objects that "there is no guarantee what [Class Members'] reward will be." (R. 156–4 at 5–6.) Of course, no guarantee exists that Class Members would recover should they proceed in this MDL litigation and, if they did, in what amount. There is evidence, however, that AT & T's agreement to discontinue the collection of the challenged taxes pursuant to the Settlement will benefit the Class Members. Dr. Landes estimates this value as being close to $2 billion. (R. 163–2; Tr. at 36.) Although this figure exaggerates the Agreement-specific gains to the Class from AT & T's no longer charging Internet-access taxes, the benefits are nevertheless real.[11] Further, as of February 23, 2011, AT & T had stopped charging these taxes in all jurisdictions, with the exception of 16 or fewer local Nevada jurisdictions and a single Missouri jurisdiction, for which the company continued to charge Internet-access taxes due to a programming error. (R. 156 at 21–22.). While the parties cannot predict the amount in cash refunds that Class Counsel will realize for the Class Members with mathematical precision, the fact that Counsel's compensation is tied to that recovery creates a strong incentive for them to maximize the value of the return. Given the powerful benefits likely to result from the Settlement, Strohlein's objection is unconvincing.

25. Challenges to Dr. Landes's methodology do not warrant denying approval to the Settlement

Margaret Strohlein challenges Dr. Landes's methodology and questions the reliability of her conclusions on the basis of bias. (R. 156–4 at 2, 9–11.) She first submits that Dr. Landes's calculation of a 3.09% tax rate common to the Class is "speculative" and "beyond vague." (*Id.* at 10.) The Court does not agree. Dr. Landes is a highly experienced economist with impressive credentials. She has worked at Lexecon—a leading economics-consultancy firm—for 30 years and has a doctorate in economics from Columbia University. (R. 163–2 at 1; Tr. at 9.) At the March 10, 2011, hearing, and in her report, Dr. Landes carefully and credibly explained her methodology. Dr. Landes relied "on the ratio of the total taxes collected to AT & T's total data service revenues for the first half of 2010 to estimate the fraction of revenues that would have been collected as taxes in the future, in the absence of the Settlement" in arriving at the 3.09% average tax rate. (R. 163–2 at 4; Tr. at 28.)

Strohlein argues, first, that Dr. Landes "only utilized the total data service revenues for the first half of 2010 in determining the tax rate instead of a larger temporal cross section." (R. 156–4 at 10.) Strohlein does not offer a view based in economics, or otherwise, why this half-year measure was improper or was apt to give rise to a misleading calculation. (*Id.*) Furthermore, Dr. Landes subsequently testified at the March 10, 2011, hearing that she had updated her conclusions in light of AT & T's fourth-quarter earnings report. (Tr. at 12–16 (observing that "AT & T's actual fourth quarter financial

results, particularly for data services, came in somewhat under the analyst projections").)

Strohlein's second objection is that Dr. Landes "utilized an average of all of the state's [*sic*] and jurisdiction's [*sic*] tax rates (instead of calculating each jurisdiction separately) in order to obtain her rate ***982** of 3.09." (R. 156–4 at 10.) Yet, at the March 10, 2011, hearing Dr. Landes explained that she had "thought about trying to get into the very varied details of the state tax collections and the members of the class that are state by state" because "the states have different tax rates and different numbers of persons in the class[.]" (Tr. at 13.) She then explained that that would not have been an effective course because it would be very difficult to do and "would lead to a sense of false precision." (*Id.*) The Court finds Dr. Landes's explanation to be convincing and credits it, accordingly.

Finally, Strohlein challenges Dr. Landes's calculation of the relevant discount rate. (R. 156–4 at 10–11.) Strohlein does so despite conceding that "Dr. Landes employed a method commonly utilized in the field of economics for this purpose[.]" (*Id.* at 10.) Observing that, "because AT & T's debt is not publicly traded, Dr. Landes was unable to access any information on its current debt rate," Strohlein criticized Dr. Landes for relying "on the yield on an index of U.S. bonds with short term maturities (1–5 years) issued by utilities and phone companies." (*Id.* at 11.) Strohlein offers no explanation why such an index is not a reasonable and acceptable proxy for AT & T's discount rate. In fact, Dr. Landes credibly testified that it is standard for economics experts to rely on such information.

With a single qualification, the Court is convinced by Dr. Landes's thorough report and testimony, and thus overrules Strohlein's objection. As noted, the Court accepts Dr. Landes's estimate of the value to the Class Members of AT & T's decision to cease collecting Internet-access taxes. This estimate, however, overstates the value that the Settlement specifically creates for the Class because there is at least some chance that AT & T would have ceased collecting those taxes independent of the Agreement.

