

**CAPSAFT RULES GOVERNING THE ACADEMIC FACILITIES PARTNERSHIP
PROGRAM, Appendix A, Section 8000 Only**

**Public Comments and Responses of the Division for Arkansas Public School Academic
Facilities and Transportation**

Second Public Comment Period

Commenter: Charles Stein (4/20/2020)

Comment (1): Numbering for requirements appears incorrect. For example, the first standard for Locking Systems and Hardware is numbered 6. Where are the first five standards?

Division Response: Comment considered. **Non-substantive changes made.**

Comment (2): The Requirements list seven components, including Egress and Refuge. However there are no requirements contained for Egress and Refuge (There is an Egress and Refuge guideline.)

Division Response: Comment considered. **Non-substantive change made.**

Comment (3): Site and Perimeter standard #4 and Building Systems standard #7 appear to be the same standard.

Division Response: Comment considered. There are slight contextual differences between the two. **No changes made.**

Comment (4): The Site and Perimeter guidelines mention perimeter features that could aid surveillance. Suggest giving some examples of such perimeter features.

Division Response: Comment considered. **Non-substantive change made.**

Comment (5): Suggest adding audio to the guidelines for Video Surveillance. Audio has many useful applications during and after an event.

Division Response: Comment considered. Districts certainly have the option of adding audio surveillance. **No changes made.**

Commenter: Dr. Charles Stein (3/21/20)

Comment (1): Is there a purpose for the strange numbering of the requirements? For example, proposed numbering implies there are five previous standards for locking systems and hardware.

Division Response: Comment considered. **Non-substantive changes made.**

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Comment (2): I know that the entire Section 8000 is new in rules and should show up as underlined, but is it possible for ADE to show a markup of the first proposed Section 8000 to show the changes in the revised Section 8000? School districts thoroughly reviewed the first Section 8000, and it would be helpful if the revised Section 8000 could show the changes made to the first Section 8000.

Division Response: Comment considered. Due to comprehensive nature of the revision after the first public comment period, providing underlining/strike throughs would likely be more confusing than not. If confusion arises in comparing the two, the Division would be happy to answer any questions. **No changes made.**

First Public Comment Period

Commenter: Clint Byard, West Memphis School District (10/30/19)

Comment (1): I was made aware of the proposed changes to the Academic Facility Manual that has been sent out for review that deal with Safety and Security. I agree fully with the concept and feel that this has been needed for some time but I also have concerns on how districts will be able to afford to implement such requirements. I would like to ask how much effort was made to include school district personnel in developing this document. Were outside contractors in the sales of some of the safety products listed involved in developing this document?

Division Response: Comment considered. The majority of the standards already are incorporated into new school design and/or are not high cost items. Additionally, many changes were made to the requirements set forth in the proposed rules. **Changes made**

Comment (2): Are these requirements only for new construction and additions? It does not state this in the documents provided. Trying to renovate all buildings to meet these requirements may be impossible because of the existing design and the cost.

Division Response: Comment considered. Yes, Section 8000 Safety and Security applies only to new construction and additions as defined by the Partnership Program Rules. **No changes made.**

Comment (3): Product: We need some clarity in the wordage used in the 8000 proposal. Bullet proof glass is a totally different product than bullet/shatter resistant product. Bullet proof glass requires special framing and support structure due to the thickness. It can cost anywhere from \$25 to \$100 per square foot depending on the quality and what caliber of bullet that you are wanting to stop. I have seen schools constructed recently that installed bullet proof glass at the main office receptionist window but only installed shatter resistant film on the glass panels in the vestibule at the main entrance. A high caliber bullet will pass through the film covered glass easily and even though the shattered glass panel may not fall out with enough bullet holes and force, it can be pushed out of the frame to allow access. If this remains a requirement then it

should state that the film should be applied to the entire glass pane and not just the exposed glass that is showing. The strength is the film itself so having the glass edge inside the frame with no film applied will allow it to fall out easily.

Division Response: Comment considered. Bullet proof glass is not a requirement. Bullet/impact resistant glass is stated in the guidelines, however, this does not prevent a district from upgrading to a ballistic rated glass or state a required rating. Installation of ballistic/impact rated glass and/or films should be according to manufacturer's specifications. **No changes made.**

Comment (4): I have been around long enough to remember when wire reinforced glass was recommended in doors and exterior windows to prevent access when the glass was broken. Years later, we were told that this product could not be used because it delayed access by the fire department and police during emergency situations and also caused injuries. That's really around the same time that we began using interior security systems. We had very few break-ins when the wire reinforced glass was in place. Now the requirement will be bullet/impact resistant glass to be used on all exterior windows and doors. Has the requirements been passed by the State Fire Marshals for consideration? What if bullet proof glass is used.

