## AR Teacher Retirement Plan:

Risks, Redistribution \& Remedies Robert M. Costrell, University of Arkansas (for affiliation only) AR Legislature, Joint Committee on Retirement; September 11, 2018

- Cost Trends: Employer Contributions per Pupil, AR \& US
$>$ AR has managed its costs much better than US
$>$ Risks lie ahead, so AR is wise to get ahead of the game
- Example of Risks in Amortization Contribution Rates
> back-loaded amortization schedule \& payroll growth assumption
- Value of Risk-Free Benefits
- Distribution of Ind'I NC @ assumed return \& risk-free rate $>$ Market value of pension guarantee is highly concentrated
- Risk-Sharing measures: ATRS has adopted several
- Examples from other states, in \& beyond traditional plans - $1^{\text {st }}$ CB plan for teachers: KS
- Takeaways


## Employer \& Member Contribution Rates

Employer and member contribution rates will change in the future according to the following schedule.

|  | Contribution Rate |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fiscal Year | Member | Employer |
| $2018-2019$ | $6.00 \%$ | $14.00 \%$ |
| $2019-2020$ | $6.25 \%$ | $14.25 \%$ |
| $2020-2021$ | $6.50 \%$ | $14.50 \%$ |
| $2021-2022$ | $6.75 \%$ | $14.75 \%$ |
| 2023 and Later | $7.00 \%$ | $15.00 \%$ |

## Employer Contributions per Pupil, FY01-23 (\$2018)

\$1,000

\$0


Sources: ATRS valuation reports, National Center for Education Statistics (US DOE), author calculations

## Employer Contributions per Pupil: US vs. AR (\$2018)

\$1,400


- Rise in employer contributions for unfunded liability (UAL), much more rapid in US.
- In part, difference is unfunded benefit hikes elsewhere, at the end of 1990s bull mkt.
$\$ 200$. AR has managed its education pension finances much better than US.
- But risks lie ahead \& AR is wise to get ahead of the game.
\$0


Sources: ATRS valuation reports, National Center for Education Statistics (US DOE), BLS, author calculations

## U.S.: Rise in "Benefit" Costs Squeezes Salaries

|  | $1990-2015$ | 2000-2015 |
| :---: | ---: | ---: |
| U.S. compensation/pupil (\$2016-17) | $1.0 \%$ | $0.9 \%$ |
| US salaries/pupil | $0.6 \%$ | $0.1 \%$ |
| US benefits/pupil | $2.4 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ |
| US compensation/staff (\$2016-17) |  |  |
| all salaries/staff | $0.4 \%$ | $0.6 \%$ |
| all benefits/staff | $0.0 \%$ | $-0.2 \%$ |

Source: National Center for Education Statistics (US DOE), author calculations

- Much/all "benefits" growth = payments on unfunded liabilities (UAL) > Payments for past accruals, not currently earned benefits
- Side note: difference between $\$ /$ pupil and $\$ /$ staff is growth in staff/pupil
- Growth in staff/pupil has slowed almost to a halt nationally


## ATRS Employer Cont'ns: Normal Cost vs. Amortization



## What Will Happen to ATRS Contributions?

- Will the hikes to $15 \%$ (employer) and $7 \%$ (employee) suffice?
- Policy: amortization with constant rate to fund in $\leq 30$ yrs
- ATRS recognizes value in moving to 18 years
- Two issues:
- Amortization method
> Level-percent of payroll backloads payments
- Failure to cover interest on UAL, as ATRS duly warns
- Negative amortization
- Depends on assumed return, payroll growth, funding period
> "open interval": amortization period re-starts every year
- Keeps rate lower in short run
- but never pays off UAL, so payments persist > normal cost
- What if assumptions on investment returns, payroll growth fail?
> Reason, Pew will speak on investment returns
> Consider payroll growth


## What Assumptions Lead to Negative Amtz'n?



## Scheduled Amortization Payments (\$)


\$100
\$0

Source: ATRS, GASB Statement Nos. 67 \& 68, 2017, p. 39

## Amtz'n Cont'n Rate @ 2.75\% payroll growth

$14 \%$
$12 \%$

$2 \%$
$0 \%$

## Actual \& Projected Payroll Growth (\$)

\$7,000

$\$ 1,000$
\$0

## Shortfall if Payroll Growth is $1.00 \%$



## Scheduled Amortization if Assume 1.00\%


$\$ 100$

## Amtz'n Cont'n Rate @ 1.0\% payroll growth



2\%

0\%

## Value of Risk-Free Benefits to Members

- Shift gears from amortization costs to normal costs
- We will look at individual normal costs:
- The annual cost to pre-fund individual benefits
- Evaluate at expected rate of return, and then at risk-free rate
- The difference is value of pension guarantee to members
- Risk-sharing will reduce that benefit