26. The objection to class actions generally is misplaced

Lastly, Robert Shattuck launches a sustained critique of the class-action device generally. (R. 156–5.) It is true that at least some forms of class-action practice have attracted criticism. *See, e.g., In re Am. Exp. Merchants' Litig.*, 554 F.3d 300, 304 n. 3 (2d Cir.2009), *vacated by Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.*, —U.S.—, 130 S.Ct. 2401, 176 L.Ed.2d 920 (2010). Yet, the law recognizes class actions as a legitimate part of the U.S. litigation system. The Supreme Court has made this clear on several occasions. *See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Falcon*, 457 U.S. 147, 155, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) (explaining that, in appropriate cases, "the class action device saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every class member to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23"); *Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper*, 445 U.S. 326, 339, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980) ("Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device."). In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provides for the use of such a procedure.

The only specific feature of the Settlement Agreement presently before the Court that Shattuck addresses is his argument that the Court should limit attorneys' fees to $100,000. (R. 156–5 at 9.) Shattuck's suggestion of a $100,000 cap appears arbitrary because, beyond opining that large attorneys' fees will invite an excessive number of class-action lawsuits, he does not explain how he reaches that figure. ***983** In addition, as Mr. Robertson testified at the fairness hearing, Class Counsel already have expended approximately $1 million in out-of-pocket expenses in litigating this case. [12]

B. The Amicus Briefs Filed by Certain States Do Not Change the Fact that the Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate

The Court has carefully studied the amicus briefs filed by several states, and concludes that those states' concerns do not warrant a finding that the Settlement Agreement is not fair, reasonable, and adequate.

A recurring concern involves the perception that the Court, in approving the Agreement, is affirmatively holding that the relevant taxing jurisdictions must grant the parties' refund requests. The Court makes no such finding. The Settlement is an agreement that, once approved by this Opinion, will only bind the private parties that are privy to it. The Settlement does not purport to dictate to any state or local authority the makeup of its applicable law.

Texas objects that, in approving the Settlement, the Court would be granting "an injunction against AT & T [*sic*] collecting state sales taxes on Internet access charges in Texas[.]" (R. 178 at 12.) To the contrary, nothing in the Agreement calls on the Court to award an injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Nor shall the Court do so. The Settlement amounts to no more than an agreement, enforceable in contract, that AT & T will cease charging the relevant taxes. Contrary to what Texas maintains, the Agreement does not "confer power on this Court to excuse AT & T from its duties under Texas law." (*Id.* at 13.) In the event that a state court determines, or a legislature provides, that AT & T's failure to collect Internet-access taxes is contrary to law, the Settlement does not require AT & T to refrain from collecting those taxes, whether it be in Texas or any other jurisdiction. Indeed, the Agreement provides that AT & T reserves the right to reinstate charging for Internet Taxes if "federal, state or local laws, statutes, regulations, administrative decisions or pronouncements, or the interpretation of any of the foregoing specifically requires, authorizes or permits the collection and payment of Internet Taxes on, or on the charges for, any services or products set forth on Exhibit I." (R. 50–3 at 15.)

A further objection raised by amici is that the ITFA does not apply to AT & T's activities in certain states because of the Act's grandfather provision. (R. 178 at 9.) This issue is not before the Court. Should amici take the position that their laws do not entitle the parties to a refund, then it will be for the legal processes of their respective states to determine whether the law justifies that position. Importantly, the Settlement provides for an appellate procedure in the event that jurisdictions refuse to grant refunds. (R. 50–3 at 19.)

Texas also argues that, because in its view the ITFA does not apply to AT & T's collection of sales taxes from the company's Texas customers, "[u]nder the Settlement Agreement[,] each member of the Texas Subclass is likely to receive a zero recovery while forfeiting possibly valid claims under a broad release of AT & T." (R. 178 at 9, 21–24.) If Texas is correct that the law justified AT & T's collection, however, it does not explain what claims the Class Members could pursue against AT & T if the release under the instant ***984** Settlement did not apply to them. Ultimately, the Court is satisfied that the aggregate expected value to Class Members under the Settlement significantly exceeds their expected value in either proceeding to trial or undertaking arbitration on an individual basis.