Division Response: Comment considered. This standard has been revised to state: "Interior vision panels shall be reinforced." "Bullet and impact resistant" have been removed. **Changes made.**

Comment (5): Another requirement that came with the facility manual was that all classroom doors were to have vision panels (lite kits) installed so that observation of the students could be made from the hallway without interfering with instruction. Now the police are instructing the teachers to keep the windows covered or blacked out. The new proposed requirements state that these windows shall be reinforced and have bullet/impact resistant glass installed. Why not recommend the removal completely to remove two requirements and save cost?

Division Response: Comment considered. This standard has been revised to state: "interior vision panels shall be reinforced." "Bullet and impact resistant" have been removed. **Changes made.**

Comment (6): I do not understand the requirement of having a one handled egress on the interior doors that cannot be reachable from any vision panel. The door handle location is required by ADA standards. I have 37" arms and could reach the handle through just about any vision panel. Again, why not just remove the vision panel completely.

Division Response: Comment considered. This requirement has been removed. **Changes made.**

Comment (7): In the Building Systems standards, I agree fully with using masonry walls instead of steel/wood studs and drywall in hallways and other student occupied areas but my preference was always due to durability and maintenance. Now we are addressing it as a way to protect the occupants but this again adds to the cost of construction and I have seen many more school buildings being constructed using studs and drywall to reduce cost. Will there be another

increase to the construction cost factor because of this requirement? Also in this section, it states that building systems should not be accessible from the outside. Need clarity on this. Is this referring to mechanical systems? Is it referring to utility systems?

Division Response: Comment considered. This is a guideline (not a requirement). The “building systems should not be accessible from the outside” requirement has been eliminated. **Changes made.**

Comment (8): In the Egress and Refuge section, it refers to windows being designed to serve as a secondary means of egress. Sprinkler systems are required in almost all new construction so most designs are going with non-operable storefront windows. In earlier sections it refers to this when it states that windows should be sealed. Need clarity on this?

Division Response: Comment considered. The requirement for sealed windows has been eliminated. Windows designed to be a secondary means of egress is a guideline. **Changes made.**

This is a guideline (not a requirement) and is at the option of the district pending approval of the appropriate code official. **No changes made.**

Commenter: David Kellogg, Prairie Grove School District (11/14/19)

Comment (1): The proposed Recommendations and Requirements would certainly help improve school safety. Several of the proposed are expensive and some such as the security fencing and gates at the perimeter would need extensive monitoring and require additional personnel. Several of the proposed items need additional details to determine what would be required to fully implement.

Division Response: Comment considered. The proposed standards (requirements) and guidelines (non-requirements) have been modified or clarified with input from members of the Safety Commission, members of the Advisory Committee, AAEA, AIA, and school districts around the state. **Changes made.**

Comment (2): Due to the apparent expense of the proposed requirements and recommendations the Partnership Funding would need to be increased and readily available for proper implementation.

Division Response: Comment considered. The updated requirements do not appear to represent a substantial cost increase over current common practices. **No changes made.**

Commenter: Sarah Bennings, Polk/Stanley/Wilcox (11/13/19)

Comment (1): I have read the Safety and Security markup dated 8-22-2019. Many of these additional safety measures are welcomed and needed, such as those related to locking systems and hardware and communication systems. As a parent and community member I applaud the ADE's effort to ensure safe schools for our teachers and children. Concerning standards include: • "Interior vision panels shall be reinforced, bullet and impact resistant" • "All interior/ exterior doors with windows are bullet/impact resistant" • "Bullet/ shatter resistant film or glass on all exterior first floor windows." As an architect I know that bullet/impact resistant glass is an EXTREMELY EXPENSIVE and custom item. This type of glass comes in UL 752 Ratings 1-8, and "shotgun." The lowest level 1 (still expensive) would meet the ADE requirement for "bullet resistance." But the fine print will reveal that it is only resistant to 3 shots from a 9mm handgun. Levels 7, 8, and "shotgun" are completely custom items and are resistant to 5 shots from .22cal, .30 caliber or 12-gauge rifle slug, respectively. The truth is that as a cost saving measure, districts will install the Level 1 to meet the requirement, but history has shown that mass shootings are almost always carried out with an AR-15 rifle or a shotgun. This equals false security. But, even more probably what will happen is that districts won't install glass at all on the interior and as little as possible on the exterior. We know that glass brings daylight to the interior and views to the exterior which creates a healthier environment for students and teachers. Interior glass increases transparency allowing better surveillance of students by teachers. A special space in the school such as an art room or media center can be highlighted by the use of glass, enriching the learning activity of students. We have come a long way from the school designs of the 70's and 80's. Those that had no exterior windows and little to no interior glazing. Those that were sad and uninspiring. Please do not return us to past mistakes with standards that are based in fear.