## Individual NC Rates

- Individuals vary by entry and separation age (yrs of service)
- Individual NC rate (employer+employee)
- applied to each year's pay would cover benefits
> the annual cost (or value) of individual benefits, as \% of pay
- Comparable to contribution rates for individual retirement accounts
- Uniform NC rate, applied to all, is average of ind'l rates.
- set to cover cohort's benefits


# NC, by Age of Exit, Age 25 entrant, $r=7.5 \%$ 

Estimated using 2017 ATRS assumptions for F teacher and benefit formula for new hires, with FY23 contribution rate Value of T-DROP excluded

25\%

20\%


## NC, by Age of Entry \& Exit, $r=7.5 \%$

Estimated using 2017 ATRS assumptions for F teacher and benefit formula for new hires, with FY23 contribution rate Value of T-DROP excluded

25\%

$$
\text { Entry Age: }-25-30=35=40=45
$$



The curves depict $n_{e s}$, the annual contribution rate required to fund benefits of an individual entering at age e and exiting at age $s$.
Variation in cost by age of exit is shown along each curve; variation by age of entry is shown across curves.

## Value of Risk-Free Benefit

- Finance economics: risk-free benefit valued at risk-free $r$
- Wilcox \& Brown, Novy-Marx \& Rauh, Biggs
- Value of individual benefits much higher than contribution rate
- Not only critics of traditional DB plans
- Defenders, too (NCTR publication on ATRS website)
$>$ N.B. This is NOT an argument that cont'ns should be calculated at risk-free rate. That is a different matter. This is simply about what it would cost on the market to buy a risk-free stream of benefits.
- How is the value of the guarantee distributed?


## Annual Value of Risk-Free Benefits, $r=4.0 \%$

Estimated using 2017 ATRS assumptions for $F$ teacher and benefit formula for new hires, with FY23 contribution rate Value of T-DROP excluded


## Annualized Market Value of Pension Guarantee

Difference between value of individual normal cost evaluated at $4.0 \%$ and $7.5 \%$ for ATRS new hires Value of T-DROP excluded


The curves depict the annualized market value of the pension guarantee for an individual entering at age e and exiting at age s.
Variation in the value of the guarantee by age of exit is shown along each curve; variation by age of entry is shown

## ATRS Has Cut Benefits \& Taken Steps to Share Risks

- Multipliers reduced for first 10 years, FAS raised to 5 years, $\$$ stipend cut
- If amortization period > 18, can raise employer cont'n to max of $15 \%$
- If amortization period $>18$, can raise member cont'n to max of $7 \%$
- T-DROP interest credit to include upside risk-sharing for market returns


## Steps Other States Have Taken to Share Risks

- Pew reports that 17 states use risk-sharing measures
- If actuarially required cont'n rises, split between employer/member
- Maine: 55/45 split subject to cap
- If required cont'n rises, suspend COLA in full or in part (SD)
- E.g. limit to CPI


## Account-Based Plans

- DC plans place all investment risk on members
- Hybrid plans (split between DB \& DC) split the risk, e.g. RI
- Cash Balance plans can share the risk (as ATRS T-DROP CB plan)
- They redistribute benefits more uniformly
- Value of risk-reduction for members is less concentrated


## Nation's $1^{\text {st }}$ Teacher Cash Balance Plan: KS

- New hires since 2015
- Employee cont'n = 6\%
- Employer cont'n credit:

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
0 & <5 \text { YOS: } & 3 \% \\
0 & 5-11 \text { YOS: } & 4 \% \\
0 & 12-23 \text { YOS: } & 5 \% \\
0 & >23 \text { YOS: } & 6 \%
\end{array}
$$

- Interest credit, $i=4 \%+0.75 \times$ [actual r (5-yr ave) $-6 \%$ ]
- 5 -year vesting to get employer cont'n credit
- annuitiz'n @ 55 w/10 YOS; @ 65 w/5-10 YOS
- KPERS assms: $r=7.75 \%, i=6.25 \%$


## Takeaways

- AR has managed its costs much better than US
- Risks lie ahead, so AR is wise to get ahead of the game
- e.g. back-loaded amortization schedule \& payroll growth ass'n
- Value of pension guarantee is high \& highly concentrated
- Risk-Sharing measures: ATRS has adopted several
- AR may want to consider enhancing these measures
- And/or considering others:
- within existing structure, or beyond (CB, hybrid)
- Since the value of pension guarantee is high (\& highly concentrated):
$>$ Risk-sharing will reduce the benefit of the guarantee
> But it will still be high compared to private sector DC plans