Amici also argue that the Tax Injunction Act deprives the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction both to entertain the present MDL and to approve the Settlement Agreement. (R. 171; R. 178; R. 179.) The TIA provides that "district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The Seventh Circuit has explained that, "if the relief sought would diminish or encumber state tax revenue, then the Act bars federal jurisdiction over claims seeking such relief. The TIA strips the district courts of the power to hear suits seeking not only injunctive but also declaratory relief from state taxes." *Scott Air Force Base Props., L.L.C. v. Cnty. of St. Clair,* 548 F.3d 516, 521 (7th Cir.2008) (citing *Levy v. Pappas,* 510 F.3d 755, 762 (7th Cir.2007)); *see also Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc.,* 560 U.S. 413, 130 S.Ct. 2323, 2332, 176 L.Ed.2d 1131 (2010) ("[T]he TIA may be best understood as but a partial codification of the federal reluctance to interfere with state taxation.... The Act ... restrained state taxpayers from instituting federal actions to contest their own liability for state taxes, suits that, if successful, would deplete state coffers.... Federal judges ... are bound by the TIA; absent certain exceptions, the Act precludes relief that would diminish state revenues[.]") (quotations omitted).

Amici argue that the Settlement, if approved by the Court, would enjoin the collection of a tax in circumstances where state courts provide for a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. (R. 171; R. 178; R. 179.) This argument misconceives both the nature of the Settlement and this Court's approval of the same. As stated above, the Court's approving the Settlement does not constitute an injunction against a state tax. The Settlement amounts only to an agreement between private parties, pursuant to which a private company agrees to cease collecting a particular tax. Furthermore, in carrying out the provisions of the Agreement that require the parties to seek refunds from taxing jurisdictions, the Settlement does not purport to dictate to any state the substance of its laws. Indeed, the Agreement provides that, if any "state or local laws, statutes, regulations, administrative decisions, or pronouncements ... authorizes [*sic*] or permits [*sic*] the collection and payment of Internet Taxes[,]" AT & T may reinstate charging for Internet taxes. (R. 50–3 at 15.) In addition, if a taxing jurisdiction declines a refund, the parties cannot turn to this Court for an order compelling that

jurisdiction to issue the same. (*Id.* at *passim.*) Instead, the Agreement provides for an appeal process within the relevant state or local jurisdiction that denied the refund. (*Id.* at 19.)

[21] Finally, the Court does not agree with amici that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain this MDL because the consolidated master class-action complaint sought, amongst other remedies, injunctive relief. (R. 48 at 27–28.) In the first place, the JPML transferred the instant MDL to this Court "for coordinated or consolidated *pretrial* proceedings" only. (R. 1 at 3) (emphasis added.) Further, it is not clear that relief awarded between private parties could fall afoul of the TIA. As the Seventh Circuit recently observed, "[w]e fail to see how a suit against a private party could challenge the validity of a tax, given that private parties do not have the power of taxation. We have not found another case where the parties even argued, ***985** let alone the court agreed, that the TIA prevented a private dispute from being adjudicated in federal court." *In re Wal–Mart Stores, Inc.*, No. 09–8039, 2009 WL 7823752, at *1 (7th Cir. Nov. 12, 2009). Finally, the Settlement does not provide for injunctive relief, and so any defect in the underlying complaint does not afflict the propriety of the ultimate Agreement disposing of the MDL. *See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis*, 519 U.S. 61, 64, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996) ("We hold that a district court's error in failing to remand a case improperly removed is not fatal to the ensuing adjudication if federal jurisdictional requirements are met at the time judgment is entered").

III. The Court Can Approve the Settlement Agreement Without Granting in its Entirety Class Counsel's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Expenses, and for Approval of Incentive Awards for Class Representatives

[22] For the reasons explained above, the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and thus the Court grants the motion for final approval (R. 154). In an accompanying, but separate order, the Court grants in part and denies in part Class Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, and for approval of incentive awards for Class Representatives. The Court can consistently approve the Settlement Agreement, finding it to be fair, reasonable, and adequate, while also finding that the requested attorneys' fee is unreasonable. *See, e.g., Strong v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc.*, 137 F.3d 844 (5th Cir.1998) (finding that the district court, having approved the amended settlement agreement, did not abuse its discretion in denying additional attorneys' fees in a class action); *In re Elan Secs. Litig.*, 385 F.Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (finding proposed settlement to be reasonable, and thus granting motion for approval, but reducing sought attorneys' fee from requested 20% of settlement amount to 12%, and so granting motion for fees in part); *In re Twinlab Corp. Secs. Litig.*, 187 F.Supp.2d 80 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (approving settlement, and finding an attorney-fee award of 12% of the common fund, but not the requested 33% fee, to be reasonable); *cf. In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig.*, 264 F.3d 712 (7th Cir.2001) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving a class-action settlement, reversing the court's award of attorneys' fees "at a level significantly below what the lawyers had requested" because the court had failed to estimate the market rate for such fees, but not suggesting that district courts cannot legitimately approve class-action settlements while at the same time awarding less than the sought attorneys' fees).