Division Response: Comment considered. Bullet resistant glass or film is not a requirement but a guideline. **No changes made.**

Commenter: Hershel Cleveland, Western Yell County School District (11/1/19)

Comment (1): Locking systems - Agree with Item 1, disagree with items 2 and 3. Cost. Grandfather in existing buildings.

Division Response: Comment considered. These items are recommendations not requirements. Existing buildings are exempt, except in case of total renovation. **No changes made.**

Comment (2): Access Control - Entrance vestibule. Difficult to have entrance vestibule at other nine buildings on campus.

Division Response: Comment considered. Requirements are for new construction and complete renovations only. **No changes made.**

Comment (3): Access and Control - Agree with visitor management system, other requirements too expensive. Bullet proof glass.

Division Response: Comment considered. Bullet resistant glass or film is not a requirement but a guideline. **No changes made.**

Comment (4): Standards - Communication Systems. Panic button too expensive.

Division Response: Comment considered. Phone based panic button is acceptable. It is not the intent to have a panic button at every door, but either phone based panic buttons or placement only at strategic points such as the reception area are acceptable. **No changes made.**

Comment (5): Standards- Site and Perimeter- Agree with item 2, disagree with item 1. Access and cost.

Division Response: Comment considered. This has been revised to state: "Provide fencing around playground area." **Changes made.**

Comment (6): Standards-Building Systems - Object to items 1-4 as it is difficult to place barricades where students walk among buildings. Also all systems are at ground level.

Division Response: Comment considered. Item 1 now states "Vehicle barriers to protect main entry points and student gathering areas (steps, curbs, etc. at a minimum)." Items 2 and 3 were removed. Item 4 (now Item 2) will remain in as a requirement. **Changes made.**

Comment (7): Building Systems - Agree for hallways and high schools have concrete blocks if concrete floors present. Difficult to put locks or other bullet proof materials in classrooms with wooden floors. We recommend this requirement for new buildings.

Division Response: Comment considered. Requirements are for new construction and complete renovations only. It is also a recommendation not a requirement. **No changes made.**

Comment (8): We agree with times 1 and two as long as current interior doors are approved. We do not feel it is appropriate to change out all our interior doors with some glass so classrooms can be observed from hallway.

Division Response: Comment considered. Requirements are for new construction and complete renovations only. **No changes made.**

Commenter: Brent Stephenson, AIA Arkansas (11/21/19).

Comment: We urge the Arkansas Division of Public School Academic Facilities & Transportation to table this proposal until such time as it can fully vetted by the DPSAFT Advisory committee to 1) determine the unintended consequences of this proposal as presented, 2) determine the acceptance of liability of the stakeholders in the design and construction processes 3) determine if/where this proposal may conflict with safety systems currently in place,

either in the current Facilities Manual and or in the statutes governing public secondary education in Arkansas.

Division Response: Comment considered. The Division extended the public comment period to 12/31/19 and have actively sought input from AAEE, AIA, and architects on the Academic Facilities Advisory Committee, as well as the Chair of the Governor's Safety Commission. Public comments received were incorporated into a revised version of Section 8000. **Changes made.**

Commenter Name: Randy Palculict, architect (11/21/19)

Comment: The main concern for architects is the establishment of a one-size fits all set of standards. Some don't want a certain type of windows for different reasons—a certain type shouldn't be a blanket requirement. School safety doesn't deal only with outside bad guys but inside safety concerns as well. Primary concern is to not move too quickly and establish blanket standards that might have unintended consequences. Applauds state in taking this effort. There are fire, ADA, and other standards but no safety standards. Arkansas is inventing something new and will be trail blazing by setting security standards. This is a noble task, but we need to make sure that it's done correctly, or the best that it can be. Schools need to be secure, and lots of things can be standardized.

Division Response: Comment considered. The Division extended the public comment period to 12/31/19 and actively sought input from AAEE, AIA, and architects on the Academic Facilities Advisory Committee, as well as the Chair of the Governor's Safety Commission. Public comments received were incorporated into a revised version of Section 8000. **Changes made.**

Commenter: Michael Hester, Batesville School District (11/19/19)

Comment: The proposed regulations of bullet proof glass and bullet resistant film to building would put our cost out of range for anything we could afford. We have a 1938 elementary school we're trying to tear down and replace, we don't even have a theatre, we have the smallest and fewest 5A gyms in the state and we have no storm shelters or safe rooms... with these regulations the community cannot afford the price tag. This will sink so many bond referendums just on the price and regulations. Please find other funding or compromise on the requirements you put on our school districts.

Division Response: Comments considered. Bullet proof glass or bullet resistant films are not requirements. **No changes made.**

Commenter: Michelle McClafin, Hights Jackson Associates (11/26/19)

Comment (1): Category- Standards- Locking Systems and Hardware

#2. Interior doors shall allow for one-handled egress from the interior and shall not be reachable from any vision panel.

Comments: Having visual connection adjacent to the door is important for regular daily monitoring of classrooms. The lack of visual connection can create daily opportunities for bullying to increase behind closed doors by either administration or other students. Knowing you can be seen is a way to control negative situations.

Division Response: Comment considered. This is no longer a requirement. **Changes made.**

Comment (2): #3. Interior vision panels shall be reinforced, bullet and impact resistant

Comments: Making windows ballistic takes away an egress point opportunity for the people within. Makes it difficult for law enforcement to gain entry to provide protection to the students and staff. If the control of the room is flipped and the shooter takes over the room it creates a protected kill zone that gives advantage to the shooter. If this stays a requirement, there are various levels of ballistic glasses, is there a minimum level proposed to be required. Will funding be increased for these additional costs?

Division Response: Comment considered. This required language has changed to read "Interior vision panels shall be reinforced." **Changes made.**

Commenter: David Tollett, Barton-Lexa School District (12/4/19)

Comment (1): On the Section 8000 Safety and Security: I believe this should not be required but merely recommended. It should be each district's choice on what security measures work best in their area and for their facilities. These are costly items that are problematic for everyday use and ultimately do not prevent anything. Research shows and we are trained that the #1 deterrent for school shooting is the immediate engagement of the shooter. For small district's like mine many of these requirements are costly, will be the determining factor in not being able to afford to build what we need, and are unnecessary as they will not stop or prevent the issues we are trying to solve. Leaving these as recommendations and not requirements allows the districts to pick the security measures that are affordable and meaningful for their facilities.

Division Response: Comment considered. The Division believes that flexibility should be given to the districts to determine which security measures work best. However, the Division also believes that reasonable minimum safety standards should exist for new school facilities. The Division extended the public comment period to 12/31/19 and have actively sought input from AAEA, AIA, and architects on the Academic Facilities Advisory Committee, as well as the Chair of the Governor's Safety Commission. Public comments received were incorporated into a revised version of Section 8000. Many changes were made to the draft rules following the extended public comment period, including changing several requirements to guidelines. **Changes made.**

**Commenter: Mike Mertins, Arkansas Association of Educational Administrators
(12/17/19)**

Comment (1): ASPMA and AAEEA certainly supports efforts to improve safety and security measures in public school facilities across the state. However, the proposed rules have the potential to dramatically increase the cost of new construction which is a concern for all of us who are trying to hold construction costs down. The section of the proposed rules identified as "requirements" would add costs to new construction, even projects that were not being submitted for approval and partial funding through the Facility Partnership Program. Many districts are struggling to meet new teacher salary and minimum hourly wage mandates and we are concerned about the additional costs. If additional facility funding isn't provided to help offset the cost, then we would recommend moving the "requirements" to "guidelines/recommendations" to give local communities more flexibility to secure their facilities. If these proposed rules are approved as presented, additional funding should be provided by:

1. An appropriation of funds that districts could apply for in order to offset all or a portion of the additional costs for these new safety and security requirements, and
2. For Partnership projects, an increase in the \$200 per square foot allocation for new construction. At the same time, taking into consideration the adequacy of this \$ amount if the new International Building Codes of 2018 are adopted by the state, and
3. Continuing state funding of the RAVE Panic Button which is a key component of many district safety plans.

Division Response: Comment considered. The Division understands that these requirements could add cost and has spent considerable time listening to key stakeholders at AAEEA, School Safety Commission, AIA, Advisory Committee, and school districts. The Division believes that flexibility should be given to the districts to determine which security measures work best. However, the Division also believes that reasonable *minimum* safety standards should exist for new school facilities. Based on this collaboration the proposed rules have been changed substantially, which included changing several requirements to guidelines. **Changes made.**

Comment (2): Standards - Locking Systems and Hardware

Recommendation: Replace the wording in #1 with the following, "Storeroom function locksets shall be on all interior doors. Rationale for change: The existing language is unclear, especially in reference to exterior doors.

Recommendation: Move #3 from the Requirements section to the Guidelines section.

Recommendation: Replace the current language in #5, which is confusing, with "Exterior doors have handles and hinges that cannot be removed from the outside."