In the present case, the Settlement Agreement is not contingent on the Court's approving Class Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees. (R. 50–3.) The Settlement merely provides that "Class Counsel agree that they will seek a fee no greater than the lesser of ten percent (10%) of the aggregate value of the settlement or twenty-five percent (25%) of the amounts refunded by Taking Jurisdictions to the Settlement Class." (*Id.* at 26.) Class Counsel have sought such a fee. The Agreement does not require that Class Counsel succeed in obtaining the fee that they seek.[13] The Court can therefore ***986** grant final approval to the Settlement Agreement, while denying in part Class Counsel's sought-after attorneys' fee. *Cf. Reibstein v. Rite Aid Corp.*, 761 F.Supp.2d 241, 247 (E.D.Pa.2011) (observing that the relevant settlement agreement provided that "a reduction by the Court ... of attorneys' fees ... sought by the Plaintiff and Class Counsel shall not affect any of the parties' other rights and obligations under this Settlement Agreement"). This interpretation comports with the statements of Class Counsel, who at the fairness hearing explicitly requested a separate fee order if the Court approved the Settlement—the "merits part of it"—to facilitate a possible appeal on the issue of fees.

The Court therefore grants the motion for final approval of the Settlement (R. 154).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court grants the Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement (R. 154).

Parallel Citations

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Footnotes

1 The Court reserved judgment on whether to appoint Analysis Research Planning Corporation ("ARPC") as settlement administrator. (R. 96 at 1.) The Court subsequently granted Class Counsel's motion for appointment of ARPC as interim settlement administrator on January 7, 2011. (R. 121; R. 122.)

2 The parties agree that the Court should exclude the Nevada and Idaho subclasses from the Settlement. (R. 156 at 53.) The Court agrees, and thus amends the Class accordingly.

3 As explained below, this objection is inconsistent with the Court's order of August 19, 2010, which provided that "Settlement Class Counsel shall file its application for class representatives' fees, attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses by January 26, 2011." (R. 108.) The Court's order also provided that "[o]bjections ... must be filed by February 2, 2011." (*Id.*) Class Counsel filed their motion for attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, and for approval of incentive awards on January 26, 2011. (R. 125.) Cox and Johnson filed their objection on February 2, 2011. (R. 132.)

4 According to the Court's calculation, however, 25% of $956,160,000 is $239,0400,000.

5 At the March 10, 2011, hearing, Dr. Landes revised the $2.02 billion figure downward slightly in light of updated figures that became available. The revised saving to Class Members from AT & T's agreeing no longer to collect the relevant taxes, as calculated by Dr. Landes, is approximately $1.98 billion.

6 Dr. Florence also explained why Bank of New York Mellon, which this Court appointed as Escrow Agent (R. 122), was the most qualified for this role. He observed that the bank had done comparable settlements in the past, that ARPC had worked with the bank before and had been impressed, that the bank had a dedicated and talented team, and that the cost factor was attractive.

7 For those jurisdictions that only allow class members to seek refunds, AT & T has provided refund claim templates. (R. 156 at 33.)

8 In her report, which preceded the fairness hearing, Dr. Landes concluded that the value of continuing tax savings to Class Members from AT & T's agreement to cease collecting the challenged taxes within 30 days of the Court's preliminary approval of the Settlement was approximately $2.02 billion, discounted to present value. (R. 163–2.) She subsequently revised this figure downward, however, to $1.98 billion in light of financial data that became available to her after preparation of her report.

9 Although Dr. Landes did not revise this figure in light of updated financial information that became available to her after she prepared her report, she testified at the March 10, 2011, hearing that it would possibly be in "the order of $4 billion" were she to do so. (Tr. at 36.)

10 Of course, the various states that have filed amicus briefs challenging the Settlement are also "affected" by the Settlement. The Court considers the merits of their arguments below, but notes here that states' hostility to the Settlement is in some respects unsurprising given that they are the entities from which the parties will seek reimbursement. As the Court previously explained in its opinion granting preliminary approval, this case is "unique" in that "AT & T essentially acts as a pass-through ... to taxing authorities who [*sic*] will ultimately make substantial payments directly to the class members." (R. 97 at 27–28.)

11 As explained above, one must discount the $1.98 billion value estimated by Dr. Landes by reference to the probability that AT & T would have elected to cease collecting the relevant taxes in the absence of the Agreement.

12 The Court rules on Class Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees in an accompanying memorandum opinion and order.

13 The Agreement provides that, if the Court does not approve the Settlement "in complete accordance" with its terms, "no class will be deemed certified." (*Id.* at 25–26.) It further states that, AT & T shall have the right to set aside or rescind the Agreement "[i]f any objections to the proposed settlement are sustained" or "[i]f there are any material modifications to this Agreement, including exhibits, by the Court [.]" (*Id.* at 30–31.) It also provides that a "final order" or "final judgment" cannot occur unless the Court approves the Settlement "without material modification unless expressly agreed to by AT & T Mobility and the Class Plaintiffs[.]" (*Id.* at 9.) As explained, however, in denying in part Class Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees, the Court does not modify any provision of the Settlement, be it materially or otherwise.

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GR-81. ASSESSMENTS: If, upon audit or examination, the Director or his duly authorized agent determines there is additional tax due, the Director shall prepare a schedule reflecting the amount of additional tax, interest and penalties payable and shall furnish to the taxpayer, if available, a copy of this schedule. A "Notice of Proposed Assessment" and "Taxpayer's Bill of Rights" shall also be mailed to the taxpayer at the address listed upon the application for retail permit or the actual business address of the taxpayer or hand delivered to the taxpayer.

Source: Ark. Code Ann. §§ 26-18-401 et seq.; 26-18-801 et seq.

GR-81.1. REFUNDS:

A. REFUNDS OF TAX ERRONEOUSLY PAID.

1. Refunds Allowed. Any taxpayer who has paid tax in excess of the amount lawfully due is entitled to a refund of the tax erroneously paid. The claim for refund must meet the requirements of the Arkansas Tax Procedure Act. The purpose of this regulation is to clarify those requirements.
2. Refund claims may not be pursued under Ark. Code Ann. § 26-18-507 or the provisions of this regulation for the following:

a. Illegal exaction actions for which a remedy is available pursuant to Article 16, Section 13 of the Arkansas Constitution;

b. Actions arising from the issuance of a proposed assessment, jeopardy assessment, or final assessment for which a remedy is available pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §§ 26-18-204, 26-18-405, and 26-18-406;

c. Taxes for which a refund is barred by the statute of limitations. (See GR-81.1(E).)

B. DEFINITIONS.

1. "Claim for Refund" shall mean:
   a. An amended return that correctly reports tax that was reported incorrectly on an original return, resulting in a refund of part or all of the tax paid with the original return.

      Example: Taxpayer A reports its gross receipts for the month of June 2004 as $132,000.00 and calculates its tax liability based on that amount. Taxpayer subsequently discovers that its gross receipts for June 2004 were actually $123,000.00. The only information required to correct the error is a change, within the limitations period provided by law, to the gross receipts amount. Taxpayer files an amended return for June 2004 correctly reporting its gross receipts as $123,000.00 and calculates the tax liability based on $123,000.00. Taxpayer is entitled to a refund of the tax applicable to the $9,000.00 difference in gross receipts; or

   b. A verified claim for refund that requires information in addition to that required on an amended return.

      Example: Taxpayer collects tax from its customer on the sale of a piece of machinery that sells for $85,000.00. Taxpayer reports and remits the tax on $85,000.00. The customer obtains an opinion that the machinery is exempt from tax as manufacturing machinery. Taxpayer refunds the tax to the customer and files a verified claim for refund that supplies the information necessary for DFA to determine whether Taxpayer is entitled to the refund claimed. (See GR-81.1(C) and GR-81.1(D) regarding claim requirements.)
2. "Claimant" shall mean the person or entity that files a refund request (claim for refund). The claimant may be the taxpayer (the vendor or a direct pay permit

holder), or the person or entity to whom the taxpayer has assigned its claim (assignee, usually the customer). A representative of the claimant who has been granted the Power of Attorney to act on the behalf of the claimant may submit a Claim for Refund. For a consumer use tax claim, the customer who reported and remitted consumer use tax directly to the state rather than to the vendor may file a Claim for Refund.

3. "Taxpayer" shall mean:
   a. Any person who is subject to or liable for any state tax
   b. Any person required to file a return, to pay, or to withhold and remit any tax required by the provisions of any state tax law
   c. Any person required to obtain a license or a permit or to keep any records under any state tax law; or
   d. Any person who files a return and pays a reported tax without regard to whether he or she was required to file the return.
4. "Assignee" shall mean a person or entity (usually a customer who paid tax to a vendor) to whom a taxpayer (usually a vendor) has assigned its right to a refund of tax that the taxpayer collected from the customer and reported and remitted to the state.
5. For purposes of this regulation the terms "vendor" and "seller" shall have the same meaning and may be used interchangeably. The terms "customer" and "purchaser" shall have the same meaning and may be used interchangeably.