Division Response: Comment considered. Concerning #1, the Division believes that the recommended language would change the meaning since it eliminates exterior door. Concerning #3, the Division has removed the language "bullet and impact resistant" to read "Interior vision panels shall be reinforced." This Division is fine with recommended changes language in #5 to clarify. **Changes made.**

Comment (3): Standards - Access Control Recommendation: Regarding #4, define more clearly the term "touch type" and delete the phrase, "exterior handles are chain proof." Chain proof is a very high standard and would require very specific, potentially expensive doors/hardware.

Division Response: Comment considered. Concerning #4, the Division has removed the language "exterior handles are chain proof" and has defined the term "touch type" to be "i.e. Panic hardware that cannot be chained together - no crash bars allowed." **Changes made.**

Comment (4): Standards - Communications Systems: Recommendation: Move #1 to "Guidelines." The new required Standards - Access Control eliminates the need for this to be a requirement.

Division Response: Comment considered. The Division needs more explanation for how the new required Standards for Access Control eliminates the need for communication between the vestibule and the main office. **No change made.**

Comment (5): Standards - Site and Perimeter

Recommendation: Regarding #1, change the existing wording to, "Provide suitable fencing around playground areas." Also, define more clearly the type and height of fencing.
Recommendation: Regarding #2, change the word "barricades" to "barriers."

Division Response: Comment considered. Concerning #1, the new proposed language is "Provide fencing around playground areas." The type and height will be left up to the school district. The idea behind this is to prevent students from wandering off the playground area. Concerning #2, the Division concurs. **Changes made.**

Comment (6): Standards - Building Systems

Recommendation: Regarding #1, change the word "barricades" to "barriers."

Recommendation: Regarding #2, change "accessible" to "easily accessible."

Recommendation: Regarding #3, delete this section completely. This is an unreasonable requirement and is covered, to some extent, by #2 above. Another option would be to replace the current language with "Air intakes are protected."

Division Response: Comment considered. Concerning #1, the Division concurs. Concerning #2, this standard has been eliminated. Concerning #3, The Division concurs. **Changes made.**

Comment (7): Standards - Egress and Refuge

Recommendation: Delete #2. This is already addressed in Standards - Access Control #4.

Division Response: Comment considered. The Division concurs. **Changes made.**

Commenters: Jeff Steiling, Craig Boone, Jimmy Alessi (Academic Facilities Advisory Committee), Dr. Cheryl May, (Governor's School Safety Commission), Brent Stevenson (AIA)

The Commission and Governor's Office approved the original proposed version last fall. This version was public comment, and the Division received a lot of feedback from school districts and other key stakeholders. Based on this feedback, the public comment period was extended until the end of 2019. During this time the Division met with the following key stakeholders and security experts on multiple occasions to listen to their concerns and recommendations: AAEA; Dr. Cheryl May, Chair of the Arkansas School Safety Commission; AIA; and members of the Advisory Committee which included the chair, Jimmy Alessi and two architects, Craig Boone and Jeff Steiling. Based on these discussions and exchanges, the Division made substantial changes to Section 8000. **Changes made.**

Commenter: Shane Patrick, Siloam Springs School District (12/30/19)

Comment (1): First is the requirement to make all exterior first floor windows be installed with either bullet/shatter resistant film or glass. There is no direction that specifically describes what the word "resistant" means. What caliber bullet is it resistant to? How many bullets is it should it resist before failure? Another concern is the cost of this requirement. These types of windows or window films are very expensive. This could lead to districts being forced to choose not install as many or no windows on the first floor at all of any new facility based on the expense. This would be in direct conflict with best educational environments, as natural lighting is most beneficial for students.

Division Response: Comment considered. This is not a requirement (standard). It is a guideline (recommendation) and therefore not required. Standards are on the left side and Guidelines are on the right side. **No changes made.**

Comment (2): The fact that all interior/exterior door windows being required to be bullet/impact resistant is another concern. As with the number 1, the question remains, what is "resistant"? The cost of such windows will again drive the cost of doors to the point that it would be too expensive to have doors with windows.

Division Response: Comment considered. This standard has been revised to state: "Interior vision panels shall be reinforced." "Bullet and impact resistant" have been removed. **Changes made.**

Comment (3): The third concern is that the requirement of Interior hallways having retracting security gates with centralized closing and opening mechanisms. This could possibly lock an intruder in with students. Another concern is creating dead-end hallways that might eliminate necessary egress points.

Division Response: Comment considered. This is not a requirement (standard). It is a guideline (recommendation) and therefore not required. Standards are on the left side and Guidelines are on the right side. **No changes made.**

Comment (4): The fourth concern is the fact that having to be designed to serve as a secondary means of egress. Does this mean that fire escape ladders are required for second floor windows? This also creates a potential problem for securing a building. If windows can be opened to get out then they also can provide an access into a building.

Division Response: Comment considered. This is not a requirement (standard). It is a guideline (recommendation) and therefore not required. Standards are on the left side and Guidelines are on the right side. **No changes made.**

Commenter: Tripp Walter (12/23/19)

Comment (1): If these standards and recommendations become a part of the Facility Manual, then they will certainly require school districts to expend additional sums to complete their new construction and renovation projects (Including Partnership Projects). If no additional funds are appropriated for districts to come into compliance with the standards, these requirements would become unfunded mandates.

Division Response: Only the Standards would be required (left side). The recommendations (guidelines on the right side) are not required. After receiving feedback from all stakeholders, proposed changes have been made to take into account costs to districts. **Changes made.**

Comment (2): Under what authority are these additions to the Facility Manual being made? It appears that at least some, if not most, of the standards and recommendations may fall outside of the scope of Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-809.

Division Response: See e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-114. Also, the Governor's School Safety Commission recommended that the Division provide specific safety and security measures in the Facility Manual.

Commenter: David Kellogg, Prairie Grove School District (11/8/19)

Comment (1): Several of the proposed are expensive and some such as the security fencing and gates at the perimeter would need extensive monitoring and require additional personnel.

Division Response: Comment considered. This requirement has been modified to "[p]rovide fencing around playground areas." No additional personnel required for revised requirement. **Changes made.**

Comment (2): Several of the proposed items need additional details to determine what would be required to fully implement.

Division Response: Comment considered. A more specific question would allow the Division to adequately address this comment. Language based upon changes already made appears to provide more clarity. **Changes made.**

Commenter: Gail Shephard, Hight Jackson (12/30/2019)

Comment (1): For a State wide initiative such as this has an outside professional that is recognized as an expert in the field of school safety, or government program that has been developed with the help of such a professional, been utilized?

Division Response: Comment considered. The Division extended the public comment period to 12/31/19 and have actively sought input from AAEE, AIA, and architects on the Academic Facilities Advisory Committee, as well as the Chair of the Governor's Safety Commission. Public comments received were incorporated into a revised version of Section 8000. **No changes made.**

Comment (2): Michael Dorn has an extensive library, he has authored, of books, videos, articles, research papers, and presentations on school safety. Many of those can be accessed through this link, or under the "resources" tab [note: no link provided].

Division Response: Comment considered. The Division understands facility measures are one part of the safety/security protocols districts should use. The Division extended the public comment period to 12/31/19 and have actively sought input from AAEE, AIA, and architects on the Academic Facilities Advisory Committee, as well as the Chair of the Governor's Safety Commission. Public comments received were incorporated into a revised version of Section 8000. **No changes made.**

Comment (3): Interior doors shall allow one-handled egress from the interior and shall not be reached from any vision panel. Having visual connection adjacent to the door is important for regular daily monitoring of classrooms. The lack of visual connection can create daily opportunities for bullying to increase behind closed doors by either administration or other students. Knowing you can be seen is a way to control negative situations.

Division Response: Comment considered. This requirement has been removed and replaced with "[i]nterior vision panels shall be reinforced." **Changes made**

Comment (4): Making windows ballistic takes away an egress point opportunity for the people within. Makes it difficult for law enforcement to gain entry to provide protection to the students and staff. If the control of the room is flipped and the shooter takes over the room it creates a protected kill zone that gives advantage to the shooter. If this stays a requirement, there are

various levels of ballistic glasses, is there a minimum level proposed to be required. Will funding be increased for these additional costs?

Division Response: Comment considered. Bullet resistant glass or film is not a requirement but a guideline. **Changes made.**

Comment (5): Exterior doors are numbered on the outside and inside. There is concern this can create a negative situation as it could offer a potential threatening individual better understanding of the building layout and navigation of the interior areas from the outside. Emergency personnel could, instead, be issued a digital floor plan of a building, once the building has been built, to help them navigate, both inside and out, without giving clues of the layout of the interior spaces to a threatening individual on the outside of the building.

Division Response: Comment considered. If a district is concerned about this requirement, it may seek a variance. **No changes made.**

Comment (6): Exterior windows are numbered on the outside. There is concern this can create a negative situation as it could offer a potential threatening individual better understanding of the building layout and navigation of the interior areas from the outside. Emergency personnel could, instead, be issued a digital floor plan of a building, once the building has been built, to help them navigate, both inside and out, without giving clues of the layout of the interior spaces to a threatening individual on the outside of the building.