C. CLAIMS FOR REFUND.

1. Who May File a Claim for Refund?
   a. Sales or Use Tax.
      (1) The taxpayer (vendor) who collected and remitted the tax may file a refund claim, if the vendor satisfies one of the following conditions:
         (a) The vendor has borne the tax (i.e., the vendor did not collect the tax from the customer);
         (b) The vendor repaid the tax to the customer from whom the vendor collected the tax; or
         (c) The customer consents to refunding the tax to the vendor.
      (2) The assignee of a vendor (See GR-81.1(G)).
      (3) For use tax, a taxpayer who reported and remitted consumer use tax directly to the state rather than to the vendor.
      (4) A holder of a direct pay permit.
   b. Income Tax. Only a taxpayer who paid income tax may file a claim for refund. An income tax refund is claimed by filing:
      (1) An original return reporting a tax liability that is less than the amount paid through withholding and estimated payments; or
      (2) An amended return.
2. Requirements for Claim. Form 2004-6 is incorporated into and adopted as a part of this regulation and is required to be used by every claimant filing a claim for refund other than an amended return. The form provides a method and format to comply with the requirements for a claim for refund. The form is available on the Internet at http://www.arkansas.gov/dfa/excise_tax_v2/et_su_forms.html. The information listed below in items (a) through (f) of this section shall be required in order to process any claim for refund other than an amended return.

a. The Taxpayer's name and identifying tax information, including sales tax permit number, social security number or FEIN;
b. The date the tax was paid to the state and the tax period for which the tax was paid;
c. The nature and kind of tax paid, such as sales tax, withholding tax, use tax, withholding tax, individual income tax, corporate income tax;
d. The amount of tax that is claimed erroneously paid;
e. The specific grounds upon which a refund is claimed. For example, if the claimant requests a refund based on a claim that the item purchased is exempt from tax, the information supplied should explain the specific exemption claimed, and the reasons that the item qualifies for the exemption; and
f. Any other information relative to the payment required by the director.

3. Deficiencies in Claim. If the director determines that the information supplied in the claim for refund substantially complies with the claim requirements, the claim will be considered to be filed timely for all periods within the statute of limitations as of the date the claim is filed. However, a refund claim that substantially complies with the claim requirements may lack additional information required by the director to process the claim. The director will send a letter to the claimant that states that the claim for refund is considered timely, explains what additional information is required, and gives the claimant a reasonable time to supply the information. If the information is not supplied within the time allowed, that part of the claim relating to the requested information will be denied.
4. Treatment of Deficient Claims. Any claim that does not contain the information listed in GR-81.1(C)(2) and as required on Form 2004-6 will be considered not to be in substantial compliance with the claim requirements. The director will send a letter to the claimant stating that the claim does not meet the claim requirements. The claimant may resubmit the claim, adding the necessary information to substantially comply with the requirements. The statute of limitations shall continue to run on the refund claim until a claim is filed that substantially complies with the claim requirements. Only those taxes that are within the statute of limitations at the time a claim that is in substantial compliance with the claim requirements is submitted will be refunded. The statute of limitations will not relate back to the filing date of a prior claim that was not in substantial compliance with the claim requirements.
5. Signature.
   a. Claims Filed by Taxpayer. The refund claim shall be signed by a person authorized by the taxpayer to sign tax documents.
   b. Claims Filed by Assignee of Taxpayer. Any person who signs any document on behalf of a vendor that relates to the assignment of a vendor's right to a tax refund must certify that he or she has access to the vendor's records and can certify on behalf of the vendor that the tax has been paid.

D. PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION OF REFUND REQUEST. To facilitate the prompt and efficient review and analysis of refund requests, it is necessary that refund requests be presented in an orderly and understandable fashion. Toward that end, all sales and use tax refund claims should be organized as follows:

1. Refund Claims Made by Vendors. The most common refund request occurs when a vendor requests a refund of taxes previously remitted to the state. In these circumstances, the vendor sells the product or service, collects the tax from the customer, remits the tax to the state, and subsequently obtains information that the original transaction was not taxable or the amount of tax originally paid was incorrect. In this situation, the vendor will refund the tax to the customer and request a refund of the tax from the state. A vendor seeking a refund under these circumstances must present documentation supporting the refund claim in the following manner:
   a. Complete Sections 1 and 2 of Form 2004-6.
   b. Attach copies of all invoices for which a refund of tax is requested.
   c. The invoices should be arranged in chronological order from the oldest invoice to the most recent.
   d. A spreadsheet or other list showing that tax was remitted to the State of Arkansas for all invoices that are included in the refund request.
   e. Provide documentation showing that:
      (1) The vendor has borne the tax (i.e., the vendor did not collect the tax from the customer but did pay the tax to the state);
      (2) The vendor repaid the tax to the customer from whom the vendor originally collected the tax; or
      (3) The customer consents to refunding the tax to the vendor.
   f. Any additional documentation that will assist DFA in verifying the refund claim should be attached.
2. Refund of Taxes Paid Directly by the Purchaser. In some situations, the customer is responsible for paying sales and use tax directly to the State of Arkansas. This typically occurs when a customer pays use tax on purchases made from outside the state or the purchaser holds a direct-pay sales and use tax permit. When a purchaser requests a refund of sales or use tax paid directly to the State of Arkansas, the refund claim should be organized in the following manner:
   a. Complete Sections 1 and 2 of Form 2004-6.
   b. Attach copies of all invoices for which a refund of tax is requested. These invoices should be arranged in chronological order from the oldest invoice to the most recent.
   c. A spreadsheet or other list showing that tax was remitted to the State of Arkansas for all invoices that are included in the refund request.
   d. Any additional documentation that will assist DFA in verifying the refund claim should be attached.
3. Vendor Assignment Refund Claims. Occasionally, a vendor will assign the vendor's right to a tax refund to the customer and the customer will request that DFA make a refund directly to the customer. In this circumstance, it is necessary to provide adequate safeguards to ensure that DFA refund only taxes that have actually been received by the state from the vendor. Refund claims made by customers as a result of a vendor assignment must be in the following form to provide these safeguards and to expedite processing of these refund claims:
   a. Complete Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Form 2004-6.

b. Attach copies of all invoices for which a refund of tax is requested. The invoices should be arranged in chronological order from the oldest invoice to the most recent.
c. If a vendor assignment refund is being requested for sales tax paid to more than one vendor, a separate Section 2 and a separate Section 3 must be included for each vendor. The total amount refunded may be summarized for all vendors on Section 1.
d. Each vendor assigning its right to a refund must complete column 12 of Section 2 and all of Section 3.
e. Any additional documentation that will assist DFA in verifying the refund claim should be attached.

4. Requests for refund that do not include the documentation as described in this section or that are not arranged in the manner outlined in this section will be denied. However, the taxpayer will be provided additional time to correct deficiencies as provided in GR-81.1(C)(3).

E. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. The statute of limitations that applies to tax refunds is found at Ark. Code Ann. § 26-18-306. Refund claims are within the statute of limitations if they are filed within three (3) years from the date the return was filed or two (2) years from the date the tax was paid, whichever is later.

F. PROCESSING CLAIMS FOR REFUND.
1. Claims for refund will be processed based upon the information supplied in the claim for refund, either on the forms or otherwise included with the claim for refund.
2. The Director will process claims that substantially comply with the requirements of a claim for refund in the order received.
3. Checks that are issued to pay refunds will be mailed to the claimant's address on the claim for refund.
4. The Director will notify, in writing, claimants whose claims for refund are denied in whole that the claim, or any part, has been denied. The denial will state the basis for the denial of the claim. For remedies available upon denial of a refund, see Section I.

G. VENDOR ASSIGNMENTS.
1. Refunds Made Directly to the Assignee (customer). For sales tax, the customer is not the "taxpayer," because the customer is not liable to report and remit the tax. A customer who pays tax to a vendor should request a refund of tax erroneously paid from the vendor. After the vendor refunds the tax to the customer, the vendor can then file a claim for refund of the tax refunded to the customer. However, under the common law principles of assignment, the vendor can legally assign its right to refund to the customer (assignee).
2. Vendor Assignment Claim Requirements.
a. The general claim for refund requirements shall apply to refund claims resulting from an assignment by a vendor of its right to refund to the customer from whom the vendor collected the tax. (See GR-81.1(C)(1).
b. Verification by the taxpayer (vendor) that the tax claimed has been paid by the taxpayer (vendor) to the state. This verification is satisfied if both the taxpayer and the assignee satisfactorily complete Form 2004-6.

c. Certifications of Taxpayer (vendor). Taxpayers who assign the right to refund to an assignee should carefully read Section 3 of Form 2004-6. By signing Section 3, the taxpayer is certifying that:
(1) The assignee (customer) paid the tax to the vendor;
(2) The vendor paid the tax to the state;
(3) The vendor has not previously requested or received a refund of the tax on the form;
(4) The vendor has not refunded the tax to the customer; and
(5) The vendor agrees not to claim a refund after assigning the claim.