Division Response: Comment considered. If a district is concerned about this requirement, it may seek a variance. **No changes made.**

Comment (7): Intrusion detection system including panic buttons. An intrusion detection system is an additional system, not previously required, which the school districts will have to pay for. It could become a cost burden. On a separate note, we already serve a district that has installed this type of system in a number of their facilities. They have since disconnected all of those systems due to problems with the alarms going off multiple times a day. This is due to daily access needs by students and staff as well as students purposefully causing the alarms to trigger. In general, it is undesirable to have an alarm system that students can activate. For instance, instead of physical panic buttons in certain areas of the school, there are apps that teachers can access from their mobile devices that can trigger alarms. This type of system would less likely be subject to being set off for disruptive purposes instead of emergency situations.

Division Response: Comment considered. The requirement for an intrusion detection system, including panic buttons is no longer a requirement. **Changes made.**

Comment (8): Provide security fencing with gates at perimeter of school. The cost of a full perimeter fence could be a cost burden for a district. If a partial fence is installed the effectiveness is negated. If a full perimeter fence is in place will there be a requirement for a person to monitor the traffic through the gate areas? If there is no monitor at the gate locations where is the security measure? How does it justify the expense if anyone can still walk or drive through the gate?

Division Response: Comment considered. This requirement has been modified to “[p]rovide fencing around playground areas.” **Changes made.**

Comment (9): Building site structures as, or reshaping topography to become, barricades (or barriers) is an added cost to any new facility a school district is planning to build. Due to the materiality and technical requirements needed to design features to be effective barricades these items become expensive. This could become a cost burden to a school district.

Division Response: Comment considered. This has been modified/clarified to barriers to prevent vehicles from being driven into building entries, student gathering places (steps, curbs, etc.). **Changes made.**

Comment (10): Real-time surveillance system with recording capability at external access points and appropriate internal areas. For this standard to be effective a minimum level of pixels, or another measure of resolution, should be required to ensure the system installed will provide the desired results.

Division Response: Comment Considered. District personnel along with design professionals should determine the resolution required to achieve desired results. Locations required are main entry points, and other key exterior and interior areas. **No changes made.**

Comment (11): Air intakes at least 12 feet above ground or protected with security fencing/wall. There are times when air intakes at 12’-0” above ground or higher do not meet the needed requirements. At gymnasiums, as an example, that do not have an air conditioning system it is a requirement to have air intake louvers low on one side of the space and fans high on the other side for proper ventilation. A security wall may not be feasible or could become a cost burden

Division Response: Comment considered. This requirement has been removed. **Changes made.**

Comment (12): In general, it is undesirable to have an alarm system that students can learn to activate. In situations we know of where such systems have been put in place the alarms go off multiple times a day and are disruptive to the school day. Once they go off repeatedly their effectiveness is hindered. The systems we know of have been deactivated due to these reasons.

Division Response: Comment considered. This requirement has been removed. **Changes made.**

Comment (13): Operable exterior windows alarm when opened. In general, it is undesirable to have an alarm system that students can learn to activate. In situations we know of where such systems have been put in place the alarms go off multiple times a day and are disruptive to the school day. Once they go off repeatedly their effectiveness is hindered. The systems we know of have been deactivated due to these reasons

Division Response: Comment considered. This requirement has been removed. **Changes made.**

Commenter: Blakely Dunn, CADM Architecture (12/26/2019)

Comment (1): Interior vision panels shall be reinforced, bullet and impact resistant. Will not significantly improve safety if door, door frame, and wall are not similarly reinforced, bullet and impact resistant.

Division Response: Comment considered. Requirement has been modified to require only a reinforced vision panel. **Changes made.**

Comment (2): Exterior windows are lockable or sealed. Clarification may be needed, as “lockable” and “sealed” may be contradictory. “Lockable” seems to imply the windows are operable, whereas “sealed” seems to imply they are not. Sealed windows would not be able to serve as secondary means of egress as proposed under the Egress and Refuge guidelines.

Division Response: Comment considered. This requirement has been eliminated. Windows designed to be a secondary means of egress is a guideline. **Changes made.**

Comment (3): Secure entrance vestibule as only visitor point of entry. Level of security required should probably be defined using UL752 standards for bullet-resistant glazing and/or UL972 standards for attach and burglar-resistant glazing

Division Response: Comment considered. Districts in consultation with their design professionals should determine the appropriate level of bullet/burglar/impact resistance of the entry vestibule. **No changes made.**

Comment (4): Visitor management at main pint of entry. Clarification may be needed on what “visitor management” is intended to be. Is it a sign-in sheet or an electronic system that performs instantaneous background checks/searches on visitors?

Division Response: Comment considered. District needs to consult with security professionals or local law enforcement to determine the best system to meet their needs. **No changes made.**

Comment (5): Visibility from main office to main entry. Clarification may be needed on what “visibility” is intended to be...is it direct line-of-site or electronically -assisted (camera)?