3. Right of Assignee to Refund No Greater Than Right of Taxpayer. If the vendor would not be entitled to a refund, then its assignee is not entitled to a refund. Under Arkansas law, an assignee of contract rights has no greater rights against the debtor than did the assignor. Tucker v. Scarbrough, 268 Ark. 736, 740, 596 S.W.2d 4 (1980). The confidentiality provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 26-18-303 prohibit the Department from disclosing to the assignee facts concerning why the vendor is not entitled to a refund. If applicable, the Department will notify the claimant that the claimant must request the refund directly from the vendor.

H. ELECTRONIC RECORDS. The age of technology has afforded many companies the ability to conduct purchasing activities in a "paperless" environment. There may be times when "paper documents" are not available and can not be included as required with the Claim for Refund. For the purposes of this rule, "paperless" will mean that a traditional "hard copy invoice or paper invoice" cannot be produced, does not exist, and has not been issued from the vendor to the purchaser. When this situation occurs, the claimant is to:

1. Prepare the spreadsheet as discussed in Section 2 of the Claim for Refund packet.
2. The claimant will substitute documentation that will provide the necessary information to substantiate that tax was paid to a vendor or was accrued by the taxpayer. This information should include the date of purchase, vendor name and address, transaction tracking number used by vendor and purchaser, description of item purchased, dollar amount paid for the item purchased, and the amount of tax that was accrued by the purchaser or paid to the vendor.
3. Any other information thought to be helpful by the claimant for refund verification purposes should also be submitted with the Claim for Refund.
4. The director may request additional information necessary to verify the claim for refund.

I. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO CLAIMANT FOLLOWING DENIAL OF A CLAIM FOR REFUND.

1. Administrative hearing. The claimant has sixty (60) days following the issuance of a written denial of a claim to file a protest of the denial and request an administrative hearing. An assignee shall have the same rights to hearing that the taxpayer would have under the Arkansas Tax Procedure Act.
2. File suit in court to contest the denial. Any claimant may file suit in circuit court to contest a refund denial. The suit must be filed within one (1) year from:
   a. The director's written denial of the claim for refund; or
   b. The final decision of either the hearing board or the director on revision following an administrative hearing.

3. If the director fails to issue a refund or a written denial of the claim within six months of the date the claim is filed, the claimant may file suit in circuit court on the claim.

Source: Ark. Code Ann. § 26-18-507

GR-81.2. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES

A. PROTEST.

1. Protest of Assessment. If a taxpayer objects to a proposed assessment of tax, the taxpayer must file his protest in writing within sixty (60) days of receipt of the Notice of Proposed Assessment setting forth under oath facts and/or law supporting the protest of the assessment. The protest shall be mailed to the address set forth in the Notice of Proposed Assessment. If the taxpayer fails to file a written protest within sixty (60) days of receipt of the Notice of Proposed Assessment, then the Director shall issue by certified mail, return receipt, a Notice of Final Assessment. Failure to pay the Notice of Final Assessment within thirty (30) days of receipt shall subject the taxpayer to the filing of a Certificate of Indebtedness, constituting a judgment, and to the collection remedies available to the Director.
2. Protest of Refund Claim Denial. If a taxpayer objects to the denial of a claim for refund, the taxpayer must file his or her protest in writing within sixty (60) days of receipt of the Notice of Claim Denial setting forth under oath facts and law to support the protest. The protest shall be mailed to the address set forth in the notice. The taxpayer shall specify the form of hearing as described in GR-81.2(B)(2).

B. HEARINGS.

1. If the taxpayer files a written protest of the Notice of Proposed Assessment, or a written protest of the denial of a claim for refund, within the sixty (60) day time period allowed for a protest then the taxpayer will be granted a hearing before a Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer shall set the time and place for the hearing which will be in any city in which the Revenue Division maintains a Field Audit District Office, or in such city as the Director, in his or her discretion, may designate. It is not necessary to request an administrative hearing prior to seeking judicial relief.
2. At the hearing the taxpayer has the option of:
   a. Appearing in person and representing himself or herself or being represented by an authorized spokesperson for the presentation of evidence or argument in support of the taxpayer's protest of the assessment;
   b. Not personally appearing, but requesting that a hearing be held and a decision rendered by the Hearing Officer upon the basis of documentation or written arguments submitted by the taxpayer; or
   c. Requesting a hearing to be held by telephone, video conference, or other electronic means available to the Revenue Division.
3. The taxpayer shall elect the form of administrative hearing in his or her written protest. In any instance an attorney for the Revenue Division may appear to offer evidence and legal argument in support of the Notice of Proposed Assessment or the denial of the claim for refund.

C. REVISIONS.

1. Upon completion of the hearing and submission of all documentary evidence and argument, the Hearing Officer shall render a decision in writing and serve copies