Division Response: Comment considered. This requirement is to enable office personnel to observe persons requesting entry into the school facility. Direct line of sight or cameras are acceptable. **No changes made.**

Comment (6): Exterior door hardware is of touch-type and exterior handles are chain proof. Clarification may be needed on what “touch-type” is intended to be...is it eypad/electromagnetic or electric strike lock?

Division Response: Comment considered. Language changed to read “[e]xterior door hardware is of touch-type (i.e., Panic hardware that cannot be chained together - no crash bars allowed).” **Changes made.**

Comment (7): Exterior doors are numbered on the outside and inside. Minimum requirements should be established related to the height of the numerals, their visibility from a specific distance, degree of contrast with the door finish, etc.

Division Response: Comment considered. Districts and design professionals should determine the numbering system and physical characteristics of the numbers. **No changes made**

Comment (8): Exterior windows are numbered on the outside. Minimum requirements should be established related to the height of the numerals, their visibility from a specific distance, degree of contrast with the window finish/tint, etc.

Division Response: Comment considered. Districts and design professionals should determine the numbering system and physical characteristics of the numbers. **No changes made.**

Comment: (9) Intrusion detection system including panic buttons. Clarification may be needed on what “intrusion detection system: is intended to be...is it entry detection at exterior doors and windows, etc.?

Division Response: Comment considered. The requirement for intrusion detection system, including panic buttons, has been removed. **Changes made.**

Comment (10): Provide security fencing with gates at perimeter of school. Clarification may be needed on what “perimeter of school” is intended to be...enclosure around school buildings, or in the case of a campus, enclosure of the perimeter of the campus...including vehicle access points to the campus? The latter would present significant functional problems for the school during periods of high vehicular volume if true security is to be maintained, not to mention impact on adjacent public streets. Additional clarification would be needed on required fence height, material, access control methods, etc.

Division Response: Comment considered. Requirement has been modified to “[p]rovide fencing around playground areas.” **Changes made.**

Comment (11): Operable exterior windows alarm when open. Clarification may be needed as “operable” exterior windows seem contradictory to “sealed” windows referenced in Item 4 under “Requirements – Locking Systems and Hardware”.

Division Response: This requirement has been removed. Windows designed to be a secondary means of egress is a guideline. **Changes made.**

Comment (12) : Visitor Management system. Clarification may be needed on what “visitor management” is intended to be... is it a sign-in sheet or an electronic system that performs instantaneous background checks/searches on visitors?

Division Response: Comment considered. District needs to consult with security professionals or local law enforcement to determine the best system to meet their needs. **No changes made.**

Comment (13): Interior hallways have retracting security gates with centralized closing and opening mechanisms. If the intent is to allow the ability to compartmentalize or isolate sections of log corridor, the proposed guideline could create conflict with life safety requirement for egress and exit access. Compartments or isolated sections could require additional exterior exits, and consequently a new entry point into the building for an attacker. The fewer points of entry the better to increase security. Additionally, what happens if the security gates are activated when hallways are full of students? They could be trapped in an exposed condition to an attacker, particularly if the interior doors on lockdown in response to a threat.

Division Response: Comment considered. This is presented as optional guideline to afford districts choices on what security/safety procedures/items they feel is necessary. Districts should consult with local safety and security experts, as well as local code officials before deciding on security hardware. **No changes made.**

Comment (14): Bullet/shatter resistant film or glass on all exterior first floor windows. No film or combination of films applied to standard commercial windows will stop a bullet, and will not achieve a UL-rated resistance. Thick films applied to very thick heavy glass (1/2 to 1” in thickness) MAY stop a round from a small caliber handgun. Window films will not stop bullets. They can, however, hold the pieces of glass together once the glass has been shot, and though the bullets pass through and can cause damage, delaying or keeping the shooter from entering the building can dramatically reduce the number off casualties by giving occupants time to exit elsewhere or shelter and for responders to arrive.

Division Response: Comment considered. This is not a requirement, but a guideline. **No changes made.**

Comments (15): Building Systems: Hallway walls in student occupied areas are concrete block or other bullet/impact resistant material. Requiring hallway walls to be bullet/impact resistant will have limited benefit if elements within the walls are not similarly resistant, such as doors, windows, etc.

Division Response: Comment considered. Districts should consider all aspects of design with their design professionals to obtain the level of safety/security the district deems necessary. Bullet resistant is not a requirement. **No changes made.**

Comment: (16): Windows are designed to serve as secondary means of egress. Clarification may be needed, as an operable window seems contradictory to a “sealed” window referenced in Item 4 under “Requirements – Locking Systems and Hardware”

Division Response: Comment considered. The requirement of sealed or locked windows was removed. **Changes made.**